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Preface
MonIsMs and pluralIsMs In the hIstory 
of polItIcal and socIal Models
Sara Lagi and Andrea Catanzaro
1. startIng froM the begInnIng: 
IsaIah berlIn’s concept of MonIsM and pluralIsM
In our first book on “Monisms and Pluralisms in the History of  Political 
Thought” (Catanzaro-Lagi: 2016) we aimed at problematizing the  con-
cepts of  monism and pluralism through the perspective of  the History of  
Political thought, while being conscious of  how deeply they penetrated 
into our language. By discussing a series of  political theories with a focus 
on historical context we tried to show the existence of  “diversified mo-
nisms” and “diversified pluralisms”. In other terms, we sought to prove 
how  monism and pluralism (as a term and as a concept) entail a variety of  
political-philosophical implications and therefore how difficult an overgen-
eralized definition of  both can be. The present book starts exactly from this 
observation with the objective to further develop it through some (for us 
interesting) examples of  political and social models. Just because we want 
again to critically reflect on the political meaning(s) of  monism and plural-
ism it is relevant for us to re-focus on the thinker who contributed the most 
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to elaborate the philosophical and political contraposition between the two 
concepts: Isaiah Berlin.
In 1958 the already internationally recognized scholar Isaiah Berlin (1909-
1997) was invited to deliver an inaugural lecture (Prolusion) at Oxford Univer-
sity after accepting one year earlier the Chair of  Social and Political Thought 
in the same University. The title of  his lecture – which was published in 1969 
as an autonomous writing (Berlin: 1969)1 – was Two Concepts of  Liberty and very 
soon it became a major topic for discussion within the international intellectu-
al environment because it delineated the problem of  liberty through the lens 
of  two – in Berlin’s mind – distinct concepts: monism and pluralism.2
On the one hand, Berlin tended to identify a positive liberty and a negative 
kind of  liberty and on the other, he conceptually related the first to monism 
and the latter to pluralism. More precisely, positive liberty was involved in the 
answer to the question: 
what or who is the source of  control or interference that can determine someone to do, 
or be, this rather than that?” whereas the negative liberty was involved in the answer 
to the question: what is the area within which the subject […] is or should be left to do 
or be he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons? (Berlin 1969: 122).
From these questions, Berlin elaborated a reflection in terms of  the History 
of  ideas3 leading him to conceptually relate positive liberty to the principle of  
“self-determination” and negative liberty to that of  “being free from external 
interference” (Berlin 1969: 123). 
If  negative liberty classically implied for Berlin the right for individuals 
to enjoy a sphere of  private liberty which no one and nothing could limit 
or abuse, positive liberty was identified by him with the concept of  “gov-
erning oneself ”, i.e. “self-determination”(Berlin 1969: 122 ss). In other 
words, in Berlin’s view, negative liberty posed the problem (philosophical 
and political) of  the limits of  power, whereas positive liberty shifted the fo-
1 We are referring to one of  the most popular Berlin’s work entitled Four Essays on Liberty.
2 This first section of  our Introduction is based in part on a series of  reflections developed in 
(Lagi 2016: 139-153). We used the online version of  Berlin’s work, dating back to 1969, which 
is now available online at http://spot.colorado.edu. 
3 At Oxford Berlin had initially contacts with logical positivists such as Ayer who left a consi-
derable impression on him, chiefly as far logical positivists’ critique against methaphisical thou-
ght and particularly against Hegel was concerned. But soon, Berlin took distance from them 
to embrace a new kind of  study, which was considered quite marginal within the Oxonien 
environment, i.e. the History of  Ideas. It is likely that he approached this new kind of  study 
through the philosopher R. G. Collingwood, whose classes Berlin attended during the Trinity 
Term in 1931 and who was the only scholar at that time to openly recall to the History of  Ideas 
(Ignatieff  1998: 56)
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cus on the source of  power and the problem of  legitimising it in terms of  
“self-determination” (human and political). More precisely, Berlin thought 
that, within the History of  Ideas, the concept of  “governing oneself ” had 
been gradually assimilated to that of  “rational self-determination” which 
fundamentally contained, in his opinion, another kind of  conceptual iden-
tification of  huge relevance, i.e. the idea that “the only true method of  
attaining freedom […] is by the use of  critical reason, the understanding of  
what is necessary and what is contingent” (Berlin 1969: 144). For Berlin, 
the ideal, ethical and political consequences of  applying this concept pf  
liberty to human reality could (and, in his opinion, it have actually been) 
immense:
For, If  I am rational, I cannot deny that what is right for me must, for the same reason,  
be right for others who are rational like me. A rational (or free) state would be a state 
governed by such laws as all rational men would freely accept; that is to say, such laws 
as they would themselves have enacted had they been asked what, as rational beings, 
they demanded; hence the frontiers would be such as all rational men would consider to 
be the right frontiers for rational beings (Berlin 1969: 145).
From this perspective, which connected “being free” with “being rational” 
and which, according to Berlin, characterized in depth the so-called positive 
liberty, once found out the  rational and therefore correct way of  being free 
and living free, the path to a full “self-determination” was reached:
All truths could be discovered by any rational principles and demonstrated so clearly 
that all other rational men could not but accept them; […] On this assumption, the 
problem of  political liberty was soluble by establishing a just order that would give to 
each man all freedom to which a rational being was entitled (Berlin 1969: 145).
This kind of  view, underpinning the positive concept of  liberty, posed a 
chief  problem (philosophical and political) for Berlin. Once identified – he 
observed – the (supposed) true and correct form of  carrying out the princi-
ple of  “self-determination”, i.e. the “just order” to make it real, what would 
happen to all those who could disagree just with that “order” and its repre-
sentatives? Their disagree and their “being recalcitrant” would not be simply 
considered as an expression of  their individual opinions and beliefs but as 
something more dangerous and potentially destructive, as the refusal of  a 
system which was rational and therefore the only one capable of  making 
people truly free; they would become a serious threat to a state of  things 
considered intrinsically and objectively just, because of  its rationality (Berlin 
1969: 145-146):
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Freedom is self-mastery, the elimination of  obstacles to my will, whatever these obstacles 
may be […] But how am I to treat recalcitrant human beings? I must, if  I can, impose, 
my will on them too; “mould” them to my patterns. […] Will this not mean that I am 
free and I alone am free, while they are slaves? They will be so if  my plan had nothing 
to do with their wishes […] but if  my plan is fully rational, it will allow the full the 
full development of  their “true” natures, the realisation of  their capacities for rational 
decisions (Berlin: 146).   
It is clear how in Berlin’s view the positive concept of  liberty, if  carried out, would 
lead to the aftermath of  political systems in which paradoxically someone could 
be “forced” even with the use of  violence to be “free” in the name of  a plan, an 
ideology, or a revolutionary thought supposed to be rational and just. Following 
Berlin’s reasoning, once found the (rational) solution to the problem of  how to 
achieve “self-determination”, all those principles, values, plans or simply opin-
ions diverging and conflicting with it had to be eliminated (Berlin 1969: 146 ss). 
What Berlin stressed a lot in this part of  his Prolusion was just the fact that 
the concept of  positive liberty – differently from that of  negative liberty – im-
plied the idea – not to say certainty – that objectively true (since rational) and 
therefore objectively valid solutions to human, ethical and political problems 
and questions, including that about how to fully “govern oneself ” –  could be 
attained. He defined this kind of  forma mentis  “monism” as opposed to that of  
“pluralism” (Berlin 1969: 167 ss).
In other words, in Berlin’s view, positive and negative liberty were under-
pinned by two particular visions, Weltanschauungen – respectively – monism and 
pluralism. From his Prolusion of  1958 on, both monism and pluralism have 
been often associated with his person and intellectual work. Whereas plural-
ism – according to Berlin – was that kind of  philosophical, ethical, political 
vision recognizing the complexity (and plurality) of  life in terms of  values, 
goals, ideas, aspirations, monism – as we have already stressed – referred to the 
opposite concept, resulting in a vision which seemed to reduce human life in 
all its aspects to a single model, a single idea or principle (theoretical, political, 
ethical), supposed to be the quintessential of  truth (Berlin 1969: 167-172).
On the basis of  our previous observations, the ideal connection between 
pluralism and negative liberty on the one hand and monism and positive liber-
ty on the other clearly takes shape. Negative liberty meant to Berlin “being free 
form interference” and this implied – in his perspective – the recognition of  
the individual as bearer of  a sphere of  liberty and fundamental rights within 
which one can decide to pursue specific goals, embrace values, support ideas 
and principles suited to one’s own way of  life, within which one has to deal 
with different values and ends, all of  ultimate relevance: 
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The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with 
choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realisation of  
some of  which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of  others. Indeed, it is because this 
their situation that men place such immense value upon the freedom to choose; for if  they 
had assurance that in some perfect state, realisable by men on earth, no end pursued by 
them would ever be in conflict, the necessity and agony of  choice would disappear, and 
with it the central importance of  the freedom to choose” (Berlin 1969: 168).
As we can assume from the aforementioned quote, the concept of  negative 
liberty contains, according to Berlin, a pluralist Weltanschauung recognizing “in-
dividual freedom” and “freedom of  choice” because accepting the existence 
of  more than one single end, more than one single value, more than one single 
specific – and supposed as universally valid – idea of  how the world works or 
how it should work. Instead, the recognition of  the extreme complexity and 
plurality of  reality (human, philosophical, ethical, political) is exactly what – in 
Berlin’s opinion – lacks to monism (Berlin 1969: 168 ss). 
As previously stated, Berlin thought that positive liberty – with its princi-
ple of  liberty as “self-determination” – inevitably led to assimilating the con-
cept of  liberty with that of  power and therefore potentially legitimising any 
form of  coercion and abuse – of  that individual sphere of  liberty otherwise 
characterizing the concept of  negative liberty and pluralism – in the name 
of  “self-determination”. Once a Leader, a Party or any Institution claimed 
to be able to carry out on earth a perfect condition of  “self  determination” 
for everyone, liberty and submission, according to Berlin’s reasoning, came 
paradoxically to coincide and this was nothing but a perverse form of  slavery 
(Berlin 1969: 152-154). To this, he opposed pluralism and therefore the con-
cept of  negative liberty:
Pluralism, with the measure of  “negative” liberty that it entails seems to me a truer and 
more humane ideal than the goals of  those who seek in the great disciplined, authorita-
rian structures the ideal of  “positive” self-mastery but classes, or peoples, or the whole 
of  mankind. It is truer, because it does, at least, recognise the fact that human goals are 
many, not all of  them commensurable, and in perpetual rivarly with one another. […] 
It is more humane because it does not (as the system-builders do) deprive men, in the 
name of  some remote, or incoherent, ideal, of  much that they have found to be indispen-
sable to their life as unpredictably self-transforming human beings (Berlin 1969: 171).
There is an extensive academic literature – chiefly of  philosophical conno-
tation – on Berlin’s idea of  monism and pluralism, on the interconnection 
between monism-positive liberty and pluralism-negative liberty and chiefly on 
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value-pluralism.4 Prominent scholars, such as Peter Gray and George Crowder, 
have for a long time reflected, for example, on the interplay in Berlin’s work 
between liberalism and value pluralism.5 
From the perspective of  the History of  Political Thought, Berlin’s dichoto-
my between monism and pluralism reflected in part the particular way he had 
internalized and interpreted, in terms of  the History of  Ideas, a century-long 
tradition of  philosophical and political thought. Spinoza, Kant, Rousseau, 
Schelling and Fichte represented to him – among many other thinkers – some 
of  the founding and spiritual fathers of  the concept of  monism and positive 
liberty, whereas Constant, Mill, Tocqueville, Burke (and many other) those 
of  pluralism and negative liberty.6 Kant had been the first to make a basic 
distinction – for Berlin one of  the turning points in the History of  Ideas – be-
tween “True and False Myself ” i.e. between “Rational and Irrational Myself ”, 
resulting in a particular way of  conceptualizing liberty as the “ability of  True 
Myself ” to govern over the “False Myself ” (Berlin 1969: 148-152). Some years 
earlier than Kant, Rousseau had already developed the political theory of  the 
Contract Social in which “political body” could “not hurt” or coerce anyone 
because it  was “built on the equality of  sacrifice of  all its members” (Berlin 
1969: 148). For Berlin, both Kant and Rousseau shared one basic assumption, 
that “the rational ends of  our true natures must coincide, or be made coincide, 
however violently or poor, […] [because] freedom is not freedom to do what 
is irrational, or stupid, or wrong” (Berlin 1969: 148). A kind of  assumption 
which was, for Berlin, fully and coherently monist.
The two philosophers of  the Enlightenment were not the only to have con-
tributed with their work to the shaping of  a certain monist way of  thinking lib-
erty. During the Romantic age, according to Berlin, another major turning point 
took place: the “True Myself ”, especially (although not only) through thinkers 
such as Schelling and Fichte, came to be conceptually identified with the “cre-
ative Will” of  the Subject, capable of  creating, transforming, changing life (and 
human beings’ life) at any cost (Berlin 1969: 148-152); this subject could be an 
individual, a Party, a political regime but the result, for Berlin, was inevitably that: 
4 Just to give some bibliographical references: (Baum-Nichols: 2013), (Crowder: 2004), (Crow-
der-Hardy: 2006), (Cherniss: 2013), (Dubnov: 2012), (Galstone: 2002), (Gray: 2013), (Galipeau: 
1994), (Ignatieff: 1998),(Jahanbegloo: 1992), (Kelley: 1986), (Lukes: 1994), (Hausheer: 1979), 
(Ricciardi: 2011). In Berlin’s intellectual trajectory, the Prolusion of  1958 was a relevant turning 
point because from then on he devoted more and more attention to the problem of  pluralism 
and value pluralism. See (Gray: 2013). 
5 (Crowder: 2002); (Crowder: 2004); (Gray: 2013). A very good bibliography of  the works pu-
blished in support and against  Berlin’s  dichotomy between positive and negative liberty is 
included in (Harris: 2004).
6 Textual references to these thinkers are disseminated throughout his Prolusion. In particular 
see: (Berlin 1969: 152 ss; 160-166).
Preface 17
humanity is the raw material upon which I impose my creative will; even though men 
suffer and die in the process, they are lifted to the height to which thy could never have 
risen without my coercive – but creative – violation of  their lives. This is the argument 
used by every dictator (Berlin 1969: 148).
The concept of  Creative Will and that of  “the rational govern of  oneself ” con-
tained – according to Berlin’s analysis – a strongly monist vision. On the oppo-
site side of  the barricade, Berlin mentioned thinkers such as Constant,7 Mill, 
Tocqueville, the representatives of  the 19th Liberal tradition, whose main merit, 
in his opinion, had been to realize that being free was not only and could not be 
univocally identified with the problem of  finding and carrying out an allegedly 
“just (and rational) order” (Berlin 1969: 163-165). In other terms, for Berlin, 
Liberal thinkers had realized that any political system (even a democratic one) 
could hurt its citizens (for example through the “tyranny of  majority”), unless 
two important conditions were granted: no power can be considered absolute – 
which meant also, according to Berlin, that no political principle was so noble 
and high to justify violence, abuses and oppression –  and there is a sphere of  
personal freedom which should be considered as intangible; a sphere made up by 
rights, principles and rules which should never “be broken” (Berlin 1969: 163 ss).
it is such rules as these that are broken when a man is declared guilty without a trial, or 
punished under a retroactive law; when children are ordered to denounce their parents, 
[…] when men are tortured or murdered, or minorities massacred […] Such acts, even 
if  they are made legal by the sovereign cause horror even in these days; and this springs 
from the moral recognition of  the moral validity of  some absolute barriers […] The 
freedom of  society […], in this sense of  freedom, is measured by the strength of  these 
barriers (Berlin: 166).
In these pages, Berlin delineated the contrast between positive liberty-mo-
nism, on the one hand, and negative liberty-pluralism in a very strong and 
vivid way. Each of  the two, as we have tried to highlight, seemed to reflect 
two – in Berlin’s mind – different lines of  thought and two different visions 
of  the world. At the same time, we can comprehend how Berlin’s  dichotomy 
between negative and positive liberty as well as that between pluralism and 
monism were in debt towards part of  Liberal tradition.8 
It is likewise clear how Berlin’s vision and critique of  monism and his defi-
nition of  positive liberty had also a strong reference to the particular historical 
and political background, in which he lived. Berlin had experienced, although 
7 Berlin’s positive and negative liberty seemed to rechoe Constant’s liberty of  ancients and mo-
derns. See (Cherniss: 2013).
8 For a complete analysis of  Liberalism in the History of   Political Thought see: (Bedeschi: 2015).
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not in first person, the totalitarian age and after the end of  the second world 
war he saw the international system redesigned according two big areas of  
influence: the Western and Eastern “camp”.9 
Part of  scholarly literature flourished around Berlin’s works (chiefly around 
those published during the late 40s and the Prolusion of  1958), such as Gener-
alissimo Stalin and the Art of  Government (1952), The Hedgehog and the Fox (1953) 
and Historical Inevitability (1954), has stressed the profound influence exercised 
by the Cold war political and ideological dynamics on Berlin’s political philos-
ophy. More precisely, Terry Hardin situated Berlin within the so-called Cold 
War Liberalism. By this term, Hardin identified first of  all “a frame of  mind”, 
in which there was “no room for the theory of  history or foundational truths 
adavanced by ideological cold warriors like Samuel Hungtington or Francis 
Fukuyama. It was epistemological skeptical, pluralist, and committed to a ver-
sion of  constitutional government that could ensure not only negative free-
dom but also provide some kind of  social minimum, which its proponents 
saw as a condition for a stable civil association” (Hardin 2015: 1). 
The same interpretation is shared by Ian Werner Mueller who observed 
in a recently published article how “Berlin, Aron and Popper all considered 
themselves engaged in an anti-Marxist war of  ideas. Even when they spoke 
out against totalitarianism it was clear that Stalinism had been the critical tem-
plate for their models of  totalitarianism”(Mueller 2009?: 45?).
When Berlin condemned in the aforementioned passage the “system-build-
ers” depriving men in the name of  some remote ideal” and sacrificing hu-
man being to “the Altar of  Ideals”, he seemed to think about all totalitarian 
regimes, but specifically those of  Communist inspiration, which he strongly 
opposed for all his life.10 
If  we relate in terms of  the History of  Political Thought Berlin’s defini-
tion of  pluralism and monism to the Twentieth century historical and political 
context we can grasp two relevant elements: first, his reflection on monism 
became in Two Concepts of  Liberty (and not only)11 a way to critically confront 
9 See in particular: (O’Sullivan: 1999).
10 Berlin was a proudly anti-Soviet and anti-Stalinist for all his life. This is not also testified by his 
diplomatic activity on behalf  of  the  British Diplomatic Service in Washington and New York, 
where he met prominent political and intellectual figures such John Schlesinger, George Ken-
nan, Max Ascoli, Hamilton Fish Armstrong and many others, all sharing the same anti-Soviet 
attitude. It is instead to stress that in Berlin’s work his anti-Soviet position never coincided with 
Russophobia. He was in fact a great admirer of  the century-long Russian cultural tradition. He 
himself  was born in Riga in 1909 and the very first language he learned before moving with his 
parents to England was Russian. Also, it is not to forget that one of  his “points of  references” 
and most beloved artists was the Russian Alexander Herzen, the father of  Russian populism, 
whose thought would have been extremely influential – as Berlin himself  stated – in the shaping 
of  his idea of  pluralism in opposition to monism. See: (Kelley 1986).     
11 The other major work in which he delineats the intellectual roots of  monism as the ideological 
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the ultimate philosophical, ethical and political sense of  totalitarianism as the 
incarnation and aftermath of  a monist vision in its most tragic consequences; 
second, by defining pluralism in contrast to monism Berlin seemed to connect 
all together complexity of  reality, plurality of  values and ends, freedom to 
chose and negative liberty. In other words, in his celebrated Prolusion of  1958 
monism ended up acquiring a negative (philosophical, ethical  and political) 
connotation whereas pluralism a positive one. 
The present work is a collection of  thirteen essays whose authors, despite 
the diversity of  historical periods and political thinkers that they have taken 
into consideration, started all from bearing in mind Berlin’s popular definition 
of  monism and pluralism, with the objective to understand in what sense and 
whether – from the perspective of  the History of  Social and Political models 
– these two concepts entail a more articulated and varied range of  meanings 
and implications.  
2. beyond IsaIah berlIn: MonIsMs and pluralIsMs 
In the hIstory of polItIcal and socIal Models
The starting point of  our work on Monisms and Pluralisms in the History of  Polit-
ical and Social Models is exactly Isaiah Berlin’s reflection on the meaning of  mo-
nism and pluralism, previously outlined in relation to the concept of  negative 
and positive liberty, but our objective – as stated previously – was basically to 
try problematizing it. An attempt which is based on the consciousness that 
Berlin’s definition of  monism and pluralism reflected, as we sought to show, 
his particular philosophical and political sensitivity of  liberal connotation and 
his personal way of  interpreting (and confronting) the totalitarian experience. 
First of  all, like in our first work on monisms and pluralisms in the history 
of  political thought, we were deeply steadfast in not approaching the topic of  
our work from a mere theoretical perspective but from the historical one: it 
was easy enough to think of  relating it to the idea of  political and social mod-
heart of  totalitarianism was Historical Inevitabiltity (1954). Here, Berlin discusses about deter-
minist philosophies, identifying differet typologies but all sharing, in his opnion, the common 
convinction that reality (in social, political, economic or moral terms) can be explained trough 
a single, universally valid principle or Law which allow us to  understand how reality works and 
towards where it is going, which allow us to make predictions and realize what our place in the 
world is. According to Berlin, most of  determinst conceptions as they had taken shape throu-
ghout the History of  Ideas, could be seen in part as strongly influenced by a certain part of  the 
Enlightenment and Rationalist tradition of  thought (Berlin 1954: 19-25).
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els as it was sketched out by Salvo Mastellone (Mastellone: 1983; 1993; 2011) 
and developed by scholars coming from different Italian Universities (Carini: 
1990; Comparato: 1989; 1993; Campos Boralevi-Quaglioni: 2002): i.e. the idea 
that over centuries specific political and social systems were considered as 
“examples” to follow, from which drawing inspiration, in order to reform and 
improve one’s social and political reality or –  instead – how new social and 
political systems were imagined and thus proposed as models, in other words 
as “examples”, to be carried out, often in frontal opposition to an existing 
reality considered as negative, unjust. 
In this collection of  essays, the authors have addressed different thinkers 
confronting the problem of  social and political models in the History of  Po-
litical thought and each of  these models has been investigated in relation to 
the problem of  monism and pluralism. Consequently, it becomes necessary 
for us to introduce how in this work we approached Berlin’s celebrated and 
popular dichotomy. 
Generally speaking, monism and pluralism as terms and concepts can not 
be confined within Berlin’s work and thought: both have been and continue to 
be discussed and debated in Sociology, Political Science, Law not to talk about 
Philosophy, although in each of  these disciplines monism and pluralism have 
acquired particular implications and posed likewise particular intellectual chal-
lenges which seem, in many aspects, to diverge from those delineated by Berlin.
In the realm of  Sociology, for example, pluralism is used to explain and 
define the relationships among smaller groups preserving their own cultural 
identities within a larger societal context (Hannerz: 1998). Also, there is an 
extensive number of  sociological studies focused on religious pluralism which 
seems to characterize liberal democracies and the challenge which it is posing 
to the traditional way of  conceiving the relationship between authority and re-
ligion, on the one hand, and individual consciousness and religion on the oth-
er. In Italy, the sociologist Luca Diotallevi, for example, has in fact devoted his 
attention in a series of  writings to what he thinks is the changing relationship 
in the current Italian and European society among religious pluralism, moder-
nity and secularization (Diotallevi: 2015; Pace-Giordan: 2014). While remain-
ing within the realm of  Sociology, we could conversely mention the so-called 
“sociological monism” which was, for example, theorized and supported by 
the sociologist, anthropologist and historian of  religions Emile Durkheim, 
according to whom the relationships between individuals and society had to 
be conceived as those existing between man and God, i.e. between man and a 
monist superior entity. More precisely, in Durkheim’s monist perspective, indi-
viduals received their values and behavioural codes, while internalizing them, 
from one and only the State, defined as the “politically and legally organized 
Nation” (Perelman 2005: 267-268).
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In the case of  Political Science, the concept of  pluralism acquires even a 
different meaning:  British Twentieth century political scientists such as, for 
example, Frederic Maitland and Harold Laski, stated that in liberal and dem-
ocratic systems power should be dispersed among different groups, i.e. a plu-
rality of  organizations, groups, communities, with the purpose to combat the 
concentration of  power into the hands of  a single elite (Pasquino 2009).12
At the same time, in legal terms, we can observe that pluralism is some-
times related to the idea that within a territory marked by national boundaries 
there might be “more than one or legal system”. More precisely, this kind 
of  concept has represented a major topic of  discussion for those scholars 
involved in analysing, for example, the complex relationship within colonized 
countries between indigenous legal orders and the “plurality of  legal orders” 
introduced by European colonizers (Davis: 2012; Merry 1988: 869-879). 
Moving to Philosophy, the term monism was used for the first time by 
the German Jusnaturalistic Philosopher Christian Wolff  (1679-1754) who re-
ferred to a metaphisical vision bringing back all beings to a unique material 
or spiritual principle: pluralism, in his view, indicated exactly the opposite.13 
According, instead, to Raimon Panikkar, who has devoted his life to studying 
the problems of  multiculturalism and inter-religious dialogue, in the present 
world pluralism has further changed – from a philosophical perspective – into 
“the true question about the human co-existence on the earth”. In this sense, 
he thinks that nowadays the concept of  pluralism is characterized by a strong 
“existential” implication (Panikkar 1995: 33-43).   
Being conscious of  the plurality of  meanings and connotations which mo-
nism and pluralism have taken on, according to the areas of  studies taken into 
account, now we want to focus on the aspects of  Berlin’s dichotomy between 
monism and pluralism which have pushed us to pose ourselves a series of  
questions. We wondered whether and to what extent Berlin’s way of  defining 
monism (in negative terms) and pluralism (in positive terms) could fit into the 
History of  Political Thought and more precisely into the History of  Political 
and Social Models: in other words, monism and pluralism, as they were con-
ceptualized by Berlin in the late 50s and therefore during the Cold War, can be 
considered a good key of  interpretation to be employed within the realm of  
the History of  Political and Social Models? And, in relation to these questions, 
we posed further ones: in the History of  Political and Social Models, does 
monism mean one and only a view of  reality trying to find one, final univer-
sally valid model or theory which, politically speaking, ends up signifying the 
12 See also: the voice: “pluralism” in Encyclopedia Britannica available at www.britannica.com
13 Berlin’s definition of  monism and pluralism itself  has an undoubted philosophical connota-
tion in the sense that – as we can read in in Two Concepts of  Liberty – both concepts seem to refer in 
first instance to a certain way of  conceiving and perceiving reality.
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triumph of  despotic and intolerant ideologies and regimes? Does pluralism 
mean one and only a view of  reality recognizing plurality of  ends and values 
and therefore that freedom of  choice which, in Berlin’s view, should charac-
terize a truly liberal, evolved and tolerant kind of  society and political systems? 
Don’t we risk – if  we confine ourselves to taking into account Berlin’s defini-
tion – to loose part of  the complexity of  both concepts? 
At the same time, like in our first book Monisms and Pluralisms in the History 
of  Political Thought we wanted to avoid transforming our work in an exercise of  
mere “erudition”. If, in fact, we move to present reality, we will notice how the 
words and concepts of  monism and pluralism have powerfully consolidated 
over time, penetrating into our language through mass media, scholarly works, 
magazines etc. This collection of  essays is indeed based on the consciousness 
of  how important and relevant both terms and concepts are in the complex 
historical and political contexts in which we are living. While being aware of  
this and of   the diversity of  meanings and implications that monism and plu-
ralism have in relation to the particular intellectual perspective used to analyse 
and discuss them, we wanted to give a personal contribution from our schol-
arly perspective to the ongoing discussion about these two concepts. In this 
sense, we sought to reflect on monism and pluralism focusing on their “con-
crete” dimension, i.e. in relation to specific historical and political problems, 
figures and projects and more precisely through the lens of  the History of  
Political and Social models. 
In other terms, in order to address the aforementioned questions, we did 
a precise and conscious methodological choice, i.e. we moved from a strictly 
theoretical level of  analysis to the historical one where the concept of   mo-
nism and pluralism become worth analysing from the perspective of  the His-
tory of  Political and Social models because of  their impact on people and their 
life (social, political, moral). More precisely, the essays here collected delineate 
different social and political models – from the Antiquity to the 21st century 
– belonging to different historical frameworks, reflecting different political, 
social and philosophical views, responding to different, concrete problems 
and even to times of  profound political and moral crisis. 
Generally speaking, the essays can be divided into two main “groups” or 
“directions”: 1. those posing the problem of  the relationship between the 
rulers and the ruled people in terms of  internal safety (social and political); 
2. those posing the same problem in terms of  freedom,  although – as we 
can see – interesting lines of  interconnections between the two groups do 
exist and are inevitable. It is not indeed our intention to cut the essays in two 
radically divergent groups; rather, we simply want to focus on what we think 
are the basic thematic lines characterizing them. On the basis of  our research, 
we can also notice how the issue of  internal safety tends to characterize those 
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social and political models having a substantially monist-oriented connota-
tion whereas freedom tends to characterize those social and political models 
showing a substantially pluralist-oriented connotation. In this sense, chiefly 
the connection between pluralism and freedom might echoe popular Berlin’s 
definition of  pluralism.
On the opposite, we think that this connection – although intriguing – is 
not so much consistent and that the analysis developed by the authors of  
the book allows to grasp how more nuanced the concepts of  monism and 
pluralism become when related to the concrete historical dimension. With his 
definition establishing a direct relation between pluralism and negative liberty, 
Berlin defended the primacy of  a liberal idea of  freedom and he opposed 
it, during the 50s and the Cold war age, to totalitarian ideologies and more 
precisely to a precise and well-defined political and social system, i.e. Soviet 
Russia.
In our work, the connection between freedom and pluralism situates – in-
stead – within political theories and more precisely political and social models 
which, in most cases, are far form being labelled as traditionally liberal and yet 
all defending and promoting the idea of  social, political and value pluralism. 
Moreover, if  it is true, according to the analysis developed in this work, that 
those theories addressing the problem of  internal safety are characterized by 
a monist component, this does not necessary imply that they aim at rejecting 
any form of  freedom or even destroying human dignity. 
The interrelation between monism and despotic thought is true, for ex-
ample, only for very few political thinkers and socio-political models here 
portrayed. In this sense, through our work, we sought to show two elements 
particularly relevant to us, because, in our opinion, capable of  problematizing 
Berlin’s definition of  monism and pluralism: the “taken-for-granted” Berlin’s 
dichotomy between pluralism as that philosophical, political, moral, view con-
sidered intrinsically positive, good, acceptable and noble on the one hand, and 
monism considered as that philosophical, political and moral, view intrinsical-
ly negative and dangerous, on the other hand, emerges from the essays here 
collected as extremely more nuanced, articulated and therefore less clear-cut. 
This does not depend only on the diversity of  thinkers and the political and 
social visions taken into consideration, but also on the fact we moved within 
the historical dimension, because in each of  the essay collected, the differ-
ent political and social designs, theories, models and proposals discussed have 
been related to challenges, problems, inquiries and crisis historically defined 
and determined.
By reading the essays here collected, covering a wide range of  authors and 
socio-political models: from Plutarch to Jacques Basnage, from David Mitrany 
to Francis Wright, from Aldo Capitini to Noam Chomsky, passing through 
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Ernest Duvergier de Hauranne, Luigi Sturzo and many others – all analysed 
and discussed with a focus to the historical and concrete dimension of  their 
political reflections and proposals – we can notice how Berlin’s definition of  
monism and pluralism show several limits. As previously observed, in many 
of  the social and political models here proposed the concept of  monism, i.e. 
the need of  finding a theory, a model, a principle capable of  explaining and 
positively reforming politics and society, seems in fact not be in total and 
open conflict with the value of  liberty in the broadest sense of  term. At the 
same time, in some of  the intellectual figures delineated by the authors of  the 
essays, we can identify a way of  conceiving pluralism far from Berlin’s liberal 
sensitivity. 
That is the reason why, like for our first book Monisms and Pluralisms in the 
History of  Political Thought, we opted for entitling our work monisms and pluralisms 
in the History of  Political and Social Models. That “s” is put to stress how – 
when moving from a purely theoretical level to a more historical-political and 
social-political one – designating all-embracing and extremely general defini-
tions in order to read and explain social and political reality is very difficult and 
problematic. In this sense, there is a continuity between our first book and the 
present one. The former and the latter share the same objective, i.e. to reflect 
through an historical perspective on the political implications of  “diversified 
monisms” and “diversified pluralisms”. 
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Chapter One
central MonIsM and suburban pluralIsM: 
plutarch and dIo of prusa between needs 
of the pr incipatus and claIMs 
coMIng froM local coMMunItIes
Andrea Catanzaro
How might be possible to create a relationship between a plurality of  local en-
tities and an absolute central power? How can be possible to establish connec-
tions between the variety of  provincial cultures and the ruler’s? How should 
non-Roman statesmen and intellectuals interact with the Roman dominant 
system? 
Two remarkable Hellenic authors had to answer these questions at the end 
of  the first century A.D., though for different reasons. Plutarch and Dio of  
Prusa1 tried to explain in some of  their political works how they interpreted 
the role of  statesmen or intellectuals in contexts where the existence of  a 
strong central and monistic power needed to relate with a plurality of  local 
communities which had to be governed. 
The issue of  the interconnections between the centre and the outskirts 
of  the Roman Empire in the first century A.D. is a significant hallmark in the 
political thought of  these two authors. During their lives, they were deeply 
involved with politics both at the low and at the highest level; they had to 
1 On the political, social and cultural contexts of  these authors, cf. Whitmarsh (2001), Swain 
(2000), Id. (1996); Desideri (2015: 293-325); Id. (1978); Von Arnim (1898); see also Stadter, Van 
Der Stockt (2002), De La Vega (1998: 1015-1058); Aalders (1982).
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manage local problems, but also to keep themselves in touch with the most 
important figures of  the central government. 
In order to analyse their ideas about this topic, three works seem to be par-
ticularly worth stressing: Plutarchean Praecepta gerendae rei publicae and Maxime 
cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum2, and the Third Discourse on Kingship by 
Dio3. The respective proposals of  these authors as sketched out in these works 
differ from each other, but also have some common elements. Furthermore 
they both represent attempts aimed at facing the same political problem4. 
If  we try to summarize the most remarkable positions on this issue in that 
period from a theoretical perspective, we might imagine the existence of  two 
polarised extremes: the former might be labelled as a ‘supervised pluralism’, 
the latter as a ‘pluralism depending on a supervised élite’. Nonetheless, as it 
will be shown, they are and remain just oversimplified, though useful labels. 
Due to this, in spite of  their utility, they are unsuitable to exhaustively describe 
the positions of  these and other authors from an historical perspective. Dif-
ferences in the respective cultural backgrounds, lives and degrees of  involve-
ment in political life, made each of  them develop autonomous and unique 
proposals. However, although Plutarch’s and Dio’s proposals remain detached, 
something is merged and a clear-cut distinction between them – based on the 
theoretical models previously sketched out – cannot indisputably be found in 
the works that will be take into account in this essay. Plutarch, for example, 
seems to bear in mind the ‘supervised pluralism’ in Praecepta gerendae rei publicae 
and the ‘pluralism depending on a supervised élite’ in Maxime cum principibus 
philosopho esse disserendum. 
Anyway, since the proposals were conceived in the same political context 
and in a rather similar cultural one, it allows us to analyse them in a compar-
ative perspective and appreciate different, but, in some extent, also similar 
proposals aimed at fixing a thorny issue of  the state of  being contemporary5. 
2 On these Plutarchean works from the perspective of  the theme of  the relations between 
Greece and Rome, cf. Swain (1996: 162 ff.); particularly on the Praecepta gerendae rei publicae, cf. 
ivi, p. 162: «Political Advice is an essay on the civic political life of  a Greek politician under 
Roman rule. It is perhaps the most important single expression of  Greek elite views of  living 
with Rome in our period, certainly the most detailed. Plutarch was well placed to speak on the 
subject. He knew important Roman and Greek politicians and was sufficiently experienced (by 
his own testimony) in local and internal politics. The work was written late in his life when his 
fame as philosopher and a writer had made him someone worth listening to»; see also Whit-
marsh (2001: 184-186). On the relations between Dio and Rome, cf. S. Swain (1996: 206-241); 
see also Desideri (1978). 
3 On the Dionean Discourses on Kingship, cf. particularly Desideri (1978: 283-318); Swain (1996: 
192-196); Whitmarsh (2001: 183-190 and 325-327); Gangloff  (2009: 3-38); Catanzaro (2012).
4 Cf. Desideri (2015: 320). 
5 Cf. Salmeri (2002: 55-56): «In Asia Minor Rome was represented not only by the governors but 
also by the notables of  the Greek cities. Building on the structures of  the Hellenistic kingdoms, 
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Plutarch’s first position effectively appears to be summarised in a metaphor 
presented in a passage of  Praecepta gerendae rei publicae where the political activity 
in a city subjected to an external domination is compared to a drama on the 
stage. The philosopher writes:
The context is clear: local rulers are only allowed to move within very limited 
boundaries. Inside them, they have a bit of  autonomy, but they cannot go be-
yond them. The ypoboléus (the prompter) plays the real key-role: though he is 
out of  public sight and hearing, actors on stage can see and hear him and are 
expected to observe his orders7. 
There is a sort of  framework established a priori: the metaphorical refer-
ences to rhythms and metres well describe a situation where individual choices 
are allowed to arise from a predetermined pattern8. It appears as a restrained 
pluralism, where room for manoeuvre is very restricted. The monism of  the 
principatus can grant something autonomous to local rulers, but only within a 
Rome maintained the poleis within a wide-reaching framework under a unified administration, 
which enabled them to shake off  some of  the isolationist tendencies typical of  the classical po-
lis. To some extent the ground was prepared for the growth of  a united Hellenic consciousness, 
at least at the cultural level. At the same time, however, given the considerable political respon-
sibility they were entrusted with, the notables of  Asia Minor found their ties with their native 
cities strengthening, and with them to desire to spend the rest of  their lives in their homeland, 
following a pattern unparalleled in the western provinces». 
6Plut., Praecepta gerendae rei publicae, 813 E-F, in Plutarch’s Moralia (1960: 236-237); henceforth, 
both the Greek excerpts and their English translations coming from this Plutarchean essay and 
from the Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum, are quoted in accordance with this 
edition. 
7 Cf. Aalders (1982: 54-55); ivi p. 37: «However much Plutarch was conscious of  the reality of  
the Roman Empire and however much he unreservedly accepted this reality, his culture and his 
ideas were Greek and his political models and ideals were rooted in the Greek world and in the 
old Greek tradition. His personal interests were primarily directed towards the self-governing 
Greek polis. Whenever Plutarch speaks about state and statecraft, the image of  such a polis is 
foremost in his eyes, even when he deals with Roman history».
8 Roskam (2002: 175-189).
εὐσταλεστέραν δεῖ τὴν χλαμύδα ποιεῖν, καὶ 
βλέπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατηγίου πρὸς τὸ βῆμα, καὶ 
τῷ στεφάνῳ μὴ πολὺ φρονεῖν μηδὲ πιστεύειν, 
ὁρῶντα τοὺς καλτίους ἐπάνω τῆς κεφαλῆς. ἀλλὰ 
μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς ὑποκριτάς, πάθος μὲν ἴδιον καὶ 
ἦθος καὶ ἀξίωμα τῷ ἀγῶνι προστιθέντας, τοῦ δ᾽ 
ὑποβολέως ἀκούοντας καὶ μὴ παρεκβαίνοντας 
τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῆς διδομένης 
ἐξουσίας ὑπὸ τῶν κρατούντων.
You should arrange your cloak more carefully and 
from the office of  the generals keep your eyes upon 
the orators’ platform, and not have great pride or 
confidence in your crown, since you see the boots 
of  Roman soldiers just above your head. No, you 
should imitate the actors, who, while putting into 
the performance their own passion, character, and 
reputation, yet listen to the prompter and do not go 
beyond the degree of  liberty in rhythms and metres 
permitted by those in authority over them6.
30 MonisMs and PluralisMs in the history of Political and social Models
given score. That is why I previously used the label of  ‘supervised pluralism’ in 
order to theoretically classified this aspect of  the Plutarchean idea concerning 
this political situation as it appears explained in Praecepta gerendae rei publicae. 
If  we take into account who is the addressee of  this work and what he is 
going to do, these words sound even more significant. 
The philosopher is writing a sort of  handbook concerning politics – par-
ticularly dealing with political activity – with a view to allowing his disciple 
Menemacus – who is about to enter the public arena – to be oriented inside 
it. So, Plutarch has no interests in describing an ideal or hypothetical situation, 
but he needs to be extremely exact in showing his disciple what kind of  career 
he might have in the near future. The Greek territories are not free lands; as 
a result Menemacus cannot expect to be completely autonomous in his local 
political activities and will always have to obey the commands coming from 
the Romans, the real holders of  power. Just prior to introducing the metaphor 
of  the play, Plutarch had specified:
The philosopher is also particularly careful in showing his disciple the poten-
tially dangerous consequences of  a lack of  obedience to Rome. Through his 
words, the monist essence of  the Roman system, the threatening presence of  
the foreign ruler, the force of  its army – even if  only in the form of  a prospec-
tive threat – are clearly explained through the development of  the theatrical 
metaphor and by mentioning an historical event.
An ékptosis (fail) in observance of  the conquerors’ will have very dangerous 
consequences both for the governor and for the ruled people. Menemacus 
will have to always call to mind that the relation with the Roman central gov-
ernment is a relation between a ruler and a subject, though there actually is a 
little space for autonomy. In spite of  this reading of  the contemporary situa-
9 Plut., Praecepta gerendae rei publicae, 813 E (1960: 236-237); cf. Swain (1996: 166).
10 Plut., Praecepta gerendae rei publicae, 813 F (1960: 236-237); concerning the line quoted by Plu-
tarch, it is specified (ivi, p. 237) that it comes «from an unknown play».
ἀρχόμενος ἄρχεις, ὑποτεταγμένης πόλεως 
ἀνθυπάτοις, ἐπιτρόποις Καίσαρος.
You who rule are a subject, ruling a State 
controlled by proconsuls, the agents of  Caesar9.
ἡ γὰρ ἔκπτωσις οὐ φέρει συριγμὸν οὐδὲ χλευασμὸν 
οὐδὲ κλωγμόν, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς μὲν ἐπέβη
δεινὸς κολαστὴς πέλεκυς αὐχένος τομεύς, 
ὡς τοῖς περὶ Παρδάλαν τὸν ὑμέτερον 
ἐκλαθομένοις τῶν ὅρων. 
For to fail in one’s part in public life brings not mere 
hissing or catcalls or stamping of  feet, but many 
have experienced 
The dread chastiser, axe that cleaves the neck 
as did your countryman Pardalas and his followers 
when they forgot their proper limitation10.
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tion and its value as a whole in Praecepta gerendae rei publicae, rather surprisingly 
Plutarch affirms that, since this space anyway exists, a local ruler has to learn 
to effectively move within it. 
The art of  politics is not dead because of  the external domination; people 
of  the provinces need leaders very skilled at ensuring them internal safety, or-
der and good administration. All these political targets require that a statesman 
becomes capable of  using the granted autonomy wisely, but fully. If  he did not 
act in this way, also that little space of  freedom would be lost. Plutarch writes:
The words speak for themselves: Plutarch uses the noun eghemón (sovereign12) 
in order to denote the holder of  power and it clearly describes the nature of  
the political system where the disciple has to live. 
Nonetheless, the philosopher warns Menemacus against the risk of  lacking 
in autonomy, since it could change the subordination to a complete douléia 
(slavery13). Undoubtedly he is writing about a monistic regime, but he cannot 
avoid recognising that it has also a component of  pluralism, though minimal, 
which is worth being protected and maintained14. 
The issue of  internal safety is an archetypal case of  those situations 
where this balance between autonomy and subordination is essential. It 
has two particular significances in Plutarch’s ideas: the former, as obvious, 
deals with the internal peace needed, to allow people to live together, the 
latter with something deeply linked to the problem of  the monism-plural-
ism question. 
11 Plut., Praecepta gerendae rei publicae, 814 E- F (1960: 242-243); cf. Aalders (1982: 55).
12 On the significances of  eghemón, cf. Liddell, Scott (1996: 763).
13 On the significances of  douléia, cf. Liddell, Scott (1996: 446).
14 S. Swain (1996: 161-162): «As has been remarked, it is well known that [...] [Plutarch] was 
highly sympathetic with Romans. But he also had a strong racial and cultural identity as a Greek. 
If  he believed that Roman government was good for the world in theory, there is no cause for 
us to find it odd that he was resistant to it in practice. Appreciation of  Rome’s benefits does 
not automatically entail total acceptance of  her rule. If  there is contradiction, it represents the 
compromise and negotiation we must expect from someone living under a foreign power».
ποιοῦντα μέντοι καὶ παρέχοντα τοῖς κρατοῦσιν 
εὐπειθῆ τὴν πατρίδα δεῖ μὴ προσεκταπεινοῦν, 
μηδὲ τοῦ σκέλους δεδεμένου προσυποβάλλειν 
καὶ τὸν τράχηλον, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι, καὶ μικρὰ καὶ 
μείζω φέροντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἐξονειδίζουσι 
τὴν δουλείαν, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὅλως τὴν πολιτείαν 
ἀναιροῦσι, καταπλῆγα καὶ περιδεᾶ καὶ πάντων 
ἄκυρον ποιοῦντες.
However, the statesman, while making his native 
State readily obedient to its sovereigns, must not 
further humble it; nor, when the leg has been 
fettered, go on and subject the neck to the yoke, 
as some do who, by referring everything, great 
or small, to the sovereigns, bring the reproach of  
slavery upon their country, or rather wholly destroy 
its constitutional government, making it dazed, 
timid, and powerless in everything11.
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He discourages Menemacus from avoiding using the power allowed by 
the conqueror if  it becomes indispensable in maintaining internal order. It 
must be a priority of  the local statesmen, because of  the potentially dan-
gerous consequences coming from a lack of  its usage. Internal disorders 
and clear ineptitude of  the local statesmen in avoiding them can cause an 
intervention by the real ruler, that is, in Plutarch’s ideas, a situation that 
Menemacus will always have to forestall15. He explains the problem by using 
again a metaphor:
It sounds clear enough who is the real holder of  power. Plutarch does not 
cast doubts on the monistic nature of  the principatus of  which he seems to be 
rather scared. Accordingly, the little autonomy allowed within this regime that 
I labelled ‘supervised pluralism’ represents a piece of  liberty worth defending 
by whatever means, in order to avoid its complete loss17. Due to this, a local 
community cannot afford to let its divisions prevail; accordingly a local ruler 
has to work harshly with a view to preventing this occurrence. 
However, though the comparison between internal disorders and diseases 
fits well, Plutarch stresses that the actions of  a physician and those of  a states-
man are different, though similar. Despite both of  them wanting to heal, a 
ruler who is not completely free has to take care of  the community effectively 
but silently, in order to avoid making the disease visible from the outside and 
having the problem definitively fixed by someone else. The risk is stressed 
again a few paragraphs later:
15 Cf. Aalders (1982: 55).
16 Plut., Praecepta gerendae rei publicae, 815 B-C (1960: 244-245).
17 Cf. Salmeri (2000: 75-76): «What mattered most to Plutarch was that the Greek world should 
retain that degree of  autonomy it still enjoyed under the emperors, and cope with its own 
problems ‘unaided’ […] For him as for Dio, the use of  force was always to be shunned, and 
the intervention of  the Roman authorities avoided, grave though the tension might be; the 
discontent of  the urban- populations was not to be countered by drastic solutions; if  politicians 
showed a certain flexibility, on the principle of  give and take, they could not afford to call for 
concord and order».
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἰατροὶ τῶν νοσημάτων ὅσα μὴ 
δύνανται παντάπασιν ἀνελεῖν ἔξω τρέπουσιν 
εἰς τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ σώματος. ὁ δὲ πολιτικός, 
ἂν μὴ δύνηται τὴν πόλιν ἀπράγμονα παντελῶς 
διαφυλάττειν, ἐν αὐτῇ γε πειράσεται 
τὸ ταρασσόμενον αὐτῆς καὶ στασιάζον 
ἀποκρύπτων ἰᾶσθαι καὶ 
διοικεῖν, ὡς ἂν ἥκιστα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἰατρῶν καὶ 
φαρμάκων δέοιτο.
For when physicians cannot entirely eradicate 
diseases, they turn them outwards to the surface of  
the body; but the statesman, if  he cannot kept the 
State entirely free from troubles, will at any rate try 
to cure and control whatever disturbs it and causes 
sedition, keeping it meanwhile hidden with the 
State, so that it may have as little need as possible 
of  physicians and medicine drawn from outside16.
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Plutarch’s suggestion to Menemacus consists of  a warning about the balance 
between internal and external pluralisms: the good statesman, as his target, 
must have the will not to allow internal pluralism to balloon to the extent it 
becomes a threat for that autonomy – or degree of  pluralism – allowed by 
Rome. 
In Plutarch’s ideas, the philía is the means able to attune central monism 
with that quantum of  pluralism, which allows both the central and local ad-
ministrations to work well. Menemacus will have to weave together relations 
with men capable of  assuring his land that it will be both protected by external 
enemies and allowed to maintain a minimum of  autonomous administration. 
We read in Praecepta gerendae rei publicae:
As a result, it does not seem to be unusual to find a similar statement in the 
opening lines of  a Plutarchean work whose title is, significantly, Maxime cum 
principibus philosopho esse disserendum. 
The essay, clearly devoted to explaining why a wise man should have good 
links with the most powerful statesmen, allows us to appreciate Plutarch’s 
thought about the question:
18 Plut., Praecepta gerendae rei publicae, 824 A-B, (1960: 288-289).
19 Plut., Praecepta gerendae rei publicae, 814 C-D (1960: 239-241); cf. S. Swain (1996: 168-169).
αἱ δὲ δι᾽ ὅλων ἀναταραχθεῖσαι πόλεις κομιδῇ 
διεφθάρησαν, ἂν μή τινος ἀνάγκης 
ἔξωθεν τυχοῦσαι καὶ κολάσεως ὑπὸ κακῶν βίᾳ 
σωφρονήσωσιν.
But States which have fallen into complete disorder 
are utterly ruined unless they meet with some 
external necessity and chastisement and are thus 
forcibly compelled by their misfortunes to be 
reasonable18.
οὐ μόνον δὲ δεῖ παρέχειν αὑτόν τε καὶ τὴν 
πατρίδα πρὸς τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἀναίτιον, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ φίλον ἔχειν ἀεί τινα τῶν ἄνω δυνατωτάτων, 
ὥσπερ ἕρμα τῆς πολιτείας βέβαιον. αὐτοὶ γάρ 
εἰσι Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς σπουδὰς 
προθυμότατοι τοῖς φίλοις. καὶ καρπὸν ἐκ φιλίας 
ἡγεμονικῆς λαμβάνοντας, οἷον ἔλαβε Πολύβιος 
καὶ Παναίτιος τῇ Σκιπίωνος εὐνοίᾳ πρὸς 
αὐτοὺς μεγάλα τὰς πατρίδας ὠφελήσαντες, εἰς 
εὐδαιμονίαν δημοσίαν ἐξενέγκασθαι καλόν.
And not only should the statesman show himself  
and his native State blameless towards our rulers, 
but he should also have always a friend among 
the men of  high station who have the greatest 
power as a firm bulwark, so to speak, of  his 
administration; for the Romans themselves are 
most eager to promote the political interests of  
their friends; and it is a fine thing also, when we 
gain advantage from the friendship of  great men, 
to turn it to the welfare of  our community, as 
Polybius and Panaetius, through Scipio’s goodwill 
towards them, conferred great benefits upon their 
native States19.
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Since there are clear differences between this work and the previous one – the 
former is devoted to a man who wants to become a politician, the latter to some-
one that has the opportunity to be a counsellor of  a ruler (or of  the ruler, that is, 
the princeps) – the theme of  the relations between central and local governments 
is present anyway. Plutarch is very careful in stressing the prospective advantages 
for the provinces deriving from good links between eminent wise men coming 
from these lands and all those who are in charge in Rome, particularly the princeps. 
This reading slightly modifies the aforementioned model: in this work 
Plutarch seems to move from the theoretical idea of  ‘supervised pluralism’ 
shown to his disciple Menemacus in Praecepta gerendae rei publicae to another 
model that fits better with the second label I have previously sketched out, 
that is, ‘pluralism depending on a supervised élite’. Obviously, it principally 
depends on the different natures and addressees of  this work. The philía, and 
no more a cautious handling of  internal questions, becomes the means that 
allows local communities to maintain their scarce autonomous pluralism. 
Dio of  Prusa seems to be more attracted than Plutarch by this means. He 
particularly stresses this aspect in his Third Discourse on Kingship through high-
lighting how, for intellectuals coming from the outskirts of  the Empire, a di-
rect relation with the most eminent Roman statesmen, particularly the prince, 
an inclusion in his inner circle, and the prospect of  becoming his counsellor 
are opportunities of  career. They are also a means that might allow these in-
tellectuals to take care of  their respective homelands21. 
Dio examines and stresses the question from the perspective of  effective-
ness: he suggests that the princeps has to make the most of  relations with the 
eminent representatives of  the provinces, particularly the Hellenic ones22, with 
a view to getting his voice listened to, his will respected and his commands 
obeyed also at the borders of  the Empire. 
20 Plut., Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum, 776 A-B (1960: 28-29).
21 Cf., for example, Stadter, Van Der Stockt (2002).
22 Cf., for example, Salmeri (2000: 86-87).
Σωρκανὸν ἐγκολπίσασθαι καὶ φιλίαν τιμᾶν 
καὶ μετιέναι καὶ προσδέχεσθαι καὶ γεωργεῖν, 
πολλοῖς μὲν ἰδίᾳ πολλοῖς δὲ καὶ δημοσίᾳ 
χρήσιμον καὶ ἔγκαρπον γενησομένην, 
φιλοκάλων ἐστὶ καὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ 
φιλανθρώπων οὐχ ὡς ἔνιοι νομίζουσι 
φιλοδόξων. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον, φιλόδοξός ἐστι 
καὶ ψοφοδεὴς ὁ φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος 
ἀκοῦσαι λιπαρὴς τῶν ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ καὶ 
θεραπευτικός.
In clasping Sorcanus to our bosom, in prizing, 
pursuing, welcoming, and cultivating his friendship 
– a friendship which will prove useful and fruitful 
to many in private and to many in public life – you 
are acting like a man who loves what is noble, who 
is public-spirited and is a friend of  mankind, not, as 
some people say, like one who is merely ambitious 
for himself. No, on the contrary, the man who is 
ambitious for himself  and afraid of  every whisper 
is just the one who avoids and fears being called a 
persistent and servile attendant on those in power20.
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The central monism needs to be made plural in its executive and opera-
tional dimension, in order to effectively reach his targets: without a systematic 
use of  proxies, an enormous political system – such as the Roman Empire – 
cannot run and, accordingly, survive in the long term. 
The principatus, a young institution whose stabilization was still in itinere 
during the first century A.D., cannot avoid finding effective means capable of  
assuring cooperation by the local communities and Dio tries to present the philía 
as a possible solution to this problem23. It is conceived by the orator as some-
thing wider than simple friendship. A. M. Milazzo well clarifies that it cannot be 
effectively translated by the Latin word amicitia, but by a series of  other terms 
– moderatio, comitas, levitas animi, civilitas, humanitas – that only taken into account 
as a whole are capable of  conveying the complete meaning of  the Dionean idea 
of  philía24. The scholar writes that, through this concept, Dio wants to provide 
«not only a series of  ideals concerning government addressed to the king, but 
also to show Trajan himself  and the senatorial-equestrian class how intellectuals 
and collaborators (primarily the Greek ones) conceive not the charismatic but 
the humanist role of  the common autokrator» (Milazzo 2007: 56-57)25.
Section 87 of  Third Discourse on Kingship, in explaining this concept, allows 
us to appreciate something worth highlighting in an analysis devoted to the 
topic of  monism-pluralism dichotomy. The orator writes:
The key-role is played by the joined usage of  the adjectives mónos (alone27) and 
ikanós (sufficient28): monism, as absolute concept, cannot exist even in private 
life. Human beings are naturally unable to be completely self-sufficient and, 
accordingly, need to get out from a monist condition and move to a more 
plural one. 
23 Cf. Milazzo (2007: 51-107).
24 Ivi, pp. 56-57 and p. 77.
25 The English translation is mine.
26 Dio Chrysost., Third Discourse on Kingship, 87 (1971: 144-145); henceforth, both the Greek ex-
cerpts and their English translations coming from this Dionean essay, are quoted in accordance 
with this edition.
27 On the significances of  mónos, cf. Liddell, Scott (1996: 1145)
28 On the significances of  ikanós, cf. Liddell, R. Scott (1996: 825).
μόνος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς πρὸς οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τῶν 
ἰδίων ἱκανός ἐστι. τοῖς δὲ βασιλεῦσιν ὅσῳ 
πλείω τε καὶ μείζω πράττειν ἀνάγκη, 
πλειόνων δεῖ καὶ τῶν συνεργούντων 
καὶ μετ᾽ εὐνοίας πλείονος. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὰ 
μέγιστα καὶ σπουδαιότατα τῶν πραγμάτων 
ἢ πιστεύειν ἑτέροις ἢ προϊεσθαι.
For no one, of  and by himself, is sufficient for a 
single one of  even his own needs; and the more and 
greater the responsibilities of  a king are, the greater 
is the number of  co-workers that he needs, and 
the greater the loyalty required of  them, since he is 
forced to entrust his greatest and most important 
interests to others or else to abandon them26.
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That being stated, how can the Roman princeps think he is able to effectively 
handle the Empire without sharing part of  his absolute power with some select-
ed friends? He cannot avoid looking for synergói (co-workers) capable of  allowing 
him to manage the State with a view to making the most of  his government. As 
Milazzo stresses: «This theory of  regal friendship is an attempt of  humanizing 
the Roman dominatus through joining the public and private spheres and making 
the princeps be not a god, but only a primus inter amicos» (Milazzo 2007: 82)29. 
Dio, like Plutarch, uses a metaphor coming from the medical sphere in 
order to highlight the significance of  friendship:
Whereas the Plutarchean doctor has to use his medicine – the scant pluralism 
allowed by Rome – in order to avoid that the monist doctor uses his drastic cure, 
the Dionean concept of  philía is a sort of  a double remedy: it acts to make 
both the monistic and the pluralist elements of  the Empire get better at the 
same time. It assures wise political advice and protection to the princeps, but 
also that provinces are safe and well governed. The utility of  this means is well 
explained some paragraphs later:
29 The English translation is mine; cf. Desideri (1978: 302-303).
30 Dio Chrysost., Third Discourse on Kingship, 100 (1971: 148-149).
καὶ μὴν τά γε ὠφέλιμα φάρμακα τοῖς μὲν 
νοσοῦσιν ὠφέλιμα, τοῖς δὲ ὑγιαίνουσι περιττά. 
φιλίας δὲ καὶ τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσιν ἀεὶ σφόδρα δεῖ 
καὶ τοῖς νοσοῦσιν. ἥ συμφυλάττει μὲν πλοῦτον, 
ἐπαρκεῖ δὲ πενίᾳ, λαμπρύνει μὲν δόξαν, μαυροῖ 
δὲ ἀδοξίαν.
Again, salutary drugs are salutary to the sick, but 
of  no use to the well. Of  friendship, however, men 
stand ever in the greatest need, whether in health or 
in sickness: it helps to defend wealth and relieves 
poverty; it adds luster to fame and dims the glare 
of  infamy30.
διὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν μόλις ὁρᾶν ἔστι 
τὰ ἐμποδών, διὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς
 πέρασι θεᾶσθαι. καὶ διὰ μὲν τῶν ὤτων οὐκ ἄν 
τις ἀκούσαι ἢ τῶν σφόδρα ἐγγύθεν, διὰ δὲ τῶν 
εὐνοούντων οὐδενὸς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὅπουδήποτε 
ἀνήκοός ἐστι. καὶ τῇ μὲν γλώττῃ μόνοις τοῖς 
παροῦσι σημαίνει, καὶ ταῖς χερσίν, εἰ καὶ σφόδρα 
εἴη καρτερός, οὐκ ἂν ἐργάσαιτοπλεῖον ἔργον ἢ 
δύ᾽ ἀνδρῶν. διὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων δύναται 
καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις διαλέγεσθαι καὶ πάντων 
ἔργων ἐφικνεῖσθαι. οἱ γὰρ εὐνοοῦντες πάντα 
ἐκείνῳ συμφέροντα καὶ λέγουσι καὶ δρῶσι.
τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντων παραδοξότατον, ἕνα γὰρ ὄντα 
ἐγχωρεῖ, ὅστις πολύφιλος, πολλὰ μὲν ἐν ταὐτῷ 
χρόνῳ πράττειν,περὶ πολλῶν δὲ ἅμα
With his eyes he may barely see what lies before his 
feet; but through his friends he may behold even 
that which is at the ends of  the earth. With his ears 
he can hear nothing save that which is very near; 
but through those who wish him well he is without 
tidings of  nothing of  importance anywhere. With 
his tongue he communicates only with those who 
are in his presence, and with his hands, were he 
never so strong, he can not do the work of  more 
than two men; but through his friends he can hold 
converse with all the world and accomplish every 
undertaking, since those who wish him well saying 
and doing everything that is in his interest. The 
most surprising thing of  all, however, is that he who 
is rich is friends is able, although but one.
Central monism and suburban pluralism 37
As previously highlighted, effectiveness seems to be the unit of  measure, the 
hallmark of  the Dionean thought on this theme, the means capable of  assur-
ing him a prominent role both in Rome and in his homeland. 
Roman monism is real monism – the power of  princeps is and remains ab-
solute – but the philía increases the opportunity that it can efficiently operate 
also at a local level. Echoes of  Xenophon’s Cyropedia and Aristotle’s Politics 
are clear31; rather interestingly it is the same model that Plutarch presents to 
Menemacus in Praecepta gerendae rei publicae as a very effective means to manage 
political power. He explains it through a famous metaphor:
Because of  the different addressees of  these works, the main distinction seems 
to be in the sphere of  application: Plutarch appeared to consider that this 
model was suitable to internal contexts, Dio would like to see it applied to the 
imperial one. The selection of  the leading class is crucial for both authors like 
as the trust between the man in charge and his co-operators; however Plutarch 
is here thinking of  the provincial communities, Dio to the Empire as a whole. 
31 Xenoph., Cyropedia, VIII, 2; Arist., Politics, III, 1281b.
32 Plut, Praecepta gerendae rei publicae, 812 C-D, (1960: 228-231).
33 Dio Chrysost., Third Discourse on Kingship, 105-107 (1971: 150-153).
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς οἱ κυβερνῆται τὰ μὲν ταῖς χερσὶ δι᾽ 
αὑτῶν πράττουσι, τὰ δ᾽ ὀργάνοις ἑτέροις δι᾽ 
ἑτέρων ἄπωθεν καθήμενοι περιάγουσι καὶ 
στρέφουσι, χρῶνται δὲ καὶ ναύταις καὶ πρῳρεῦσι 
καὶ κελευσταῖς, καὶ τούτων ἐνίους 
ἀνακαλούμενοι πολλάκις εἰς πρύμναν 
ἐγχειρίζουσι τὸ πηδάλιον. οὕτω τῷ πολιτικῷ 
προσήκει παραχωρεῖν μὲν ἑτέροις ἄρχειν καὶ 
προσκαλεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ βῆμα μετ᾽ εὐμενείας 
καὶ φιλανθρωπίας, κινεῖν δὲ μὴ πάντα τὰ τῆς 
πόλεως τοῖς αὑτοῦ λόγοις καὶ ψηφίσμασιν ἢ 
πράξεσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχοντα πιστοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς 
ἄνδρας ἕκαστον ἑκάστῃ χρείᾳ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον 
προσαρμόττειν.
But just as pilots do some things with their with their 
own hands but perform other duties by means of  
different instruments operated by different agents, 
thus giving a turn or a twist to the instruments while 
they sit apart, and they make use of  sailors, look-
out men, and boatswains, some of  whom they often 
call to the stern and entrust with the tiller, just so 
it is fitting that the statesman should yield office 
to others and should invite them to the orators’ 
platform in a gracious and kindly manner, and he 
should not try to administer all the affairs of  the 
State by his own speeches, decrees, and actions, but 
should have good, trustworthy men and employ 
each of  them for each particular service according 
to his fitness33.
βουλεύεσθαι, πολλὰ δὲ ὁρᾶν, πολλὰ δὲ ἀκούειν, 
ἐν πολλοῖς δὲ ἅμα εἶναι τόποις, ὃ καὶ τοῖς 
θεοῖς χαλεπόν, ὡς μηδαμοῦ μηδὲν ἔρημον 
ἀπολείπεσθαι τῆς ἐκείνου προνοίας.
man, to do a multiplicity of  things at the same time, 
to deliberate about many matters simultaneously, 
to see many things, to hear many things, and to 
be in many places at once – a thing difficult even 
for the gods – with the result that there is nothing 
remaining anywhere that is bereft of  his solicitude31
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To sum up: as shown above, solutions for attuning the needs of  the impe-
rial government with those concerning the local communities have differences 
and similarities in Plutarch’s and Dio’s political ideas as they explain in the 
works taken into account in this essay. 
The labels sketched out in the opening lines are maybe useful to under-
stand theoretical archetypes of  possible solutions, but are not tailored enough 
to fully clarify the historical positions of  these authors during all the years of  
their respective political careers. Surely Plutarch seems to be more interested 
in local politics than Dio, though – as the case of  Maxime cum principibus phi-
losopho esse disserendum well explains – he appears completely aware about the 
context as a whole. 
However, despite the differences, the philía seems to be a crucial aspect for 
both of  them; it is a sort of  means capable of  making the monism milder by 
merging it with elements – very often minimal – of  pluralism. In the analysed 
works we can see two ways to conceive the philía, but it appears significant 
enough that, in spite of  the differences, both Plutarch and Dio think that it 
is a means to reach the ambitious target of  the common good – no matter 
whether it is at local or central level.
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Chapter Two
the MIllet: an InterMedIate body 
of the ottoMan relIgIous and legal pluralIsM
Federico Donelli
Even if  there still is a wide debate about the nature and the definition of  the 
empire, most scholars agree that every empire consists of  something called a 
‘core’ and something called a ‘periphery’. Furthermore, most of  them agree 
that both ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ are situated in geographically bounded spac-
es inhabited by culturally differentiated elites and populations. The Ottoman 
Empire (1302-1923) was one of  the most important and long-lived traditional 
empire of  European history. Like others (Habsburg and Romanov) it was 
characterized by the vastness of  the territory and by the ethnic, religious and 
linguistic diversity. The Ottomans successfully maintained the imperial rule 
over a vast domain for many centuries thanks to their intrinsic flexibility and 
ability to integrate diverse populations through pragmatic and tolerant poli-
cies. To do that, the Ottomans created new institutions as intermediate bodies, 
between the core and the peripheries culturally and geographically conceived. 
Among these the institution of  millet represents an original example of  a 
vertical integration model as well as an innovative instrument involved in the 
management of  interethnic relations. The term millet, originally used to refer 
both to one of  the religions and the religious community itself, has been used 
to account for the administrative and legal status of  the large numbers of  
non-Muslim under the Ottomans between the 15th and the 20th century.
This chapter conceives the ‘core-periphery’ relationship as the tension be-
tween a monistic idea of  power (Imperial and Islamic universalism) and a plural-
istic reality characterized by religious and ethnic diversity. The chapter is divided 
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into three sections. The first section offers the basic view of  the empire as a 
complex socio-political structure marked by a polyethnic and multi-religious so-
ciety, drawing inside the core-periphery (monism-pluralism) structure. The sec-
ond section deals with the Ottoman Empire as a pristine example of  Muslim 
state (Caliphate) where religion was subordinate to the state and it was a major 
criterion for defining different groups. Finally, in the last part, the chapter con-
cludes with an analysis of  the institution of  millet as vertical integration model 
(hub-and-spoke) able to manage religious and ethnic diversity.
2.1 theoretIcal and analytIc fraMework: 
the core-per Iphery structure of the eMpIre
The empire as a socio-political phenomenon is particularly complex and ex-
tensive, thus making it difficult to draw conclusions about the type of  social 
and political institution it represents. In the course of  the 20th century, the 
empire as a state form had a “bad” reputation, and it was inexorably associated 
with expansionism, conquest, imperialism, arbitrariness and tyranny. Since the 
late 1980s, the growing challenges linked to the process of  globalization – i.e. 
transnationalism, multiculturalism, interfaith coexistence, clash of  civilizations 
etc. – have paved the way to a renewed interest for the imperial experiences. 
The new millennium saw a burst of  innovative researches on the history of  
the traditional or typical empires, prompting a whole revaluation of  their so-
cio-political structure. Nowadays, if  the future of  the nation-state appears un-
certain, the idea of  empire is seen under a more favorable light as the imperial 
mentality is associated with the concept of  tolerance and with the pragmatic 
management of  ethnic and national heterogeneity.
According to the editors of  the Dictionary of  Human Geography, empire is 
commonly understood in its classic sense as «an extensive territory and polity, en-
compassing diverse lands and peoples, that is ruled, more or less directly and effectively, by a 
single person» (Gregory et al., 2011:189-190). This definition allows the editors 
to assert that there have been over 70 empires in history. Precisely, several 
theoretical proposals have been formulated in international studies of  empire 
regarding the categorizations to classify historical empires, such as continental 
and overseas empire, predatory and developmental empire, and scattered and 
territorially contiguous empire (Hopkins 1999).
Even though literature classifies the empires in several categories, this 
study evaluates only one of  them: the traditional empires. Traditional or typ-
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ical empires were a good example of  multi-ethnic state, where the sovereign 
authority was grounded on the principle of  the subject’s’ loyalty, and not to the 
state or a form of  its legitimacy. Currently, there is a wide literature about the 
traditional empires, and there have been many definition of  them as socio-po-
litical institution (Eisenstadt 1963; Doyle 1986; Tilly 1997; Lieven 2000; Motyl 
2001; Suny and Martin, 2001). Among the many definitions, this work agrees 
with Barkey’s one, who described an empire as: 
a large composite and differentiated polity linked to a central power by a variety of  
direct and indirect relations, where the core exercises political control through hierarchi-
cal and quasi-monopolistic relations over groups ethnically and religious different from 
itself  (Barkey 2008:9).
Historically, until the 20th century, building an empire was the most preva-
lent and effective way of  uniting a variety of  peoples and extensive territories 
under a single rule. It was the only way of  establishing and maintaining po-
litical order in the face of  cultural, ethnic, social heterogeneity. It is not sur-
prising that this inclusive institutional entity collapsed concurrently with the 
emergence of  the nation-state idea. Indeed, an empire was characterized by 
a large composite polity connected to a central power by indirect role; its life 
span usually had two distinct though frequently overlapping phases: an initial, 
relatively brief  phase, characterized by military conquest and a subsequent, 
extended phase, known as ‘system maintenance’ where the main focus insists 
on stability. In order to remain dominant, imperial states had to find a way 
to handle diversity – diversity management1 – of  their polyethnic societies. 
Perhaps the major challenge of  empire was the establishment of  coherent 
and lasting rule over this vast array of  peoples (Greene, 2005). The empires 
maintained control over multi-religious and multiethnic diversity through a 
variety of  policies, from toleration of  diversity and its gradual incorporation, 
to forced conversion and assimilation (Barkey, 2008).
The study of  this chapter conceives the empire as a premodern sociopo-
litical form defined through the social conflict between various elites, and the 
balance established among the center, or core, and the different peripheries: 
the so-called core-periphery structure. The core carries out some military and 
fiscal control in each segment of  its imperial domain, but tolerates the two 
major elements of  indirect role: retention or establishment of  particular, dis-
1 Nowadays, the social and cultural composition of  societies is becoming increasingly diverse. 
This diversity has turned policy-makers attention to the management of  cultural differences, 
which is usually known as diversity management. The diversity management defined an organi-
zation’s culture and systems to ensure that all people are given the opportunity to contribute to 
the common goals of  the organization Hon and Bruner (2000).
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tinct compacts for the government of  each segment; and exercise of  power 
through intermediaries who enjoy considerable autonomy within their own 
domains in return for the delivery of  compliance, tribute and military collabo-
ration with the center (Tilly 1997). Motyl (1999) points out that when we refer 
to empires we should keep in mind that they are not so much “states” as “sys-
tems”. According to him, «these systems are substantially supported by the 
operation of  a sovereign structure, that of  core-periphery» (Motyl 1999:124). 
The core-periphery structure reflected an hub-and-spoke network, where each 
spoke was attached to the center but was less directly related to the others. 
More specifically, Galtung (1971) noted that the center performs the work of  
exclusive political mediator for the periphery and as a result excludes the pos-
sibility of  interaction between peripheries. According to him, there are four 
rules defining core-periphery interaction structure in an empire:
1. Interaction between center and periphery is vertical;
2. Interaction between periphery and periphery is missing;
3. Multilateral interaction involving all three is missing;
4. Interaction with the outside world is monopolized by the center, with two 
implications:
A. Periphery interaction with other centers is missing;
B. Center as well as periphery interaction with periphery nations belong-
ing to other center nations is missing (Gultung, 1971:89-90).
As Barkey (2008) underlined, the fact that imperial relations were vertically 
integrated, and that peripheral entities communicated mainly with the center 
and with one another only through the center, provided centers with added 
control over the various peripheral entities.
In summary, the success of  empire was based on the resolution of  two con-
flicting ideas: segmentation and integration. Even if  the basic definitional aspect 
of  empire that has been used time and again is ‘divide and rule’, this work as-
sumes the ‘hub-and-spoke metaphor’ instead. The structure of  core-periphery 
relations maintains both the provision of  goods and services to the center and 
makes peripheral elites dependent on the center. Peripheral entities were forced 
to communicate only with the center rather than with one another. However, to 
rule over vast territories and to ensure their military and administrative presence, 
imperial states negotiated and willingly relinquished some degree of  autonomy. 
For this reason, empires reproduced themselves in peripheral hubs that display 
an internal hierarchy analogous to that of  the center. The main argument of  this 
chapter is that the core-periphery relationship constituted a key element of  im-
perial political structure, useful to manage diversity, harmonizing a pluralistic re-
ality thanks to an intermediate body (millet) conceived as a monistic institution.
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2.2 the ottoMan context an exaMple 
of MultI -relIgIous and MultIethnIc eMpIre
The Ottoman Empire, founded at the end of  the 13th century and collapsed 
in the first quarter of  the 20th century, was one of  the longest-lived empires 
history ever recorded. The conquest of  Constantinople by Mehmet the Con-
queror in 1453 was an important step in becoming a world scale empire. By 
this conquest, the Ottoman sultan inherited the long-lived Roman rule and 
acquired several titles, including “Caesar” (Rum Kayseri), with the feeling of  
dominating the whole world. The new kingdom reached from Vienna in the 
West to Basra in the East, and from Russia in the North to the Indian Ocean 
in the South. At the height of  its power in the 16th century, it comprised an 
area of  about 19.9 million km2, though much of  it was under indirect control 
of  the central government. Most important, in these immense territories, the 
Ottomans ruled over many nations, communities and religious groups (Kafa-
dar 1994; Faroqhi 1995; Anscombe 2014).
The establishment of  Ottoman administration across new domains took 
different forms and different times in different places. According to Cleveland 
(2013) the Ottomans’ success was due to their official recognition that the 
diversity of  the territories over which they ruled required the adoption of  
flexible administrative practices that could accommodate the needs of  differ-
ent religions and different cultures. The Ottomans integrated peripheries into 
the central state, while also maintaining their distinct identities, and keeping 
them separate from other local elites (Bragg 2014). Rather than imposing a 
clean break with the past, the Ottomans tended to preserve pre-existing ar-
rangements (Finkel 2005). They negotiated between the contradictory yet also 
complementary, visions and organizational forms of  urban and rural, Muslim 
and non-Muslim, Sunni Muslim, Shiites and Sufi sects, but they also created a 
hybrid civilization that means a civilization that contains elements of  differ-
ent traditions that are brought together by institutional bricolage (Stark and 
Bruszt 1998).
In all empires, rulers claim the right to be in power, and the population ac-
cepts this claim. Thus, one of  the most sensitive issues was about power legit-
imacy of  the empire. For centuries the Ottomans were a strong imperial polity 
that claimed Islam as their main source of  legitimacy. This claim remained a 
potent source of  Islamic unity and strength outwards, but within the empire, 
Islam played a more constrained role (Barkey 2014). In the Ottoman Empire 
the loyalty to the dynasty had no ethnic or religious nature since the Ottomans 
had built a dynastic legitimation that accepted and promoted only the descen-
dants of  Osman’s family as the legitimate heirs to the throne (Finkel 2005). In 
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fact, legitimacy was not based on Islam, but on the notion of  normative order. 
This was imagined and maintained by the Ottomans following the concept 
of  a ‘well-ordered society’ or ‘world order’ (nizam-I alem). The well-ordered 
society was the rationale of  the state’s attitude also toward religious and ethnic 
diversity. Furthermore, the nizam-I alem was a vital plank in the ideological 
platform on which the legitimacy of  the ruling house rested (Zilfi 2010). For 
these reasons, despite loyalty and devotion to the religious world of  Orthodox 
Sunni Islam, Ottoman society for centuries remained free of  large-scale reli-
gious conflict (Kuru and Stepan 2012).
The main pillar of  the state-society relations was the concept of  justice 
(adalet), that was conceived primarily in terms of  protective relations between 
the sultan and his subjects. This because, according to the concept of  adalet, 
the subjects would be induced to work hard and produce more if  they were 
satisfied with their conditions of  life (Karpat 2002). Thus, in order to protect 
the world order, the sultan had a duty to provide justice to all its subjects, Mus-
lim or non-Muslim, treating everyone, regardless of  their ethnic or religious 
standing, as equals.
At the early stage of  the nascent empire, the polyethnic society was divid-
ed into two segments regardless of  ethnicity or religious affiliation: the rulers 
(askerî), military or administrative class, performed some public function as the 
delegates of  the sultan and was thereby officially exempted from all taxation; 
and the ruled class (reâyâ), literally the ‘flock’, who pursued productive activi-
ties and therefore paid taxes (Shaw 1976; Itzkowitz 2008). The latter consisted 
of  three categories: the peasants, city dwellers and nomads. The reâyâ were 
further set apart from the askerî class by sumptuary laws that regulated their 
dress and prevented them from riding horses or carrying swords (Quataert 
1997). It should be emphasized that in the Ottoman Empire there never was 
dominant ethnic group or ethnic elite.
The Ottomans established an Islamic empire (Ottoman Caliphate) after 
the conquest of  the Arab lands in the early 16th century, and the Sultan also 
became the leader (Caliph) of  the Sunni Islamic community. However, within 
the Ottoman Empire the relationship between religion and state had pecu-
liar features. In the Ottoman Empire, although Islam was understood as the 
religion of  the state, it was subordinate to the raison d’état. This characteristic 
differentiates the Ottomans from their Arab predecessors, Umayyad and Ab-
basid Caliphates. In other words, religion functioned as an institution of  the 
state (Barkey 2008). Islam in the Ottoman Empire represented chiefly a world 
view, a set of  ideas, institutions, and practices that actors believed, interpreted, 
and lived their lives according to. As Clifford Geertz (1968: 98) argued, reli-
gions are «frames of  perception, symbolic screens through which experience 
is interpreted and they are guides for action, blueprints for conduct».
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The Ottomans created a strong Islamic religious identity, yet taming it 
through state-dominated and state-guided administrative structure. Islam was 
not institutionally dominant because the Ottoman state nurtured and main-
tained a particular separation between religion as an institution and religion as 
a system of  meanings and relations (Kuru and Stepan 2012). Religion as an 
institution would help administer the empire. Religion as a system of  beliefs 
would provide the tools for every day practice (Mardin 1969). Thus, in the 
Ottoman Empire religion was mostly functional to the needs of  the state and 
contributed to the segmented integration of  groups into the state, by making 
religious institutions compliant to its interests.
Broadly, religion not only became the leading element of  identity but it 
also represented the mechanism of  integration as well as the main principle of  
horizontal cleavage among subjects (Muslim and non-Muslim). In the Otto-
man domains religious identity determined a person’s legal and political status 
(Karpat 2002). Although the Ottoman Empire was predominantly Muslim, it 
allowed non-Muslims to practice their religion and conduct their community 
affairs provided that they would exhibit loyalty to the Ottoman rulers and pay 
their taxes. Since the expansion period (1300-1500) the Ottomans accepted 
diversity, and pursued policies of  accommodation known as istimalet (Lowry 
2003). This attitude towards non-Muslim groups contributed meaningfully to 
the developement of  a form of  religious tolerance that contrasted to the so-
called persecuting society of  the medieval West (Moore 1990). As Rodrigue 
(2013) suggested, Ottomans understood difference and accepted it as such, 
showing no effort to transform difference into sameness.
Most scholars considered Ottoman toleration2 borrowed from an Islam 
body of  thought and practice that recognized non-Muslim subjects as sec-
ond-class status. Indeed, according to the Koran the “Peoples of  the Book” 
(Christians and Jews), also referred to as dhimmi (protected), could not be 
forced to convert to Islam with violence, and they were given the rights to 
live within an Islamic state and to practice their own religion, paying the ci-
zye (special tax of  protection), and maintaining some administrative and legal 
functions (Emon 2012). Certainly, Islam provided the legal framework for 
the state’s acknowledgment of  other religious groups. However, toleration as 
developed by Ottomans, had a little to do with ideals or with culture of  tolera-
tion. The Ottomans attitude to religious diversity was actually a pragmatic way 
to qualify and maintain the differences within the empire, to organize the dif-
ferent communities, to establish peace and order, and to ensure the loyalty of  
these communities (Barkey 2008). Precisely, in terms of  diversity management 
practices, the Ottoman government utilized a pragmatic, non-ideological style 
2 This work assumes toleration as the absence of  persecution of  a people but not their complete 
acceptance into society as full and welcomed members or communities.
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of  rule and granted broad autonomy to diverse groups in order to maintain 
public order and prevent internal violence (Levy 2000). The Islamic set of  
guidelines for Muslim-non-Muslim relations facilitated the integration of  the 
non-Muslim communities, but crucial was the convergence of  other elements 
such as the openness of  the Ottoman leaders to the ’other’ and the relatively 
weaker Islamic identification of  the rulers that allowed a unique experience of  
permissiveness and forbearance. This attitude was the outcome of  the historic 
Ottoman path or ‘path dependence’ marked by the assimilation of  customs 
and practices by various civilization including Seljuk, Mongols and Byzantium 
(Lowry 2003). The ancient tribal practices (yāsā), Seljuk filter of  Islam, Mon-
gols customs (‘örf) and Byzantine administrative system had several effects on 
the Ottomans diversity management policies, especially in the early period. 
Thus, toleration emerged as the negotiated outcome of  intergroup relations 
and was maintained in the first three centuries of  Ottoman rule, both from 
the top down by the state and from the bottom up by communities where 
each shared an interest in the maintenance of  intercommunal peace and order.
The set of  regulations and practices shaping the relation of  the Ottoman 
Empire’s ruling class with its non-Muslim subjects is commonly referred to as 
the millet system (Braude, Lewis 1980)3. The word millet, literally means ‘nation’, 
was used to define religious groups who were subjects of  the Ottoman Empire. 
Moreover, all through Ottoman history, the term millet was used to refer to mi-
norities and the term “minority” was never applied until Lausanne Treaty in 1923 
(Atabay et al. 2008). The Ottomans allowed the “religions of  the Book” to be 
organized in communities: the Orthodox Christians or Rums, the Armenians 
and the Jews (Ercan 2000). The Ottomans dispensed justice fairly, treating dhimmi 
as separate, unequal, and protected (Yetişgin 2007). According to the millet sys-
tem, which is the primary mechanism to manage the internal affairs, minorities 
enjoyed wide latitude of  religious and cultural freedom, as well as administrative, 
fiscal and legal autonomy (Atabay et al. 2008). There were two fundamental ob-
ligations for millet’s members: paying taxes and sustaining public order (Ortayli 
2004). State taxes were collectively assessed by the local Ottoman authorities to 
the local community as a whole, but the amount was generally set through nego-
tiations between the community leadership and the local authorities (Levy 2000).
3 The modern historiography shows that the use of  term millet is quite recent and concerns 
mainly the 19th century. The term is not reduced in the beginning of  the Ottoman period, in the 
14th and 15th centuries. So the use of  the term millet as a nation and religious community is not 
that old in the Ottoman history. The term has for this reason been labelled as an ‘historical fe-
tish’ plaguing the historiography of  the last hundred years. The terms that they mean a religious 
community are the terms takin, cemaat and tâ’ife. The term millet was almost non-existent at the 
duration of  the 15th and 16th centuries while in the 17th century it is used in order to describe 
a religious community. The term that is used more often by the Ottoman administration is the 
term tâ’ife, who is replaced finally in the beginning of  the 19th century Braude, Lewis (1980).
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2.3 the ottoMan InstItutIon of MIllet
During the 16th century the Ottoman Empire witnessed the foundation of  its 
political and social institutions that were to last until modern times. In order to 
his power to be effective, the Ottomans attempted to control their population 
as much as possible through the centralization of  government. This attitude 
led them to develop and support strong hierarchical administrative structures 
for the different communities (Levy 2000). The government (core) shared 
control on peripheries with a variety of  intermediate organizations and with 
local elites, religious and local governing bodies, and numerous other privi-
leged institutions, creating an ‘hub-and-spoke’ structure. Ottoman core-pe-
ripheral structure was not direct between state and individual subjects, rather, 
intermediate bodies, networks, and elites mediated the relationship. The main 
organizational unit of  the Ottoman Empire was the community. Religious 
communities, local administrative community units, and guilds as economic 
communities represented the means through which Ottomans administered 
and controlled society (Barkey 2008).
The Empire’s domains linked three continents encompassing an array of  
cultures, languages, peoples and various social and political structures. Diver-
sity in the Ottoman Empire was due to many different factors like ethnicity 
(Arabs, Kurds, Laz, Tcherkess, Greeks, Albanians), language (Arabic, Kurdish, 
Turkish, Greek, Bulgarian, Armenian, Albanian, Serbian), and religion (Ortho-
dox, Gregorian, Jewish, Catholic). However, a major criterion for defining dif-
ferent groups in the Ottoman Empire was religion (Mardin 1977; Anscombe 
2014). In a society segmented along religious lines, a special place among the 
intermediate bodies was of  the non-Muslim confessional communities known 
as nation (millet). The religious community (millet) progressively acquired insti-
tutional status and were recognized by the Ottoman state as a mechanism of  
social and political control.
The Ottoman state organized and administered a system of  religious and 
communal rule as a version of  indirect rule known as the millet system (Greene 
2005). The millet system was to some extent an improved version of  Islamic 
dhimmi system for pragmatic reasons (Cleveland 2013). At the early years of  
the Empire, there were four main religious groups, namely the Muslims, the 
Orthodox Christians, the Gregorian Armenians and the Jews. Communities 
had their own organizational structures, a dominant church hierarchy, and 
their leaders were coopted as intermediaries and peacekeepers between state/
core (hub) and community/periphery (spoke). Three non-Muslim millets were 
organized around their dominant religious institutions, with the understanding 
that religious institutions would define and delimit collective life. All non-Mus-
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lims subjects had to be part of  a millet in order to be considered as citizens of  
the Ottoman Empire (Braude and Lewis 1980).
The millet system was a vehicle for administrative purposes (Hovannisian 
1997; Göçek 2005). In this system, all minorities freely engaged in their daily 
activities and their own economic, educational, cultural, social and religious 
affairs. The millet institution was a quasi autonomous unit which performed 
functions in legislative, judicial, fiscal, religious and charitable affairs and were 
responsible for educating their members. Inside them, community’s members 
enjoyed the same liberty and rights as Muslims. Privacy of  residence, liberty 
of  religion and thought, liberty of  education, right to have access to public 
utilities and employment right were all recognized to non-Muslims, provided 
that they belonged to a millet. They were free to establish and maintain their 
houses of  worship, own educational institutions, own welfare institutions and 
own community courts. They were also permitted to collect their own internal 
taxes (Ursinus 1993).
The three main non-Muslims groups were incorporated and administrated 
differently, but the main similarity was the establishment in each case of  in-
termediaries who managed relations for the state, reproducing hub-and-spoke 
structure. The Greek Orthodox millet was recognized in 1454, the Armenian 
in 1461 while the Jewish millet remained without a declared definite status 
for a while though it was unofficially recognized around the same time as the 
other two (McCarthy 1973; Ben-Naeh 2008).
The top of  ecclesiastical hierarchy of  non-Muslim communities become 
the institution of  indirect rule par excellence within the Ottoman hub-and-
spoke structure. Each millet was headed by its own religious dignitary: Ec-
umenical Patriarch in the case of  the Greek Orthodox, a Catholicos in the 
case of  Armenian community, and a Chief  Rabbi in the case of  the Jews. The 
millets had freedom in electing their religious leaders but the elected leaders 
were approved by the Sultan. Through the sultan’s decree of  investiture (berat) 
the leader of  each millet was in charge as a public servant with the title of  millet 
başi. The millet başi, a high ranking paşa entitled to three horse tails (tugs), was 
accountable to the Sultan for the loyalty of  his community and was the chief  
interlocutor of  the Sublime Port (Kenanoğlu 2004). In other words, the millet 
başi recognized as Ottoman official, was held responsible for any act of  rebel-
lion committed by millet members against the state.
These mediators were expected to maintain inter-religious and inter-ethnic 
peace. Moreover, community leaders, alongside the central state, were inter-
ested in preserving the status quo as well as communities boundaries. These 
intermediaries were controlled by the state, and often were unappreciated by 
their religious communities. Moreover, although the clerics might have had a 
leader position in the millet hierarchy, this was always tempered by the local 
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notables’ and laity’ s economic and political power. This balance reflected the 
one that could be found within Muslim community between the ulama class 
and the province notables (ayan). The potential power of  the confessional 
leaders was diminished by the Ottoman acceptance of  millet secular leader-
ship acting to balance ecclesiastical concerns (Karpat 2002).
The millet system was a socio-cultural and communitarian form of  organi-
zation which was based primarily on sectarian identity, and only secondarily on 
linguistic and ethnic features (Karpat 1980). Nonetheless, each millet had its 
own internal complexity of  competing leaders and institutions which reflected 
different ethnic groups. For example, the Greek Orthodox millet, the biggest 
one, included Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Romanians, Vlachos, Bosnians and 
the inhabitants of  southern Albania. Since the Ottoman government gave lit-
tle or no consideration to millet ethnic or religious differences, the local church 
and village communities took over as the strongholds of  cultural identity and 
linguistic continuity (Hupchick 1993). As Karpat (1980: 147) summarized, the 
millet system allowed individual communities to retain their local ethnic and 
linguistic distinctiveness, and thus produced a system of  “simultaneously, religious 
universality and local parochialism”. Relative segregation as well as the freedom 
to give an education in their own schools allowed each group to preserve its 
own language, customs and culture, observe its festivals and holidays and in 
general live in accordance with the rhythm of  its own calendar and traditions 
(Levy 2000).
Even though the imperial pattern of  vertical integration (hub-and-spoke) 
was reproduced in religious administration and boundaries were maintained 
by each side, relations among communities flourished in the everyday inter-
actions (Goffman 1994: 135-158). Contacts of  each community with other 
groups led to considerable acculturation and borrowing, which affected lan-
guage and every other aspect of  culture and daily life (Levy 2000). This be-
cause where religion and key institutional policies clearly demarcated bound-
aries between Muslims and non-Muslims, other institutions, such as markets 
(bazaar), neighborhoods (mahalle) and everyday practices, made possible the 
flow from one community to others (Barkey 2008). The presence of  safe 
boundaries among communities and the tolerant and impartial attitude of  the 
Ottoman state favored a long period of  peaceful interreligious and interethnic 
cohabitation, known as Pax-Ottomanica (Aydin 2010). Especially, the classical 
period in Ottoman history has been expressed as Ottoman Peace due to this 
diverse peaceful coexistence (Ercan 2000).
In addition to a long peaceful cohabitation, one of  the main privileges of  
millet was the high level of  social cooperation; each millet’s member shared 
a common life without being assimilated by a larger community or culture 
(Yetişgin 2007). The boundaries between the different communities were 
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definite but fluid, and there were public spaces where the entire population, 
Muslims and non-Muslims, freely mixed, could create an intercultural envi-
ronment. In this particular environment, intercommunity relations facilitat-
ed the rise of  multilingualism, which contributed to the general Ottoman 
cultural synthesis.
Non-Muslim communities were subject to their own ethnoreligious 
groups in the field of  private law, and in public law they were subject to 
state law. Even if  the millets had their own community courts, the problems 
between Muslims and non-Muslims were subject to Islamic law and the state 
authorities, namely kadı, judged them. Yet, within the Ottoman context state 
law was plural because both religious law (Şeriat/Sharī’a) and secular or or-
dinary law (kânûn) were in force. The Şeriat provided the principle of  public 
law, and covered matters of  personal behaviour and status in the Muslim 
millet in the same way that members of  Christian and Jewish millets were 
subject to their own religious codes (Heyd 1973; Sonyel 1993). This picture 
shows how the millet system was not only a structure which guaranteed re-
ligious pluralism, but also a model of  legal pluralism. The different sources 
of  law were exercised by the religious and administrative authorities of  the 
empire and were welded together or separated out of  local necessity (Ger-
ber 1999). Moreover, Islam’s blueprint for ruling non-Muslims communities 
allowed the communities to maintain their own religious tribunals with ju-
risdiction over personal law (Ross 2013). As Richard Ross (2013) elegantly 
shows, legal pluralism in the Ottoman Empire was linked with the special 
relationship established between state and religion, with the latter subordi-
nate to the first; the fact that religious law never dominated as a single source 
of  law was important for Ottoman state and society.
The historiographical interest and debate about the millet system is still 
very heated. According to Braude and Lewis (1980) the millet system was not 
an empire wide system that was regulating the communities of  the non-Mus-
lim subjects of  the empire during the 15th and 16th centuries beyond the 
capital, but this happened only when the Tanzimat reforms took place. Ursi-
nus (1993), on the other hand, refers to millet to define a religious community 
during the pre-modernization era of  the empire, and the term was used by 
Ottomans in order to describe the religious non-Muslim communities that 
were living in the ottoman state. The sure thing is that the Ottoman pluralism, 
religious and legal, as well as Ottomans ability in managing diversity contribut-
ed in the end to strengthen the stability of  the Empire.
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2.4 conclusIon
The millet system functioned well until the European concepts of  nationalism 
and ethnicity filtered into the Ottoman Empire, in the second half  of  the 19th 
century. During the long 1800s several changes took place which altered the 
land tenure system, the social arrangement, the communal organization, and 
ultimately the social structure and leadership of  the millets. Until then, the 
millet contributed to the preservation of  a separate identity and, eventually, 
to the generation of  a nationalist consciousness distinct from that of  Otto-
man Muslims. This trend was facilitated by reform programs promoted by the 
Ottoman government, known as Tanzimat (Reorganization). The equality of  
all Ottoman nationals was the leading policy of  the reforms. The Ottoman 
administration tried to instill a sense of  common identity and significance 
of  patriotism in the population: the Ottoman identity (Osmanılılık). With the 
statement of  equality of  all the subjects of  the empire, the Muslims felt they 
lost the essential superiority they possessed regarding the non-Muslims (Davi-
son, 1990). Meanwhile, non-Muslims were susceptible to the ideas of  equality 
and nationalism emanating from the French Revolution.
As Levy (2000) accurately emphasized the Ottoman millet system was not 
an original Ottoman innovation, but it had its origins in earlier Middle Eastern 
states, both Muslim (Umayyad, Abbasid) and non-Muslim (Persian, Byzan-
tine). The Ottoman contribution was mainly to regulate and institutionalize it, 
pay greater attention to its proper operation, and bring it down from medieval 
times to the 20th century. The Ottoman flexible and pragmatic approach to 
diversity was institutionalized into millet, displaying a mosaic pattern, in which 
non-Muslims enjoyed a partial autonomy (Davison, 1980). The Ottoman Em-
pire was able to establish mainly a plural organization, which had assisted them 
to gain the benefits of  diversity.
As the evaluations of  this chapter suggest, the Ottoman organization was 
mainly plural in its nature, as the diverse religious communities could preserve 
their style of  living as well as becoming part of  the Ottoman population. In 
other words, the Ottoman diverse management could be consider an expe-
rience where a hierarchical institution conceived under unifying principle of  
religious identity, how was the millet, guaranteed for several years a pluralistic 
reality.
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Chapter Three
polItIcal pluralIsM and the unIty of huMankInd: 
the IMage of the respublica magna 
In alberIco gentIlI’s reflectIon
Davide Suin
Alberico Gentili1 (1552-1608)’s political doctrine develops in an historical con-
text marked by bitter tensions. In his multiform work, the author gives us a 
viewpoint open to the different contributions offered by late-Sixteenth Cen-
tury Europe’s theoretical and institutional changes. 
The Reformation had undermined the ethical and religious monism on 
which every theoretical construction of  political order in Respublica christiana 
was based: the religious conflicts that tore apart Europe in the second half  of  
the XVI century were also caused by the discovery of  the plurality of  values 
and principles founding ethical order and political laws. 
In his Mémoire sur la pacification des troubles (1561) Étienne de La Boétie 
(1530-1563) had expressed this opinion: 
Ogni male proviene dalla differenza religiosa, che è proceduta così avanti, che uno stesso 
popolo, soggetto a uno stesso potere, si trova ora scisso chiaramente in due parti: non 
solo sono differenti le opinioni, ma esistono ormai diverse chiese e diversi capi, opposte 
obbedienze, un diverso ordine, una diversa disciplina della religione; in breve, a causa di 
ciò esistono due Stati diversi, l’uno all’altro contrapposti (Quaglioni 2004: 73).
1 Gentili, born in San Ginesio in 1552, graduated in law in Perugia (1572). He abandoned Italy in 
1579 to reach England in 1580 where he became a brilliant academic jurist and lawyer. Biographical 
notes are in Molen van der (1937); Panizza (1981); De Benedictis (1999a: 245-251); Ragoni (2000).
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Religious foundation of  power is no more an instrument of  obedience and 
political submission; it becomes cause of  the disintegration of  political and 
social order. State existence as a unitary and monist entity seems to be com-
promised. 
New horizons were opening to a critical reflection on the faint founda-
tions of  reality. Gentili is witness to a phenomenon of  crisis in European 
conscience: the dissolution of  old socio-political relationships was combined 
with a veiled relativism in the individual conscience. The same Gentili adopts 
a relativistic approach to the issue of  religion and of  the relationship between 
the religious and political spheres. He reads reality with skeptical rationalism 
and distrusts the possibility of  reaching a complete knowledge about Truth 
and God: this is why religious differences and peaceful interreligious and in-
ter-confessional coexistence should be guaranteed.
Even if  on the religious side Gentili accepts pluralism by means of  toler-
ation – because «quelli che sono posseduti dall’umano errore e, pur mossi dal 
desiderio del bene, non seguono una buona religione, non vanno per questo 
contro il diritto naturale» and so they should be tolerated (Gentili A. 2008: 
60) – on the political side Gentili is a firm defender of  State monism. Unity 
and cohesion, threatened by religious divisions, must be guarded in the State: 
theological and religious differences should be solved, or at least lessened by 
this common belonging to the monist body of  the State. 
Sovereign States were replacing the Medieval universal empire, the modern 
system of  States was developing as a pluralist community: uneven on both 
political and religious sides. 
On the political side, Gentili’s approach is strongly inspired by relativism, 
especially regarding study of  the forms of  government (Panizza 2002: 59-
213). He elects effectiveness in the exercise of  power as the only criterion to 
evaluate politics: a power is sovereign when effective and continuous (Suin 
2015: 431-448). This idea leads Gentili to recognize the plurality of  the centers 
of  power and legitimize the countless manifestations of  sovereignty.
The author, by abandoning the traditional interpretative categories of  po-
litical experience (in particular the classic distinction between good and evil 
forms of  government), assumes a position near to relativism. Gentili raises 
the principle of  supremitas – a power superiorem non recognoscens – to the only 
measure of  evaluation of  political legitimacy and affirms the equal value and 
dignity of  the different constitutions: there are no good or degenerate forms 
of  government.
Gentili’s reflection is expression of  a common tendency in late-Sixteenth 
cultural climate: politics was conceived as a theory of  obedience to power, it 
was reduced to the problem of  effectiveness of  power and to the force of  the 
sovereign authority: this is the only guarantee of  peace and order.
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This approach explains the absence, in Gentili’s theory, of  a systematic 
reflection on the forms of  government: Gentili does not single out the best 
constitution. In De iure belli (1598) the Italian jurist, evoking Michel de Montai-
gne (1533-1592)’s reflection2, argues: «Come ogni animale ha il suo verso, così 
ciascuno Stato ha la sua forma di governo: ad alcuni si adatta la democrazia, ad 
altri l’oligarchia, ad altri ancora il governo di uno solo» (Gentili A. 2008: 493).
Realistically Gentili, neglecting the traditional binomial princeps-tyrannus, re-
duces the category of  tyranny to a merely ethical side supporting the absolutist 
tendencies of  Modern monarchies. 
Bodin and Machiavelli had strongly contributed to the diffusion of  an image 
of  sovereignty as potestas absoluta: a power, which consists of  the derogation of  
laws and, pro salute reipublicae, to moral principles too (Quaglioni 1992; Id. 2004). 
A new image of  sovereignty was asserting itself  in political doctrine while the 
category of  tyranny was gradually being eroded by modern civil jurists.
Alberico Gentili plays a central role in this process. He refutes the clear 
distinction between good prince and tyrant: they enjoy same rights because 
«uterque dominus est» and «uterque tenet principatum» (Gentili A. 1585: 53). 
Often, Gentili affirms in De armis Romanis (1599), «creditur principatus, quae 
saeva dominatio est» (Gentili A. 2011: 114).
Sometimes tyranny, argues Gentili in De iure belli, appears to be the best 
solution to save power and to ensure the safety of  the State: «Si dice anche 
che la tirannide può essere una buona cosa per uno stato lacerato, perché c’è 
bisogno di qualcuno che vi porti la pace: il tiranno allora è come un principe» 
(Gentili A. 2008: 493). 
The category of  tyranny ex parte exercitii is demolished: like a good prince, 
the tyrant should be considered legitimate for being sovereign and owner of  
an effective and unbroken power. Subjects can’t rebel to the prince, not even 
to the princeps malus: they must «obbedire al sommo magistrato» (Gentili A. 
2008: 74) and, if  ruled cruelly, they have as only possibility the escape or the 
intervention of  a foreign sovereign (Gentili A. 2008: 75, 108-114). 
In De armis Romanis, political treatise in which the author focuses on Ro-
man imperialism, Gentili moves to Brutus, the murderer of  Caesar, this objec-
tion: «Obsistere potueris invadenti principatum: factum principem tollere non 
potuisti» (Gentili A. 2011: 38).
Resistance to authority, if  not explicitly allowed – as happens in the Ger-
man Empire where the Emperor is not sovereign (Bodin 1988: 391-392) –, is 
unlawful. 
2 Montaigne in his Essays (1588) had affirmed: «E certo tutte quelle descrizioni di governi, immagi-
nate per arte, si trovano ridicole e inadatte ad esser messe in pratica. Quelle grandi e lunghe discus-
sioni sulla miglior forma di società e sulle regole più utili per tenerci uniti, sono discussioni conve-
nienti soltanto all’esercizio del nostro spirito […] e non hanno alcuna vita fuori di lì» (1970: 1273).
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In Regales disputationes (1605), conclusion of  a reflection mostly aimed at 
the legitimation of  European monarchies’ absolutist tendencies, Gentili – by 
referring to Roman law and Scriptural tradition – observes that tyrannized 
subjects can only hope in God’s justice: solely God can remove evil rulers 
from power (Gentili A. 1605: 99-132). Anyway, Gentili’s absolutist position in 
Regales disputationes should not be read as the election of  absolute monarchy to 
the rank of  the best constitution. 
Prudently, the Italian jurist recognizes absolute and centralized monarchy 
as the only answer to political and institutional instability: a strong monarchy 
could guarantee the endurance of  peace and security in England. 
The absolutist solution offered in Regales disputationes is inspired by Ius-
tus Lipsius’ political reflection3, in particular the three conclusive books 
of  his Politicorum libri sex (1589): emblem (together with the successful De 
Constantia, 15844) of  late-renaissance neo-stoicism5. With the Flemish hu-
manist Gentili shared, beyond the pragmatic approach to the question of  
relation between politics and ethics6, the concept of  absolute monarchy as 
a bastion against the crisis of  political community and as an efficient an-
swer to the threats of  civil and religious conflicts7. This concept, in Lipsius’ 
theory, was combined with the affirmation of  subjection to authority as an 
ethical value.
In De iure belli Gentili refutes Lipsius’ theory on religious policy (Gentili A. 
2008: 63, 66-67) – the Flemish humanist treated this question principally in the 
Book IV of  Politicorum libri sex and in De una religione adversus Dialogistam liber 
– and the ambiguous definition of  war offered by Lipsius in Book V of  the 
same work where, Gentili affirms, the humanist «attribuisce dignità di guerra 
3 The Flemish humanist is constantly quoted in Gentili’s works. Lipsius, editor of  several mo-
dern publications of  Tacitus’ works (1574, 1576, 1581, 1585, 1588, 1589, 1600, 1607) and com-
mentaries to the Latin author, is yet mentioned in Gentili’s De legationibus (1585). We have a 
reference to Lipsius’ commentary to Tacitus’ Annales (1581) in Gentili A. (1585:27).
4 The work was translated in English in 1604.
5 The fortunate Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae libri sex appears in English translation in 1594. Also 
Guillaume du Vaur’s La Philosophie Morale des Stoiques (1585 ) had great significance in the diffusion 
of  Stoic tradition, the work was printed in English in 1598: The Moral Philosophie of  the Stoicks. The 
interest for stoic tradition is testified by the important editions of  Seneca promoted by Erasmo, 
Lipsius (1605) and Marc-Antoine Muret (1585). On Lipsius’ edition of  Seneca and his introduction 
to the Latin author (Manuductio in Stoicam Philosophiam, 1604) see Isnardi Parente (2008: 169-186).
6 Lipsius’ pragmatism is evident in the election of  precautionary prudence to first virtue of  the 
Prince. By referring to this virtue, the author formulates the expression prudentia mixta, a faded 
reference to Renaissance virtue of  prudence as art of  behaviour and technique of  mediation 
between ethics and utility: prudence permits the composition of  the irreconcilable conflict 
between praxis and moral laws. See Provvidera (2012).
7 These themes are central in Lipsius’ doctrine, as we can infer from the reading of  his copious 
correspondence in the years 1584-1589.
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anche alla violenza di privati cittadini e di predoni» and «non fa alcun cenno 
alla giustizia» (Gentili A. 2008: 17). 
However the importance of  Lipsius in Gentili’s formation is undeniable: 
Gentili accepts and reworks Lipsius’ idea of  prudentia mixta and the study of  
the Flemish philologist conveyed him the political value of  Tacitus’ works.
In the dedication, addressed to the Ordinibus Bataviae, of  Lipsius’ commen-
tary to Annales (1581) the Latin author is seen as master of  political prudence: 
Tacitus had read recurring events in human history and similitudo temporum as 
sources of  descriptive principles for political action (Lipsius 1581). In a note 
in Book IV of  Politicorum libri sex Lipsius had expressed this opinion: «Tacito 
sembra essere autore oscuro tuttavia ammetto che la sua scrittura è penetrante 
e acuta. Raccomando la sua lettura ai consiglieri dei principi come guida per la 
loro azione politica e per la loro prudenza» (Provvidera 2012: 200).
Prudence, aimed at peace and stability of  the State (the highest form of  
utility and the aim of  politics), is for Lipsius and Gentili the principal virtue 
of  a politician.
Tacitus, edited by Filippo Beroaldo il Giovane8, Beathus Rhenanus and Ius-
tus Lipsius, was a recurring source in the late-Sixteenth political debate (Bar-
cia 2003: 43-58). Giovanni Botero in the premised dedication to Ragion di Stato 
(1589) had observed that «nelle corti di re e principi grandi, or di qua or di là dai 
monti» he had heard talking about Reason of  State and «in cotal materia citare 
ora Nicolò Machiavelli ora Cornelio Tacito» (Baldini, Battista 1997: 398).
It has been observed that Tacitus’ works, in particular Annales and Historiae, 
have been plagiarized in order to support the most various doctrinal posi-
tions: Tacitus was recalled by republican authors as by absolutist ones. Iustus 
Lipsius had realized the double potentiality of  Tacitus’ historical treaties: in 
his over-quoted commentary to Tacitus the Flemish humanist had caught the 
anti-monarchical implications in Tacitus’ depiction of  Tiberius, while in Po-
liticorum libri sex the Latin author was quoted to corroborate absolutism and 
subjection to authority.
Giuseppe Toffanin, in his classic work consecrated to the study of  modern 
Tacitism, has widely investigated Tacitus’ reception in late-Sixteenth political 
debate: his partition of  Tacitism into three macro-currents is surely fascinating 
but equally inadequate to explain the use of  Tacitus in political literature and 
Gentili’s position (Toffanin 1972). 
Gentili’s reflection is mostly extraneous to ideological confrontation between 
anti-monarchical and absolutist authors. Gentili’s intention is not to single out 
8 Beroaldo, in his dedicatory letter premised to the editio princeps of  Tacitus (1515), had un-
derlined the political interest of  Tacitus’ writings. In relation to Tacitus’ works the editor had 
affirmed: «summe utilem cum privatis hominibus tum vero etiam principibus et imperatoribus»; 
the quotation is in Valeri (2011: 257).
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the best form of  government or an ideal theoretical model, he aims to describe 
the reality of  power and searches for a mediation between politics and ethics.
Tacitus is not quoted in order to support republican or monarchical political 
values, from the Latin author’s works Gentili extracts exempla of  political pru-
dence: Tacitus is master of  political realism, he is a forerunner of  Machiavelli’s.
Guicciardini observed that Tacitus «insegna a’ tiranni e modi di fondare 
la tirannide» and «a chi vive sotto a’ tiranni il modo di vivere e governar-
si prudentemente» (Guicciardini 1994: 10): in Gentili these are not the only 
teachings of  Tacitus’, Tacitus has revealed arcana of  politics and the iron-clad 
reason of  a power seen as secrecy and deceit. 
In one letter, collected in the second book of  the work Lectionum et epistola-
rum quae ad ius civile pertinent (1583-1584), Gentili refers to Tacitus by defining 
arcana imperii as «rationes, et consilia, quae dum maxime inducunt, firmant[q]ue 
tyrannidem, hanc protinus, maximeque tegunt» (Gentili A. 1583-1584: 117)9. 
Arcana imperii are instruments, intrigues and stratagems which hide dominatio, 
tyranny: Gentili asserts the coincidence of  the two terms dominatio and tyrannis 
in Latin culture (Gentili A. 1583-1584: 117). 
As Gentili affirmed in the conclusion of  the letter, in Latin political lan-
guage dominatio and tyrannis were synonyms: both are expressions of  imperium 
(Gentili A. 1583-1584: 117). 
Ancient and modern history offer several illustrious examples of  tyranni-
cal rulers and, as Gentili clarifies in the third book of  De legationibus, Machi-
avelli has uncovered the arcana of  power to oppressed peoples10. However 
tyrannized subjects (as Gentili diffusely asserts in the third disputation of  the 
treatise Regales disputationes) cannot oppose any form of  active resistance to 
sovereign authority. Violent resistance to the sovereign, as well as being illegit-
imate (because the ruler is responsible for his actions only to God), damages 
the political community: rebellion and the overthrow of  government cause 
instability in the State and conduce to death and ruin11. 
9 Scipione Gentili, Alberico’s brother, would offer a more detailed definition of  arcana imperii in 
his Oratio de Lege Regia, de Imperio Principis (1600) where he gives a definition inspired to the most 
recent developments in the debate on Reason of  State: «Arcana […] imperii non Principem 
& Imperatorem solum respicere, sed ipsius Reipublicae in universum salutem, tranquillitatem, 
atque amplitudinem, immo formam administrationis, intelligo. Quae formae quum multae sint 
atque variae, etiam arcana imperii cuiusque varia esse oportet. Graeci sofismata vocant, de qu-
ibus in Politic. Aristoteles libr. IV cap. VII exponit»; Gentili S. (1766: 285). Scipione Gentili, 
who undertook a brilliant academic career in Germany (De Benedictis 1999b: 268-272), was 
probably influenced by Arnold Clapmarius (1574-1604)’s doctrine (the two scholars probably 
met in Altdorf) and by Scipione Ammirato’s distinction between good and evil reason of  State. 
One distinction which was widespread in German political debate; Stolleis (1998: 31-68).
10 Machiavelli didn’t aim «tyrannum instruere, sed arcanis eius palam factis ipsum miseris populis 
nudum et conspicuum exhibere»; Gentili A. (1585: 109).
11 By quoting Tacitus and the esteemed Gerolamo Cardano (author of  the Encomium Neronis) 
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At the end of  his third disputation Gentili further confirms his own thesis 
on the illegitimacy of  resistance to authority by quoting the dialogue X of  the 
book XIX of  Scipione Ammirato’s Discorsi sopra Cornelio Tacito (1594). On this 
matter the humanist had affirmed: 
Cosi possiam dire noi, si trovano de i Principi scelerati […] ma infelicissimi quelli, i 
quali ardiranno di manometter la persona reale. […] se natione alcuna è al mondo, la 
qual habbia minore scusa di ribellarsi, o di congiurar contro il suo principe, questa è 
la Christiana, ammaestrata a non ricusare d’ubbidire al suo giusto e legittimo signore; 
ma quando quello pur reo, e malvagio fosse, vuol, che in ogni modo gli si presti ubbi-
dienza, tollerando patientemente l’asprezza della sua servitù. Poi che tale habbiamo 
a credere, che sia la volontà di Dio, nella cui mano sono i cuori de i re (Ammirato 
1607: 498-499).
Passive submission to the ruler’s will and stoical subjection to the supreme 
authority are essential conditions to aim to the highest utility: State stability 
and safety. 
Anyway in Gentili, the achievement of  these values does not mean the 
denial of  the universal principles of  natural law on which relations among sov-
ereign States are funded. These natural and moral laws constitute ius gentium, a 
right «di cui usano le genti umane, un diritto che la ragione naturale costituì fra 
tutti gli uomini e che è custodito in modo perfettamente uguale presso tutti i 
popoli» (Gentili A. 2008: 10).
Gentili identifies universal moral and rational laws as foundations of  hu-
man coexistence: these laws, being innate to human reason, are valid both in 
the internal field (that of  relations between rulers and subjects) and external 
field of  relations among States:
Non sono adatti ai principi quei precetti dei libri di Giustiniano, «vivere onestamente», 
«non ledere altrui», «dare a ciascuno il suo», «proteggere i figli», «respingere l’ingiuria», 
«sentirsi affratellati con l’umanità intiera», «mantenere i commerci», e gli altri di questo 
genere, e quelli che da questi derivano e che sono sparsi quasi dappertutto in quei libri? 
(Gentili A. 2008: 25).
Even if  on the side of  international relations, the violation of  natural laws is 
a valid cause of  war (because it is legitimate moving a war to reply to the vio-
lation of  a right), on the internal side the natural laws’ force is far from being 
guaranteed: their violation doesn’t legitimize subjects’ resistance by means of  
force. 
Gentili observes that the Roman Empire’s condition during Nero’s administration was much 
better than in the turbulent years that followed his death; Gentili A. (1605: 103).
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To this contradiction Gentili answers by originally elaborating the teach-
ings of  stoic cosmopolitanism, a doctrine which he approached by reading 
Seneca and Cicero. Cicero in De Officiis (one of  the most quoted works in 
Gentili’s treatises) evokes the primary social connection which naturally binds 
all men: one universal dimension of  sociality constituted on the rational nature 
of  men (Scuccimarra 2009: 30-50). 
Seneca would underline the universal value of  natural and rational princi-
ples of  justice innate to men, he would affirm the defense of  those principles 
as a duty of  solidarity to every member of  the immense human community: 
the respublica magna (Seneca De providentia, 5, 4). In one famous passage in Epis-
tolae morales (95, 33), by Gentili quoted in De iure belli, Seneca had asserted:
Teniamo sempre questo verso nel cuore e sulle labbra: sono un uomo, e non giudico a me 
estraneo nulla di ciò che è umano. Mettiamo tutto in comune: siamo nati per una vita 
in comune. La nostra società è molto simile a una volta di pietre: cadrebbe, se le pietre 
non si sostenessero reciprocamente, ed è proprio questo che le sorregge (Seneca Epistulae 
morales, 95, 33). 
Gentili is an important voice in the modern revival of  the paradigm of  soci-
etas hominum and its universalistic ethic. He sees, in the natural membership 
of  every rational creature to the human community, the source of  binding 
moral obligations to men: the ideal of  an ethical and juridical community of  
humankind which gathers together all nations, despite their different cultures 
and religions.
In De iure belli there are many references to the philosophical and literary 
tradition of  classical cosmopolitanism. The first book of  the work starts with 
a reference to Seneca’s image of  magna respublica, the stoic societas hominum12: 
«Questa filosofia della guerra concerne la grande comunità politica, l’universo 
orbe della terra e il genere umano tutto» (Gentili A. 2008: 3). 
In the chapters of  the first book of  De iure belli, dedicated to the illustration 
of  the just causes of  war, the constructive value of  Gentili’s confrontation 
with the conceptual constellation of  classical cosmopolitanism is clear. Gen-
tili, by dealing with some fundamental theoretical matters (for example the 
question of  the war legitimacy), manifests being in debt with Cicero’s idea of  
a natural kin of  human beings. 
In the chapter XV (De honesta defensione) Gentili illustrates the category of  
wars moved for an honest cause: these are defined as a kind of  just, defensive 
war waged in gratiam aliorum. Honest wars are not conduced to repel a threat or 
to satisfy a personal utility but to aid people unlawfully attacked by an enemy 
or cruelly subjugated (Gentili A. 2008: 97-114, 175-184). 
12 On this image see Scuccimarra (2006: 239-281).
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To legitimize this particular kind of  military intervention Gentili recalls, be-
yond the Aristotelian idea of  the natural sociability of  men and the Christian 
imperative of  charity, the Stoic concept of  the unity of  human kind (image which 
inspired also the authors of  Vindiciae contra Tyrannos (1579), treatise probably 
introduced in England by intellectuals near to the Huguenot Philippe Duples-
sis-Mornay)13: «noi siamo le membra di quell’unico, grande corpo che è il mondo» 
(Gentili A. 2008: 97), «se l’uomo è un animale sociale generato alla comunità, non 
può non guardare al mondo che come a una sola dimora» (Gentili A. 2008: 98)14.
The honest defense is based on the «fondamento di quei vincoli di paren-
tela, amore e benevolenza che la natura ha costituito tra gli uomini» (Gentili A. 
2008: 97). Gentili confirms this political theory by recalling, as well as Cicero 
and Seneca, Lactantius, Philo of  Alexandria, Tertullian: a real compendium of  
classical cosmopolitanism.
In De iure belli Gentili underlines that men are bound to help each other for 
natural and moral reasons because «la legge di natura ci costringe alla carità 
universale» (Gentili A. 2008: 98)15: these principles, inserted in the context of  
development of  ius naturae et gentium, become the foundations of  the theoretical 
framework where the regulation of  relations among sovereign States develops:
occorre che le armi siano pubbliche da entrambe le parti e che, da entrambe le parti, 
siano i principi a fare la guerra. […] La guerra è stata introdotta per quella necessita 
che è dovuta al fatto che fra principi sovrani o popoli liberi non possono esservi dispute 
nel foro, se non previo accordo delle parti, perché essi non hanno né giudice né superiore. 
[…] Sulla terra il principe non ha giudice, o altrimenti non è un principe quello al di 
sopra del quale c’è un altro che occupa il primo posto (Gentili A. 2008: 21)16.
What – Gentili affirms – Plato had observed relatively to private people should 
be associated to sovereign States (Gentili 2008: 99): «la condotta che deve te-
nere un privato cittadino nello stato è la medesima che deve tenere il pubblico 
13 By referring to the Stoic tradition Gentili affirms: «Gli Stoici pensavano che tutto il mondo 
fosse una sola città, e che tutti gli uomini fossero il suo popolo, e immaginavano i suoi cittadini 
come un solo armento che brucava in un pascolo comune»; (2008: 97). The authors of  Vindiciae 
contra Tyrannos had aimed: «Del resto gli stessi pagani ci potrebbero insegnare ciò che la società 
umana e la natura comune richiede da noi in questo caso. Dice infatti Cicerone che tutti gli 
uomini hanno una stessa natura umana e la natura prescrive e ordina che un uomo desideri e 
procuri il bene dell’altro […]»; Testoni Binetti (1994: 186).
14 This consideration is extracted from Seneca’s De beneficiis.
15 The quotation is extracted by Ambrogio’s De officiis.
16 In Regales disputationes Gentili would affirmed: «Ille est huic absolute supremus, qui nihil su-
pra se, nisi Deum agnoscit: nec cuiquam reddere rationem, nisi Deo, habet. […] Et hoc igitur 
supremitatis est, ut nihil supra se, umquam cernat principatus, neque hominem, neque legem»; 
(1605: 9). Yet in De legationibus the Italian jurist utilizes the adjective «supremus», he defines the 
sovereign princes as supremi (1585: 7).
68 MonisMs and PluralisMs in the history of Political and social Models
cittadino in questo pubblico e universale stato del mondo, che riguarda i so-
vrani ed i popoli sovrani» (Gentili A. 2008: 99-100)17. These solidarity bonds 
legitimize foreign princes’ intervention to protect tyrannized subjects. Even 
if  on the theoretical side this solution appears to be a mediation between the 
sovereign power’s objectives and the binding principles of  justice inherent to 
human reason, on the practical side of  historical experience Gentili’s proposal 
is an extraordinary ideological instrument to support English foreign policy in 
the last decades of  XVI century. 
Gentili was near to the circles of  militant Protestantism, in particular to 
Philip Sidney and to the Earl of  Essex who were champions of  a strongly 
aggressive anti-Hapsburg foreign policy. The Flemish rebellion against Haps-
burg has a strategic significance in England’s political agenda and Gentili, not 
at random, becomes the defender of  English intervention to support the Low 
Countries: in Gentili’s works this action is conveniently associated to the im-
age of  the honest defense. 
The great heritage of  classical stoicism gives Gentili the inspiration to build, 
on the rising States’ common belonging to respublica magna, the doctrine of  ius 
belli and ius gentium. However Gentili’s political theory, despite the surprising 
modernity of  some conclusions, is anchored in a classical and Christian vision 
of  the order of  the Universe: Gentili’s reflection is not so innovative. The 
Italian jurist frames European relations with the ethnic-cultural Alterity in a 
system that goes beyond the limits of  the asymmetrical confrontation between 
Christians and Pagans or Civilized and Barbarian peoples, but he maintains an 
Eurocentric approach regarding the question of  relations between Europeans 
and Indians or, equally, between Christians and Ottomans. 
Gentili, taking part in the current debate on the conquering and submis-
sion of  the New World, refutes the classic reasons of  colonial legitimation but 
all the same he justifies European intervention and agrees with «l’opinione di 
chi definisce giusta la causa degli Spagnoli nella loro guerra agli Indi», because 
they – Gentili observes – «intrattenevano commerci carnali contrari al diritto 
divino, perfino con animali, e mangiavano carni umane, di uomini uccisi a 
questo scopo» (Gentili A. 2008: 176). These actions are «peccati contro la 
natura stessa del genere umano, e pertanto ben noti a tutti, salvo forse agli 
animali bruti, e ai bruti umani» (Gentili A. 2008: 176). 
The imposition by force of  a natural law conceived in the European con-
science shows the contradictions and inconsistencies of  Gentili’s image of  
respublica magna, the ambiguity of  a culture not yet completely detached from 
the Christian and Medieval tradition.
17 This quotation is extracted by Baldo degli Ubaldi’s Consilia.
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Chapter Four
Jacques basnage’s reInterpretatIon 
of cunaeus theocracy: a MonIstIc 
descrIptIon of a polItIcal Model
Iolanda Richichi
4.1 the lIterature of refuge
In 1685, Luigi XIV emanated the Fontainebleau’s edict in which he revoked the 
cult’s liberties without persecution from the state obtained by Huguenots in 1598 
with Nantes’ edict. The ‘Revocation of  Nantes’ edict caused an exodus of  Hugue-
nots from France and the exacerbation of  the theological tensions and the polit-
ical divergences that had characterized the French Protestantism for a long time. 
In this scenario, Protestants, Lutherans or Calvinist, which constituted a per-
secuted minority in France, weren’t united against the King’s choices. Instead, 
every confession was subject to painful intestine struggles for the determination 
of  some meaningless point of  dogma. These theological disputes produced a 
grateful literature. These works were divided in ideological-political terms but 
also geographic ones: a «géographie théologique» as François Laplanche called 
its (Laplanche 1986: 5). The relevance of  this literature was highlighted by the 
contemporary historiography, that reserved to these works more attention, by 
starting from the studies of  Laplanche to the most recent Laursen, Mckenna 
and Hubert Bost (Laursen 1995; Mckenna, Häseler 1999; Bost 2001).
It is possible to describe the dynamics to the Protestant Churches in France 
as divided in two academies, which belong to two different ways to consider 
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the faith: in the one hand we find the communities of  the North represented 
by the academy of  Saumur and on the other hand the Churches to South of  
the Loira, represented by the academy of  Sedan.
At the beginning of  the XVII century, the academy of  Saumur was consid-
ered the most important and productive institute related to humanistic studies. 
While the academy of  Sedan was the «vraie citadelle de l’orthodoxie dogma-
tique» as claimed by Pierre-Daniel Bourchenin (Bourchenin 1996²: 428). The 
last one academy was composed by the radical part of  French Protestantism 
and defined by a rigorous and orthodox Calvinism that was connected with the 
prophetism and the millenaristic expectations. The differences between the two 
academies didn’t concern exclusively dogmatic matters but also politic ones. The 
salmurianism movement was inspired by republican feelings and sustained by 
the aristocracy and by the high middle class. While Sedan’s academy was defined 
by monarchic tendencies and it supported the House of  Orange.
Despite the absence of  unity, the Huguenots exiles produced an important 
‘literature of  dissent’ focused on historical, theological and political points of  
view. These works constitued the ‘Refuge’s literature’1 and the authors were 
identified by the historiography as ‘second generation of  exiles’. The political 
and intellectual debate produced by this literature, inspired many works during 
the Enlightenment about the religious toleration.
4.2 respublIca hebraeoruM lIterature
The Jewish myth was an important topic used by the ‘second generation of  
exiles’. The first reason concerns the use of  the same topoi of  the first Hu-
guenots generation2 essays. After St. Bartholomew’s massacre, many works 
were focused on the people’s right of  revolt to a king which didn’t allow the 
cult’s liberty. Among these works the most important were the Francogallia of  
François Hotman (1573), Du droit des magistrats of  Théodore de Bèze (1574) 
and the Vindiciae contra Tyrannos (1579). In these texts, we can find a series of  
exempla drawn by the ancient Testament and a biblical language that was used 
by the authors to explain their points of  view. 
The second reason is the connection between the literature of  Refuge with 
Respublica Hebraeorum literature. 
1 This name comes from the reformed Churches constituted by the exiles out of  France.
2 The first generation of  exiles was composed by the Huguenots escaped from Saint Bar-
tholomew’s massacre in the night of  23-24 August 1572.
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From the 1570s to the 1670s many political thinkers transformed biblical 
‘exempla sacra’ of  Old Testament into an organic political model, the Respublica 
Hebraeorum. In the political debates of  the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
in northern Europe, many specific treatises employed the biblical texts to find 
legitimation for either monarchy, democracy, or aristocracy, such as Bonaven-
ture Bertram’s De Politia Judaica, tam civili quam ecclesiastica (1574), Carlo Sigonio’s 
De Republica Hebraeorum (1582), Althusius’s Politica methodice digesta (1603). All 
of  them discussed and referred to the biblical polity as a model. Although the 
secularization is one of  the key issues considered by historians analyzing the 
modern era, Christopher Ligota, Lea Campos Boralevi, Diego Quaglioni, Vit-
torio Conti’s studies about this topic showed the political nature of  this debate 
over the biblical polity, though using terms and themes traditionally belonged 
to theology (Ligota 1992; Conti 1997; Campos, Quaglioni 2002; Nelson 2010).
In De Republica Emendanda associated to Grotius (1605) and Petrus Cunae-
us’s De Republica Hebraeorum (1612) this model was identified as a theocracy. In 
particular, the description of  Cunaeus theocracy started with the studies of  
the IV book of  Antiquitates Iudaicae of  Josephus Flavius, in which the Helle-
nistic historian described the first constitution of  ancient Israel as a theocracy. 
In his Contra Apionem, Josephus explained that Aristotle’s classification of  the 
forms of  government was not adequate to define Israel’s institutions. He thus 
coined the term ‘Theocratia’, meaning ‘Government by God’, which entailed a 
special combination of  politics, ethics, and religion (Campos 2011: 115).
In the modern age, the works of  Josephus had a great diffusion and his de-
scription of  theocracy was elaborated with the aim to recognize into Jewish’s 
theocracy a new and different model. Cunaeus described the Jewish theocracy 
as a positive and normative model that would be able to employ to political 
reformation of  actual Dutch republic. 
At the beginning of  Eighteenth century, works concerning Respublica He-
braeorum had a great diffusion in Europe but the theocratic model described in 
this literature was analysed in radically different way.
4.3 the JewIsh hIstory
In this analysis, we take into account an interesting interpretation of  theocracy 
presented by a thinker of  Refuge’s literature, Jacques Basnage. 
Basnage was a Huguenot Minister, chef  of  the reformed Church of  Rouen 
in 1676, historian, theologian and French diplomat. After the revocation of  
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Nantes edict, he escaped from France and emigrated in Holland. Here, in the 
1704, he published the Histoire et the religion des Juifs, depuis Jésus-Christ jusqu’à 
present.3 At Seventeeth century, this work, which consisted of  29 volumes, was 
considered the principal source to study the political, religious or cultural his-
tory of  the Hebrews. 
Basnage’s analysis presented different approach to study the Jewish history. 
He distinguished the Jewish people in ‘ancient’, that lived before the destruc-
tion of  Jerusalem Temple, and ‘modern’. According to the Christian interpre-
tation, the destruction of  Temple was a consequence of  divine punishment 
for the missed recognition of  the Messiah. The ‘modern’ Hebrews was guilty 
of  this misunderstanding and they were punished for this during the centuries. 
Furthermore, Basnage considered also historical reasons, connected to the 
problematic relationships among the Iudaea province and the Roman Empire. 
For Basnage, the theologians recognised just the primary reason (divine pun-
ishment), whereas the historians identified the secondary and rational causes 
(political interests). In this distinction, Basnage located the line between the-
ology and history. 
At Seventeenth century, after the circulation of  new chronology, the Eu-
ropean intelligentsia raised up some doubts about the ancient history. The 
Bible’s content became the subject of  scholarly scrutiny. The assessment al-
lowed to shift the Jewish’s history in the chronological axis of  the formation 
of  civilization. These studies proved that the Jewish’s history was less ancient 
than they had previously believed (Richichi 2016: 30-31). 
Basnage described ‘ancient’ Jewish people as not particularly ‘smart’ com-
pared with other people, for example the Egyptian:
le peuple juif  n’avoit rien qui le distinguât du reste des Nations. Occupé à labourer la 
Terre, & à nourrir des Troupeaux, il avoit peu de disposition pour les Arts & pour les 
Sciences. Les Egyptiens, sous l’Esclavage desquels ce Peuple gémissoit, étoient spirituels, 
savans, habiles, & faisoient remonter leur Origine au delà du Déluge. S’ils avoient tiré 
de la Phenicie une partie de leur connoissance, on ne peut contester qu’ils ne l’eussent 
portée infiniment plus loin que leurs Maîtres (Basnage 1716, vol. I: 1-2).
However, for Basnage the history of  the ancient Hebrews definitively main-
tained a central role, because they were the people chosen by God, the people 
that God «avoit adopté». 
The God’s intervention was the origin of  all the historical events and the 
‘ancient’ Jewish history was considered exceptional due to the God’s choice. 
3 The text was printed in different editions among which, the most complete, was that revised 
and correct in 1716, Histoire des Juifs depuis Jésus-Christ jusqu’à présent: pour servir de continuation à the 
histoire de Joseph.
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Furthermore, even if  it was God to determinate the ‘ancient’ Hebrews iden-
tification as ‘elected people’, it was his choice also to drive the ‘modern’ He-
brews to be considered as marginalized people.
Gerald Cerny and Myriam Yardeni’s studies have brought Basnage’s 
thought to the centre of  historiography’s debate, showing the importance of  
Basnage’s works for the French philosopher at Eighteenth century. However, 
their studies didn’t analyse the political aspects of  Basnage’s thought and, in 
particular, his attention toward Respublica Hebraeorum literature (Cerny 1987; 
Yardeni 2000). 
Basnage had a great interest for this literature. He presented the Histoire des 
Juifs as a continuation of  the work of  Josephus:
Nous n’avons aucun dessein d’entrer en comparaison avec cet Historien, dont le Génie 
& Les Lumieres étoient fort différentes du nôtre. […] Notre Ouvrage s’étend particu-
lièrement depuis la Ruine de Jérusalem, où il a fini. Il peut donc être regardé comme un 
Suite du sien. (Basnage 1716, vol. I: 19-20).
The Histoire des Juifs started where Josephus interrupted his work. Basnage 
knew very well Josephus’s works and also the authors that used them in the 
modern age. 
A few years before the publication of  the Histoire des Juifs, Basnage ana-
lysed De Republica Hebraeorum of  Petrus Cunaeus, using the French trans-
lation realized by Hugues-Guillaume Goree in 1705. Finally, he realised two 
volumes of  notes, Antiquités judaïques, ou remarques critiques sur the République des 
Hébreux (1713): «Il est peu important qu’on regarde ce Livre comme un Com-
mentaire, ou qu’on lui prête une autre forme, pourvû qu’on y trouve quelques 
remarques capables d’instruire» (Basnage 1713: IX).
Basnage recognized the relevance of  Cunaeus’ work. Nevertheless, his in-
tent was to show the mistakes and wrong interpretations of  Cunaeus’ descrip-
tion concerning government of  ancient Israel and the history of  the religious 
cult. In the Antiquités judaïques, it’s possible to find out important critics and 
confutations of  Cunaeus’ work, but also of  the other authors of  Respublica 
Hebraeorum literature like Sigonio, Spencer, Spinoza.
In the Preface, Basnage showed a great interest toward the description 
of  the Respublica Hebraeorum as a positive and normative political model that 
would be able to employ to political reformation of  actual Dutch republic. 
Nevertheless, he didn’t accept completely Cunaeus’ interpretation: «on me 
condamnera peut-être plus rigoureusement, parce que je ne suis pas toûjours 
aveuglement Cuneus» (ibid.).
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4.4 the theocracy’s descrIptIon 
The Basnage’s work consisted into two volumes and distinguished the his-
torical and political analysis of  ancient Israel from the study of  cult and its 
degeneration.
In this paper, we analyse only the first volume in which he contests the 
wrong interpretation about the government of  ancient Israel. We consider two 
topics: the theocracy description and its degeneration, the role of  the Kings 
and the importance given by Basnage to the monarchic power.
For Cunaeus, theocracy was a ‘God’s government’, based on the best laws, 
the divine ones, which provided for a collective ethos and assured social har-
mony. For Basnage, the constitution of  ancient Israel had God as only true 
king, so, like Cunaeus work, in the Antiquités judaïques the government was 
described as theocracy:
Ce Gouvernement étoit donc une Théocratie, car Dieu en étoit le veritable Roi, puis 
qu’il choisissoit lui-même ses Officiers, &qu’en les choisissant il les révêtoit d’un pouvoir 
surnaturel pour soûtenir son nom par des Miracles éclatans (ivi: 8).
On the other hand, Basnage didn’t accept the Cunaeus’ representation of  
mosaic revelation. Cunaeus described Moses as a legislator that had created 
a sacred and perfect republic. Instead, Basnage didn’t describe Moses like a 
great legislator, but only like a «Juge subalterne». Basnage presented him like 
a «Lieutenant» of  God and described God like the only true King of  Israel:
il ne dépendoit pas de Moyse de choisir la forme du Governement qu’il vouloit donner au 
Peuple qui marchoit sous sa conduite, car Dieu la lui avoit dictée, & ce n’étoit pas l’effet 
d’une Providence générale par laquelle on attribuë tout à Dieu, mais par une Institution 
divine & particuliere qu’il forma la République des Hébreux & en devint lui même 
le Roi: Moyse ne faisoit que la fonction de Ministre du Dieu vivant, & il apportoit ses 
ordres au Peuple (ibid.).
The Jewish theocracy, described in the seventeenth-century like a pluralistic 
political model, became in Basnage’s work a monistic model, in which the 
absolute power was assigned not to the laws but to God. The extraordinary 
social power of  theocracy, showed by Cunaeus through the presence of  agrar-
ian law, was denied. 
The Agrarian Laws or ‘lex Agraria Hebraeorum’ was the Jubilee Laws, pre-
scribed in Leviticus. The Jubilee laws permitted that every fifty years the land 
– originally divided by Joshua among the Tribes – should be given back to its 
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original owners and it permitted also the remission of  debts and emancipation 
of  slaves. In this way, according to Cunaues, it was possible to limiter politic 
and economic inequalities and promoter social stability. Besides following Jo-
sephus in stating the greatest antiquity of  Moses’s laws, Cunaeus argued that 
the Respublica Hebraeorum was better than all other commonwealths in the past, 
because it was the only one which adopted an effective agrarian law (Campos 
2011: 115). This law, for Cunaues, was established by Moses, who
as it became a wise Man, not only to order things at present, but for the future ages 
too, brought in a certain Law providing that the wealth of  some might not tend to the 
oppression of  the rest [. . .]. This was the Agrarian Law [lex agraria]; a Law whe-
reby all possessors of  Land were kept from transferring the full right and dominion of  
it unto any other person, by sale or other contract whatsoever: For, both they that on 
constraint of  poverty had sold their Land, had a right granted them to redeem it at any 
time; and they that did not redeem it, received it freely again, by 20 this Law, at the 
solemn feast of  Jubily (Cunaeus 1653: 51).
According to Basnage, the periodical restitution of  land to original owners 
was caused by religious reasons connected to the necessity ‘to do not mix’ the 
different native families.
Basnage denied the social and political reasons of  agrarian laws adopted by 
Cunaeus. For him, the Jubilee laws didn’t guarantee the stability of  the ancient 
Israel government. It was the supernatural power of  God to assured it:
ainsi quoi que Moyse voulût sans doute conserver la simplicité dans le Peuple d’Israël, je 
croi pourtant que la Loi Agraria pour la restitution des terres tendoit plûtôt à empêcher 
que les Tribus & les Familles ne se confondissent, parce que la distinction en étoit ab-
solument nécessaire pour la connoissance du Messie, dont la nativité étoit encore éloignée 
d’un grand nombre de siécles (Basnage 1713: 23).
In the Antiquités judaïques, theocracy was no more described as a normative 
political model. It was the form of  government of  a people who belonged to 
ancient history, but it wasn’t analysable like the other political forms, because 
it was divine. Basnage denied also the possibility to employ this model to po-
litical reformation of  actual Dutch republic:
ainsi je ne vois pas pourquoi on les appelle [le souvrain Sacrificateur] des Monarques, 
ni comment on peut disputer, si la forme du gouvernement étoit Aristocratique ou 
Democratique, car ce gouvernement étoit extraordinarie, & ne peut être comparé avec 
aucun autre, Dieu étoit le chef  de la Nation, & les Juges les exécuteurs miraculeux de 
ses ordres (ivi: 71).
78 MonisMs and PluralisMs in the history of Political and social Models
The Jewish theocracy was still considered a sacred and singular political mod-
el. However, according to Basnage, it was the God’s intervention to safeguard 
the stability of  ancient Israel. So, the Jewish people lost their privilege at the 
moment in which they decided to have a human king. The political reasons 
about the decline of  Jewish theocracy were founded in this choice. 
For Basnage, the sacred texs content was clear: 
Dieu se plaint de ce que son peuple l’a rejetté, voilà le peché; & quelle est cette rejection? 
Elle consiste en ce que les Juifs prenoient un Roi, & secouoient la Theocratie, ou le 
Gouvernement sous lequel ils avoient vécu en prosperité si long-temps (ivi: 123).
Despite all interpretations, it was obvious that: «Dieu se sentoit picqué de se 
qu’on renonçoit à sa Theocratie, & qu’in rejettoit le Gouvernement de Samuel 
divinement ispiré, pour se faire un Roi». 
The theocracy degeneration didn’t depend by the action of  the priestly 
caste, as sustained by Cunaeus and Spinoza. The decline of  the ancient Israel 
was the result of  the choice to have a monarchy, that left the Jewish people 
without the divine protection:
le peuple juif  pechoit par un temerité criminelle en se soulevant contre l’ordre et la vo-
lonté de Dieu qui leur étoit connuë, & en preferant le gouvernement des Rois à celui des 
Juges qu’il avoit établis (ivi: 134).
Although the connection between Basnage’s works and Respublica Hebraeorum 
literature has been proved, Basnage’s interpretation of  theocracy is very differ-
ent compared to Cunaeus’ work. The theocracy, described in the seventeenth 
century like the pluralistic political model, became into Basnage’s work a mo-
nistic model, in which the absolute power was concentrated into God’s hands. 
Finally, for Basnage, the peculiarity and the sacredness of  the Jewish his-
tory guaranteed its uniqueness during the time. However, in the Eighteenth 
century the theocracy represented only a model of  the antiquity: it wasn’t pos-
sible to compare it to the others political models and it couldn’t be employed 
to political reformation of  actual constitutions for its divine nature.
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Chapter Five 
counter-revolutIonary thought 
and the contradIctIons of ModernIty : 
bonald’s sanctIfIcatIon of oneness 
and Its deconstructIon
Giorgio Barberis
The starting point of  this overview of  monism and pluralism will be to ex-
amine one of  the authors to which I have dedicated much of  my research; 
namely, Louis de Bonald, the French thinker who lived from 1754 to 1840. 
One of  the leading figures in the development of  political theory and count-
er-revolutionary political action, he was the sworn enemy of  the philosophers 
of  the Enlightenment and a harsh critic of  modernity1.
A staunch conservative, or rather a reactionary, Bonald is one of  the chief  
exponents of  what Carlo Galli chose to call an «intellectual constellation» 
(Galli 1981) to describe the group that included other authors such as Joseph 
De Maistre, early Lamennais, Carl Ludwig von Haller and Juan Maria Donoso 
Cortés. All of  noble origin and all «militant Catholics», these counter-revolu-
tionaries were united by a form of  radical antagonism towards the spirit of  
18th century Enlightenment, which they saw as «a century of  criminal worth-
1 Louis de Bonald, Viscount of  Rouerge is a much cited but little studied author, especially in 
Italy. He was the subject of  my doctoral thesis, subsequently published as a book entitled Louis 
de Bonald. Potere e ordine tra sovversione e Provvidenza, published by Morcelliana in 2007. A new, revi-
sed edition of  the book was translated and published in France in 2016 by Desclée de Brouwer, 
under the title Louis de Bonald. Ordre et pouvoir entre subversion et providence.
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lessness» that had jeopardized the stability of  an eternal and transcendental 
order. What we might refer to as a “pluralistic” society founded on the idea 
of  popular sovereignty, they defined as “unruly anarchy” that jeopardized the 
very existence of  a hierarchically organized, single and indivisible power de-
rived directly from God.
Although Bonald’s works do not make for easy reading, I believe that there 
are certain aspects of  great interest that provide insight into understanding 
our own times. While some consider that his prolix and repetitive style can-
not compare with other great writers of  the counter revolution2, such as De 
Maistre, he does, however, remain faithful to his principles. Indeed, in spite 
of  the excessively redundant, systematic, dry and paternalistic nature of  his 
prose, it is this methodical and coherent style that makes Bonald one of  the 
most emblematic writers of  the revolutionary period. His untiring efforts to 
provide critical reflections on the contradictions of  the modern age make him 
stand out as a theoretician who, in my view, was well placed to dialogue with 
the contemporary reality from which, on an initial reading of  his works, he 
seemed to be far removed.
It may therefore be useful now to re-read the pages of  Théorie du pouvoir poli-
tique et réligieux (the first and arguably the most important of  Bonald’s works, 
written in exile in 1796 and confiscated on the orders of  the Directory) or Lég-
islation primitive (produced in 1802 after his return to his hometown of  Millau), 
and give a broad outline of  his theories, which are not only easily recognizable 
but provide a perfect conceptual base for counter-revolutionary thought, with 
some measure of  originality.
So what are these ideas and theories?
First and foremost, the Holy Alliance between the Monarchy and the 
Church. The underlying premise is the existence of  a natural and fundamental 
law of  society, in respect of  Divine Will embodied in the Decalogue, which is 
the exclusive point of  reference for both religious and political society. There-
fore, if  society needs fundamental principles and postulates on which to base 
a legal system, it is Mosaic Law that must be invoked, and certainly not the 
artificial abstract laws contained in the Declaration of  the Rights of  Man, the 
symbol of  revolutionary constructivist fervor.
2 In the preface to his lengthy Thèse entitled Bonald. Les concepts et l’histoire, Gérard Gengembre 
(a well-recognised authority on the works of  Bonald) writes that «la lecture des œuvres publiées, 
ajoutée à celle des nombreux inédits, tient plus de l’ascèse que du divertissement». He also ma-
kes the point that Bonald consciously chose to employ the same language used by his political 
opponents, i.e. the philosophes with whom he was in constant conflict. It was a battle of  words, 
in which he obsessively regurgitated particularly incisive modes of  expression, tenaciously se-
eking new turns of  phrase that would best convey the basic concepts of  his thinking. Gengem-
bre adds, perhaps somewhat ungraciously, that it was a battle «qui explique les répétitions ad 
nauseam et la rapide lassitude d’un lecteur qui s’inflige une telle nourriture indigeste».
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Reality has its ontological basis in God; ideas, knowledge and language it-
self  derive from Him. The theory of  the divine origin of  language, set down in 
his early work Recherches philosophiques sur les premiers objets des connoissances morales, 
is both innovative and interesting; however, rather than looking at metaphysi-
cal aspects, I wish to focus here on Bonald’s political reflections.
For Bonald, there exists a transcendental legal order, a divine providence 
present in all things. This natural and eternal order propagates an organic and 
hierarchical model of  society that is characterized by a state religion, a sover-
eign power and by a fixed social structure [«There have never been – he writes – so-
cieties without Gods, nor nations without leaders; there have never been Gods without priests, 
nor leaders without soldiers»]. Above all else stands a single and unchallengeable 
authority, whose legitimacy is founded on and linked to the unknowable, the 
Transcendental. All attempts at subversion will fail, and it is unthinkable that 
any different form of  human society might exist.
Bonald affirms that the very existence of  this order implies that there must 
be a natural scientific order to society, formed by the natural and necessary 
relations between members of  a community. Indeed, he sets himself  the ambi-
tious task of  elaborating a comprehensive social theory, which to some extent 
presages the later notions developed by the positivists, in particular by the 
social philosopher Auguste Comte3. One of  the ideas they had in common 
was the belief  in the close relationship between the study of  society as an 
exact science and devising plans for its reorganization. Other prominent ideas 
included working out a clear definition of  an organic society, in which all 
sectors demonstrate reciprocal solidarity and find harmony within the social 
group and the need for a shared belief  system underpinning a strong moral 
base and shared spiritual principles that ensure social order. The fundamental 
difference between Bonald and the Positivists was that the latter considered 
there to be two separate models of  organic society: the medieval theological 
order, which after the critical age of  Reform and Revolution could no longer 
be restored, and the new model of  an industrial society, which marked a turning 
point in the historical evolution of  mankind. This was something the counter 
3 Bonald was one of  the first to see the need to undertake scientific studies of  social structures, 
which would provide the bases for good moral and political governance. To cite the title of  his 
essay on the Viscount, Robert Spaemann, disciple of  Joachim Ritter and one of  the leading con-
temporary German philosophers, believed that sociology had its roots aus dem Geist der Restau-
ration (Spaemann 1998). And as Léon Brunschvicg and Jean Lacroix had also observed, the 
theoretical premises of  sociology are to be found in the works of  Bonald. Spaemann affirms 
that Bonald was the first to understand the evolving relationship between politics and moder-
nity and to identify its theoretical foundations, which put succinctly, incorporate and ascribe all 
philosophical notions and the very idea of  God into their respective social functions. In short, 
in the works of  Bonald, metaphysics and theologies can be assimilated into a new theory of  
society and the laws necessary to ensure its conservation.
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revolutionaries obviously refuted. Indeed, just as other theoreticians of  the 
Restoration did, Bonald always fervently defended the traditional model of  
a healthy and cohesive society, in particular agricultural societies where the 
spirit of  solidarity and brotherhood stand up against the wayward obsession 
with greed of  an embryonic capitalist system that was already showing signs 
of  heartless doggedness in the pursuit of  profit through trade and commerce. 
He found this abhorrent.
Bonald points out that three-part structures are to be found in all societies 
(a clear connection with the Holy Trinity); that is to say all social structures are 
composed of  three distinct “social entities” (with well-defined roles and func-
tions). The essential tripartite division is: power, the ministers and the subjects, 
though names change according to different social contexts: father, mother and 
children in domestic society; God, priests and the congregation in religious so-
ciety; the king, nobility and the people in public or political society. Power rules 
and regulates; ministers apply the law and control; the people obey.
As Bonald sees it, there is an indivisible link between political and religious 
society, between the combined establishment and development of  one with the 
other; the convergence of  Catholicism and the monarchy is a union of  abso-
lute perfection. In Théorie du pouvoir he writes: «In Christian Europe, there are 
four different forms of  government, all of  whom espouse religions based on 
essentially similar founding principles and all of  whom share analogous external 
features» (Bonald 1982: xiv, 301). These four separate typologies of  government 
are: 1) Monarchy, with the King, the nobles and the assembly of  the Estates 
General, all of  whom carry out their assigned social function in natural harmo-
ny, in the same way as the Pope, the clergy and the religious councils do in the 
Catholic church; 2) Aristocratic hereditary regimes, allied with pure Lutheran-
ism, who accept social distinctions but not the unity of  power; 3) democratic 
governments which, like religious organizations spawned by the Calvinist, Pu-
ritan and Presbyterian movements, recognize the separate and distinct power 
of  each, but do not consent to the principle of  social hereditary; 4) hybrid gov-
ernments, such as in Britain, which blended elements of  monarchy, aristocracy 
and democracy together with an Anglican church that combined elements of  
Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism. But there is yet another category to 
consider, and one which Bonald frequently refers to in order to expose its radi-
cal negation of  and threat to the natural order of  society: he was alluding to the 
demonic dyad of  anarchism and atheism, the corollary of  every revolutionary 
government and the inevitable consequence of  any revolt against established 
authority4. I will return to this point in the concluding part of  this essay.
4 The typology suggested by Juan Maria Donoso Cortés in his Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalis-
mo y el socialismo also recognizes the close link between religious and political order (or disorder). 
However, it differs partially in that absolute monarchy coincides with theism, Constitutional 
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As regards corrupt societies, Bonald is particularly adamant about one fact: 
no social system can survive and thrive if  individuals are granted absolute 
liberty, or are allowed to disavow the principles shared by society as a whole, 
in complete contempt of  legitimate authority and with no respect for social hi-
erarchies and roles. When this does occur, the seed of  deterioration is already 
planted and will quickly and inevitably lead to the complete destruction of  
society; this will provide the space for the restoration of  fundamental princi-
ples. Besides, «men cannot impede the continual and inevitable progression of  
things» (Bonald 1982: xiv, 344). All rebellions, particularly when provoked by 
those entrusted to enforce law and order, will result in confusion and disorder, 
which can never last for long.
Real personal freedom consists, then, in being true to one’s own nature and 
following the path of  one’s own ultimate destiny, which will always coincide 
with the collective goal of  constructing and conserving society. Man is noth-
ing outside the context of  the community to which he belongs, and the more 
that community adheres to solid Christian and monarchist ideals, the freer 
man will be, and the more willing will he be to respect unquestioningly the 
necessary relations that evolve and derive from the very nature of  things (i.e. 
from Divine will) and the more unlikely he will be to challenge authority, hier-
archies and order. «A free society must be independent, but man can only find 
true freedom in being dependent»5 (Bonald 1982: xiv, 405). Thus, man has 
no freedom to choose between good and evil, since real freedom can only be 
fully achieved through performing good, and not through exercising free will, 
which entails making a choice that negates freedom itself. God can neither do 
or want evil, but is at the same time absolutely free. Now, it is religion that pro-
vides the best means to guarantee freedom because it conquers and controls 
human passions, places faith above reason and free will, and systematically 
regulates social life, preventing and repressing immorality and disorder with 
the force of  its truths and the promise of  either reward or eternal damnation. 
Society’s natural and perfect eternal order is assured by the French Catholic 
monarchy, except when called into question by the ill-fated errors - individu-
alism, subjectivism and rationalism - of  Reform and ‘Enlightenment’, culmi-
nating in the ruinous effects of  the 1789 revolution. Bonald lived through the 
revolutionary upheavals personally, something which would radically influence 
his ideas and thought. Although a transitory phase (because order would even-
tually be restored - «Les troubles ont toujours affermi le pouvoir»), revolutionary 
fervor produced a monstrous and hellish state, with atheism as its religion 
liberalism with Deism, democracy with Pantheism and atheism with nascent socialist doctrines, 
whose chief  exponent was Proudhon and whose only transcendental equivalent was Satan.
5 This is the basis of  authoritative traditionalism, of  which Bonald was undoubtedly one of  the 
chief  exponents.
86 MonisMs and PluralisMs in the history of Political and social Models
and anarchy its new principle of  government. The zeal of  the revolutionaries 
ultimately backfired: freedom created more prisons, equality generated acute 
and excessive divisions, fraternity bred sharp differences and progress brought 
about only conflict and killing.
A staunch defender of  what he considered the real moral foundations 
of  society, one of  the basic tenets of  Bonald’s thought is a blind fear of  
any form of  dissent. The harsh counter-attack of  the anti-revolutionaries 
(despite the fact that the Revolution itself  was in many ways an act of  Prov-
idence) nurtured a total obsession against the enemy, both in its tangible 
forms (Reform and the ideas of  the Enlightenment, Rousseau and Montes-
quieu, Voltaire and Condorcet) as well as in the “stigmatized” notion of  the 
subversive, the atheist, the anarchist, the Protestant, the liberal rationalist 
and even the bourgeois trader.
An additional integral part of  Bonald’s thinking was the ideological battle 
against the dogmas of  unrestricted freedom of  press and unlimited tolerance 
of  others’ opinions so strongly defended by the philosophes. He opined that this 
encouraged the spread of  revulsion against authority and a hatred of  religion; 
allowing for all opinions to be given voice, he said, was tantamount to showing 
scorn and indifference to all truths.
A last consideration on Bonald’s thinking regards his questionable view of  
history, somewhat blemished by his radically negative anthropological beliefs, 
in stark contrast to his faith in a Providential design that will lead to a state of  
ultimate and definitive perfection. As the guardian of  the monistic belief  in 
the indivisibility of  Oneness, it is Divine Providence that determines history. 
So how do we explain revolutions and the increasing proliferation of  rebel-
lions? Does social disorder always presage a new order, or have the repeated 
examples of  brutal reprisals throughout history always led to catastrophic re-
sults for humanity? What heralds the end of  history: perfection or dissolution? 
Is the ontological divide between the created and the creator destined to dis-
appear, or is failure the fate of  humanity? And how do we reconcile the “evil” 
in man with the kingdom of  God? Is the ‘mediation’ of  Christ enough? Such 
questions have yet to be answered.
In my view, Bonald offers us a prime example of  the tension between 
realistic pessimism and eschatological expectations, between the optimism of  
faith and the finality of  catastrophe. Bonald’s own existential and personal 
experiences are varied and contrasting. His education and early involvement in 
politics followed a fairly linear path, until interrupted by the chaos unleashed 
by the revolution and his harsh years in exile. On his return from exile, he 
lived through the ambivalent, confusing period of  Napoleonic rule, followed 
by the interlude of  the glorious restoration of  the monarchy and the rise of  
ultra-right wing militant movement. Among the many awards bestowed on 
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him, Bonald was nominated member of  the Académie Française in 1816 and 
received the peerage of  France in 1823. When the Orléanist faction took con-
trol following the revolution of  1830, Bonald saw it as «an impetuous rush 
towards plurality», once again highlighting his continual wavering between his 
historical angst and theological convictions, between political disillusionment 
and his theoretical coherence.
Despite the undeniable inherent contradictions in Bonaldian thought, I be-
lieve that this stands out as one of  his strengths. To quote Marcuse, Bonald is 
not only «the most grandiose example of  an apology for and defence of  a so-
cial order under threat» (Marcuse 1970: 87-104), but with his ambitious efforts 
to work out a comprehensive theory of  society and to solve the contradictions 
wrought by modernity6, he is of  great interest as a subject of  study that can 
help shed light on the aforementioned contradictions in order to conceive a 
radical political alternative to the conflicting forces of  conservation and prog-
ress, unity and plurality, order and liberty. To my understanding, the strongest 
and most solid form of  liberty can only emerge by means of  the deconstruc-
tion of  ‘order’ and the metaphysical foundations on which it claims to rest. 
Continuing our journey through Bonald’s philosophical reflections, on 
the one hand we have a well-ordered, organic, hierarchical society that has 
reached a peak of  perfection, a radical monism governed by divine, tran-
scendental providence that also governs every aspect of  social life; on the 
other hand is the threat that plurality poses to this order, which should be 
thwarted at all costs.
To illustrate this clash, I could cite any number of  passages in Bonald’s 
writings, since, as mentioned previously, we are talking here about one of  the 
key tenets of  Bonald’s thinking.
However, I would like to focus here on a piece Bonald dedicates to the 
subject of  divorce, a question of  perennial interest to the French philosopher, 
in his theoretical deliberations addressing its effect on community life. It was 
Bonald who was the architect of  the repeal law of  1816 that remained in force 
until 1884. The text in question is entitled Du divorce considéré au xixe siècle relati-
vement à l’état domestique et à l’état public de la société, written in the same period as 
Législation primitive; first published 1801, there followed numerous subsequent 
editions.
On the subject of  domestic life – the heart of  social life, the nuclear fami-
ly – Bonald contends that it can only be established through marriage, a free 
6 Any list of  contemporary society’s inherent and unfathomable contradictions that the count-
er-revolutionaries did much to highlight should certainly include its failure to control chronic 
political instability, manifested both in the domination of  various forms of  political extremism 
(e.g. the totalitarian threat) as well as the spread of  social apathy and nihilism, or selfish indif-
ference and shallow individualism.
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and voluntary act that sanctions the joining together of  a man and a woman, 
legitimized by the church and given legal recognition by the state. The bond 
of  marriage is indissoluble: a married couple, «inwardly joined together by 
the religious sacrament, a bond given outward legal recognition by the state, 
forfeit their individuality and no longer possess an individual will (that could 
induce separation) to rebel against social obligations, which exist and serve to 
unite people. All arguments against divorce can be summarized concisely thus: 
once a marriage has been celebrated, the couple as individuals cease to exist 
(divorce presupposes the contrary); marriage is an inseparable bond [et erunt 
duo in carne unâ»; cf. Gn 2,24; Mt 19,5s.; Ef  5,31].
The particular aim of  the text I chose to examine here is to demonstrate 
that the dissolution of  a marriage bond, plainly contrary to the will of  God, is 
therefore perilous and extremely harmful to social order, to the very stability of  
the State. Hence, as stated, any upsetting of  the natural order of  things, par-
ticular if  instigated by a state legislator, will lead to instability. Indeed, divorce 
is always an intolerable threat, because it not only jeopardizes the welfare of  
children and encourages dissolute and corrupt behavior, but in many cases 
it causes disruption and conflict in families, undermines paternal authority, 
creates disorder and instability, but most of  all it contravenes the divine spirit. 
Therefore, it is by far more desirable that certain individuals endure suffering 
because unable to fulfill their often irrational, illusory and unwarranted aspi-
rations, and that some unhappily married man must accept the consequences 
of  an unworkable marriage, with the possibility in extreme cases of  a dignified 
separation of  two people and their material goods (but without dissolving the 
bond), rather than endanger the stability of  society as a whole (Bonald 1982: 
v, 207-208).
In its various guises, divorce may only be tolerated in backward societies, 
which are usually highly unstable. Many societies in Asia accept and continue 
to allow polygamy; the Jewish religion authorizes a husband to repudiate his 
wife; the Greeks, one of  history’s most arbitrarily corrupt peoples, introduced 
divorce at all levels of  society, giving both spouses the possibility of  dissolv-
ing their marriage bond. Christianity, though, assures the sanctity of  marriage 
through divine law, and this for Bonald is further confirmation of  how Chris-
tianity ensures that plurality and chaos give way to ultimate stability and order 
and the universal recognition of  the principle of  unity. In this regard, the 
words of  Bonald are of  an exemplary simplicity and clarity:
Monotheism in religion, monogamy in the family, monarchy in government, will gra-
dually remove the threat of  polytheism, polygamy, polycracy or government by the people 
(Bonald, 1982: v, 167).
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This is the clearest example of  Bonald’s sanctification of  Oneness, or his 
obsession with the unchallenged and unchallengeable concept of  oneness or 
singleness, referred to by the Greeks with the generic term μόνος, a strand 
that runs through all of  the author’s philosophical reflections: mono-theism, 
mon-archy and mono-gamy are the three constituent parts necessary to obtain 
universal order; it is a situation of  order that can never be overturned, and will 
always absorb and rebuff  any revolt or subversive actions, however violent 
they might be.
Quite simply, it is plurality that poses the greatest threat to unity. Poly-the-
ism, poly-gamy, poly-cracy have caused a return to confusion and backward-
ness, tragically triggered by revolution and reform. This rift risks compro-
mising everything, since it evokes the radical antithesis to the monism of  the 
natural society: atheism, as the rejection of  all religion; anarchy, as the repudia-
tion of  all government and power; and a situation that cannot even be defined, 
created by an insular, untenable and flawed society, devoid of  social relations, 
where a sense of  collectivity cannot exist.
Bonald is convinced of  the absolute coherency of  his arguments. Society 
has an absolute ontological and axiological claim on all individuals, who de-
pend on it to obtain the knowledge and awareness of  rules essential to adhere 
to in every aspect of  their lives. Derived directly from God, it is the legitimate 
power assigned to those who govern that creates and makes a people. If  such 
a pre-ordained structure did not exist, society would be nothing more than 
a disaggregate, lawless group of  people in constant conflict7. Using an apt 
visual metaphor, Maistre writes: «Take the Queen bee away from a swarm of  
bees and you will still have as many bees as you like, but the hive will be gone» 
(Maistre 1995: 50).
Bonald firmly believes that the absence of  power, literally ‘anarchy’, is an 
absolute evil that will cause the radical disintegration of  all things. In his work 
Essai analytique sur les lois naturelles de l’ordre social, he defines human dignity itself  
as the very power human beings have to control themselves. If  man possessed 
the just balance of  reason and passion, of  strengths and weaknesses, he would 
have no need for religion, for government or any kind of  authority, nor any 
form of  social organization, if  the latter implies a social structure necessary 
to repress and control destructive tendencies8. Faithful to his brand of  ‘realist’ 
orthodoxy, the Viscount asserts that a world without government would be 
7 In Considérations sur la France, Joseph de Maistre writes: «Le peuple est toujours enfant, fou, 
absent» (Maistre 1979: i, 46).
8 «Let it not be said that just as men bring their innate emotions and passions to society, that 
they also bring reason and goodness; if  they were blessed with rational thought, able to offset 
their instinctive, irrational behavior, and a strength of  mind able to override their weaknesses, 
there would be no need for religion, governments, not even for a public sphere in society» (Bonald 
1982: i, 54-55). 
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simply absurd. Instead of  entertaining vain visions of  a utopian, ideal society, 
it would be far more useful to ponder the basic unchanging nature of  human 
beings and their intrinsic limitations: «We will never discover within us another 
man different to ourselves, nor can we expect such a hypothesis to be viable» 
(Bonald 1982: i, 60-61). Maistre believed that if  left to his own devices, man 
becomes too evil to be free. Carl Schmitt started with this very assumption 
to make his strong argument describing how the radical opposition to an-
archism’s positive anthropology has its roots in the writings of  Maistre and 
Bonald (Schmitt 1934)9.
Let us attempt to draw some conclusions from Bonald’s reasoning. The 
differences in the models of  society outlined here are of  considerable interest, 
regardless of  the criteria adopted to judge them. On the one hand, there is 
the strength and perfection of  monism, blemished, though, by its unnatural 
disregard for the complexity of  reality. A contrived simplification whose foun-
dations collapse in the face of  increasing plurality. On the other hand lie the 
challenges and dangers of  an almost unfathomable model of  society, i.e. be-
liefs in the ideals of  absolute liberty that counter-revolutionary monism rejects 
entirely, although it cannot erase its force and attraction (because the idea of  a 
society without government is by no means absurd).
In effect, no perfect symmetry exists between all parts of  the triad. The 
structure is most solid in the first triad (monotheism, monarchy and monoga-
my) and also the second (polytheism, polycracy and polygamy). The third and 
last of  the trinities, characterized by Greek negative prefix alfa, has an inherent 
contradiction: anarchy, the second element, is not coherent with, or rather is 
the antithesis of  the third, i.e. the absence of  societal bonds. This is not a ne-
gation but a proposal for an alternative model of  society, set within a different 
ontological plain. It doesn’t entail precipitating into an abyss, but is a change 
of  paradigm leading to new horizons and new lands, as yet unexplored.
Using Bonald as a starting point, we can arrive at the idea of  a world where 
all members of  a society are free and equal.
9 C. Schmitt, Politische Theologie, Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität. The reference is to the 
fourth chapter in particular, dedicated to the philosophy of  the counter-revolutionary State. 
The works of  Maistre and Bonald contain a number of  ideas that would later be revisited by 
other philosophers, for example in the clash between reactionary and libertarian thinking, ex-
emplified by the divergent and opposing ideas of  Juan Maria Donoso Cortés and Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon.
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Chapter Six
nashoba: turnIng an Ideal 
Into a concrete realIty
Federica Falchi
The community of  Nashoba1 in the state of  Tennessee was founded in the 
year 1825 in area of  land that once belonged to the Chiskasaw Indians. The 
idea and inspiration of  the woman who founded it was to create a community 
for ex-slaves, provide them with both an education and the opportunity to 
learn a trade that would enable them to pay their own way after emancipation 
and to make a living for themselves outside the community itself. 
The founder and inspirational force behind this experiment that took place 
at a time when the anti-slavery movement was gaining strength2, was Frances 
Wright3, the Scottish thinker and intellectual born in Dundee in 1795. Wright 
came from a well-to-do radical family, though having lost both parents at a 
young age, she was brought up by relatives and friends of  her father. The 
many hours spent in her father’s libraries and the period spent in Glasgow 
with her uncle James Mylne4 were a great influence on her education. Mylne 
held the chair in moral philosophy at the university in Glasgow, considered to 
1 The community was given the name Nashoba, which meant ‘wolf ’ in the language of  the nati-
ve Americans, because the land on which it was built was near the River Wolf. On Nashoba, see 
among others: Wright (1821); Parks (1932: 75-86); Elliott (1939: 141-157); Emerson (1947: 291-
315); Pease (1960: 99-109); Lane (1972); Kolmerten (1973); Wright F. and C. (1975: 221-251; 
429-46); Egerton (1977); Kissel (1993); Sampson (2000: 290-303); Bederman (2005: 438-59).
2 Gould (2003); Kish Sklar and Stewart (2007); Clapp and Roy Jeffrey (2011).
3 On Frances Wright: Wright (1844); Waterman (1924); Lane (1972); Stiller (1972); Perkins and Wolf-
son (1972 [19391]); Morris (1984); Kissel (1993); Rendall (2006, 145-159); Picchetto (2007: 284-294).
4 See Coley (2015).
94 MonisMs and PluralisMs in the history of Political and social Models
be the home of  Scottish Enlightenment, given that the previous occupants of  
the chair included such illustrious names as Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith 
and Thomas Reid5.
Although she could not benefit directly from the influence of  her father, 
who died when she was a small child, she did so indirectly through reading 
books in his libraries and by dialoguing with his friends, who like him were 
great admirers of  Thomas Paine6, and of  the principles and precepts of  the 
American and French revolutions. More significantly though, they were expo-
nents of  the Scottish Enlightenment movement, who believed that an under-
standing of  political, economic and social contexts was the key to understand-
ing human behavior and the development of  ideas7. 
Having read Botta’s ‘A history of  the American war of  independence’(1809) 
she became fascinated with America, so much so that in 1821, still very young, 
she and her sister Camilla sailed to America to discover for herself  what she 
thought was a utopian land that gave refuge to the poor and the persecuted 
from any country or culture in the world. 
On her return from the United States, Wright published a collection of  
letters she had sent to Robina Craig Millar8 in a volume entitled Views of  society 
and manners in America, in which she alternates between detailed descriptions 
of  the founding principles and institutions of  America and accounts of  the 
places visited and the people she met. The book drew the attention of  a num-
ber of  influential British thinkers, first and foremost Jeremy Bentham, but also 
5 On the Scottish Enlightenment period: Trevor-Ropper (1967); Venturi (1970); Restaino (1974); 
Phillipson (1981: 19-40); Jones (1989); Devine (1989); Hook and Sher (1995); Sher (2010); Rub-
boli (2010: 229-242); Geuna (2003: 49-86).
6 James Wright belonged to a family of  merchants and traders who were involved in radical 
politics. A fervent admirer of  the French and American revolutions and committed to spre-
ading their ideals, he was put under close surveillance by the government after he published 
a cheaply-priced edition of  Paine’s The Rights of  man in 1794. See among others: Wright 
(1844).
7 Exponents of  the Scottish enlightenment were greatly concerned «above all, in the social 
behaviour of  mankind». The pioneer was Hutchenson, who emphasized the fact that the mind 
of  every human being was guided by «a common or moral sense that was innate, instinctive 
and fundamentally virtuous and benevolent», though it «was (he believed), directed differently 
at different times under different social pressures. It follows therefore that, in order to know 
man and the development of  his ideas, we must know about society and the different forms of  
society within which man operates and by which his thinking is determined. So, insensibly, the 
study of  man merges in the study of  his social context, and the pupils of  Hutchenson, from 
being moral philosophers, concerned with the problem of  virtue, became social historians, 
concerned with the problem of  virtue, became social historians, concerned with the problem 
of  progress» Trevor-Ropper (1960: 1640).
8 Robina Craig Millar was the daughter-in-law of  John Millar, a leading exponent of  the Scottish 
enlightenment. She too, enamoured with the United States, married and settled there with her 
husband. See among others: Morris (1984); Rendall (2006).
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James and John Stuart Mill and General la Fayette9, who was to become her 
trusted friend and mentor. 
The two most striking features of  the new American world as Wright 
describes them in her writing are liberty and equality, upheld by equal civil 
and political rights, which together form the core foundation of  a new re-
publican model made possible by the favourable historical circumstances 
and the particular social and political conditions that promoted the creation 
of  shared values. It was these conditions that fostered not only a sense of  
belonging and inclusion but also helped create the environment conducive 
to the flourishing of  republican civic virtues. Furthermore, representation 
by universal suffrage promoted syncretism between elected representatives 
and the demands for liberty and equality advanced by the various sectors of  
society represented. 
Although her enthusiasm for the United States clearly shows through in 
many passages of  her book, she does not balk from identifying imperfec-
tions in an albeit advanced model of  society for the time. Wright points to 
two main flaws in the model that need to be rectified, namely, the inferior 
status of  women and the scourge of  slavery. While some progress had been 
made with the former thanks to the increase and spread of  female educa-
tion, she felt the question of  slavery was so painful and appalling that she 
could not bring herself  to visit the southern states. These two iniquities 
so undermined the widespread application of  the principles of  liberty and 
equality because they disavowed the plurality of  voices in society, i.e. the 
opportunity for all members of  society to have their needs and interests 
fully represented.
9 Wright met La Fayette thanks to Bentham’s introduction, and it was the latter who insisted 
she should make his acquaintance. They both had a great admiration for America and im-
mediately formed a close friendship; indeed Wright and her sister spent much of  their time 
in France as guests in the General’s houses. It was thanks to La Fayette that she was able to 
frequent French intellectual circles and after seeing the publication of  the French version 
of  the Views published in 1822, she returned to America to undertake a celebratory tour to 
which the hero of  two revolutions had been invited. The close relationship between the two 
provoked a certain amount of  jealousy among the relations and admirers of  the General 
and some insinuated that theirs was not a father-daughter type relationship, as they declared 
it was, but a great deal closer. Whatever the reality of  their relationship, her friendship with 
the General enabled her to meet and dialogue with some of  the most important intellectual 
and political figures in America, notably Thomas Jefferson, and to make known her own 
intellectual standing in a country that would soon become her adoptive home. On the rela-
tionship between Wright and La Fayette see among others: Waterman (1924); Morris (1984); 
Pichetto (2007).
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6.1 slavery
Wright’s strong conviction that humanity’s progress would only come 
about through the full realization of  liberty and in particular equality, led 
her to concentrate her mental energy, and subsequently her physical re-
serves and financial means, on the question of  slavery. Her qualities as a 
political philosopher are evident in her attitude and approach to consid-
ering a problem not only from a theoretical viewpoint but also from the 
standpoint of  seeking concrete solutions. This was a personal mission that 
took more urgent form after her return from the United States, but espe-
cially during her second journey to America in the company of  General 
Lafayette in 1824.
In Views of  society and manners in America, Wright had already written ex-
tensively on the subject of  slavery, stressing the horror and repugnance she 
felt for a phenomenon she defined as «the most atrocious of  all the sins that 
deface the annals of  modern history» (Wright 1821: 62).
In deference to her ‘Enlightened’ education, as a result of  which the influ-
ence of  the Scottish philosophers and also Montesquieu were quite apparent, 
Wright’s historical analysis of  the introduction of  slavery into the New world 
underlines how it was not so much a need seized upon by the colonists than 
an imposition from the motherland. Indeed, in some states, such as Pennsyl-
vania, where the Quaker10, community was well represented, there was staunch 
opposition to slavery.
Wright makes a further interesting observation on the correlation between 
the establishment of  a state religion with its entrenched ecclesiastical hierar-
chies and the broad acceptance of  slavery. The proposition she advances is 
that the establishment of  one preeminent, official religion and the privileges 
attached to it, makes the violation of  the principle of  equality for all people 
more readily acceptable. This does not occur in places where a plurality of  
religions exist: «in those provinces where the home authority was insufficient 
to establish one privileged church, this traffic was held in odium from its very 
commencement» (Ivi: 63).
A further interesting and striking aspect that Wright notes, drawing clearly 
on the ideas of  Montesquieu (who was also a vociferous opponent of  slavery), 
is the correlation between climate and enslavement of  other human beings. 
She discerns that in the South there is a notably greater inclination to accept 
slavery simply because the whites found it more arduous to work in adverse 
climatic conditions.
10 See among others: Jackson (2009); Brycchan (2012).
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The low and marshy lands stretching along the coasts and great rivers of  the south, 
tainting the warm atmosphere, and generating diseases fatal to a white population, held 
out too alluring a temptation for the employment of  the African, to whose constitution 
the climate was less fatal, for the offers of  the trader to be resisted by the young settlers 
(ivi: 64).
While denouncing the presence of  massive numbers of  slaves in the south-
ern states, Wright (who remained almost exclusively in the north) was quick 
to note the different behavior of  Americans compared to Europeans in re-
gard to slavery. In fact, although it certainly cannot be said the colonists were 
not guilty of  perpetrating the horrors associated with slavery, they were in 
the forefront of  the movement to abolish the slave trade routes and were 
pioneers in granting freedom to slaves in individual states as well as at the 
Federal level:
The history of  African slavery is at once the disgrace and honor of  America; the di-
sgrace she shares in common with the whole civilized world — the honor is all her own. 
Surrounded by every temptation which could seduce her to the crime, at first courted and 
then awed into compliance, she openly reprobated it when all the nations of  the earth 
were silent, and dared, even in her weak infancy, to brave the anger of  a powerful empi-
re in behalf  of  the wretched […] More than a dozen years before the abolition of  the 
trade by the British parliament, it was abolished in America by act of  Congress. There 
is surely something to admire --- something grand, as well as beautiful, in the effect of  
liberty on the human heart. This Congress was composed, in great part, of  representa-
tives from slave-holding states, themselves slave-holders (ivi: 64-65).
The reasons often given, notes Wright, to the delay in bringing slavery to an 
end in the South were the large numbers involved and the aforementioned 
climatic conditions, which had made the economies of  the southern states 
dependent on black labour. She was also aware of  the fact that the total abo-
lition of  the infamous practice would still require several more years and that 
it would be necessary to raise full awareness of  the injustice of  slavery before 
real equality could be achieved. 
Wright understood that if  the black population were not first brought out, 
through education, of  their objective conditions of  poverty and ignorance, 
emancipation would do little to eliminate slavery. The chief  obstacle lay in 
their cultural backwardness, not biological differences. Indeed, the state of  
Virginia made the interesting proposal «to educate the whole black population 
at the public expense» (ivi: 69). 
A similar proposal was presented to Congress by one Mr Meigs, a rep-
resentative from New York state. Wright thought that his idea was neither 
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visionary nor impractical, especially if  it were to obtain the backing of  south-
ern slave owners. Wright believed that emancipation could only be achieved 
gradually because:
To give liberty to a slave before he understands its value, is, perhaps, rather to impose 
a penalty than to bestow a blessing; but it is not clear to me that the southern planters 
are duly exerting themselves to prepare the way for that change in the condition of  their 
black population which they profess to think not only desirable but inevitable (ivi: 518). 
The widespread belief  was that the black population was not ready for free-
dom and would need help and guidance to deal with their new status. Wright 
firmly believed that it was up to the government to provide them with a basic 
level of  education and a profession that would allow them to provide for 
themselves or they would risk falling into the poverty trap: «To their untutored 
minds, the gift of  freedom is only a release from labour. Poor, ignorant, and 
lazy, it is impossible that they should not soon be vicious» (ivi: 520).
Among the written documents that attest to Wrights increasing interest 
in the emancipation of  black slaves and the reasons why she chose to take 
up the battle so passionately, are the letters she exchanged with the Garnett 
sisters11. What emerges in many of  these letters is her strong connection and 
sense of  belonging to America, so much so that she would soon take US cit-
izenship, driven by the desire to contribute to improving the country12. The 
Scottish thinker was in fact convinced that, unlike in Great Britain, conditions 
in America were more favourable to leading the country on a firm path to-
wards true progress, liberty and equality, putting these ideals genuinely into 
practice. Americans had managed, opined Wright, to achieve a higher level of  
civic virtue and to forge sentiments of  connection between individuals, a sine 
qua non for the unity and prosperity of  a community.
The criticism that Wright levies against the home country of  Great Britain 
is the existence of  a gulf  between the proclamation of  ideals and their actual 
11 Julia and Harriet Garnett were the daughters of  John Garnett, belonging to a family of  
merchants from Bristol, and Mary Gordon. John Garnett was disillusioned with the situation 
in England and decided to move the whole family to the United States. Frances Wright and her 
sister Camilla stayed with the Garnetts in 1819 and 1820 and formed a strong bond of  friend-
ship with Julia and Harriet Garnett, documented by the numerous letters they exchanged over 
a number of  years. See Payne-Gaposchkin C. (1975a-b: 221-251; 429-461).
12 «if  you then continue in America, I shall seek you there, & follow the bent of  my heart in 
becoming ‹the› /a/ citizen of  the only country to wch I acknowledge an attachment. To this I 
think my two English friends secretly look forward. They have always known my aversion from 
England, from its climate, its government, its society, & the recollection wch make all these dou-
bly offensive to me. Do not think me madly prejudiced against this island, I know it contains 
much of  good & something yet of  happiness, but vice & misery are heavier in the scale». Letter 
of  Frances Wright to Garnett sisters, October 1820 (?), (ivi: 223).
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application. While acknowledging the evident imperfections in American so-
ciety, she saw the widespread poverty and the tangible lack of  liberty in the 
motherland as intolerable: «England had once public spirit, she had dignity, 
she had, at certain degree, freedom, - where is all this now?». Not only had 
certain basic principles made little or no progress, but social regression had 
led to the further impoverishment of  the lower classes and had induced a 
number of  middle class Britons to take up residency in America. While the 
introduction of  universal suffrage in America had produced social cohesion, 
a sense of  belonging, public spiritedness and impartial patriotism, Wright de-
tects that in Britain such virtues had been swept aside by «The long submis-
sion to an unjust government» (Payne-Gaposchkin C. 1975a: 224)13 which had 
led to permanent conflict between classes. With more than a hint of  acrimony, 
she notes that the only measures taken by the wealthy classes to help the poor 
were little more than underhand expedients aimed at maintaining distances 
between classes rather than seeking concrete solutions to address inequality 
and suffering. 
And it is in the light of  such considerations, as she confides to her friend 
Harriet, that the evil system of  slavery still existing in the southern states of  
America has become a pain intolerable to bear:
see liberty/mocked & outraged/ & that by a race of  free men, who while they have 
their name in their mouths, ay and energy in their souls, grasp the chain of  oppression 
in their hands, denying to the wretched sons of  Africa that holy birthright wch they 
themselves declare man holds of  God. When my thoughts turn to America the crying 
sin of  her slavery weights upon my heart (ibid.)
For someone who was an avid supporter of  republicanism, seen as the only 
political system able to offer all citizens liberty and equality and to promote 
civic virtue in the classical sense of  the term, the existence of  slavery in over 
half  of  the American states was a shameful indictment. However, the fact that 
slavery had been abolished in some states where it had formerly existed was 
promising for the future.
Following the publication of  Views of  society and manners in America, Wright 
was contacted by Jeremy Bentham with whom she formed a relationship that 
would be described as one between master and novice (Morris 1984).
Therefore, she was certainly familiar with the principles of  utilitarianism, 
as is evident in some of  the reflections she makes in her letters to the Garnett 
sisters. Starting with the assumption that evil prevails over good in human be-
ings, she is nevertheless convinced that although people are capable of  selfless 
actions, they are rarely motivated by pure altruism: «his own good must been 
13 Letter of  Frances Wright to Garnett sisters, October 1820 (?).
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connected, or must seem to be connected, with that of  those he befriends» 
(Payne-Gaposchkin C. 1975a: 225)14. As Wright further explains, citing exam-
ples of  her own acts of  pure generosity, such considerations do not concern 
individuals but regard man in general. A key point in her argument is the idea 
that regardless of  whether or not people’s intentions are self-motivated, ben-
efits to society will ensue. 
But man ever finds sooner or later, in every nation & every clime that only wch is just 
& right & virtuous is lastingly for his advantage. Nations as well as individuals are 
gradually forced to see the truth of  the proverb that honesty is the best ‹proverb›/policy/ 
(ibid.). 
She harboured little doubt that slavery did nothing but degrade and impover-
ish human society.
6.2 on utIl Ity and JustIce
The time spent in the company of  Bentham and other intellectuals who 
formed part of  that circle gave her the opportunity to discuss and continue 
to reflect on topics and themes that had impassioned her from an early age. 
One such subject was the notion of  happiness, which Wright examined in one 
of  her early writings on Epicurus (A Few Days in Athens 1822), but she was 
also animated by issues such as the reform of  the criminal justice system, the 
emancipation of  woman and of  course slavery15.
Bentham did not fail to note the affinity that her enquiring mind had with 
such wide ranging questions, so encouraged her to join British and Interna-
tional radical circles, and indeed persuaded her to go to France and meet his 
friend Lafayette, thanks to whom she began participating in debates on as-
pects of  democracy and republicanism in both Europe and America.
In 1824, together with her sister Camilla, Frances Wright left for America 
in the company of  the General, where in the space of  a few months she met 
a number of  leading American intellectuals and political figures. It was on this 
same journey that she visited the southern states, which gave her the occasion 
to further examine the issue of  slavery and advance possible means for bring-
ing it to an end.
14 Ibidem.
15 See Campos Boralevi (1984); Rosen (2005).
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Among the more prestigious figures that she met was the elderly Thomas 
Jefferson. Although fascinated by her project and charmed by her personality, 
he could not commit to becoming involved in it due to his advanced age: 
At the age of  eighty-two, with one foot in the grave, and the other uplifted to follow it, I 
do not permit myself  to take part in any new enterprises, even for bettering the condition 
of  man, not even in the great one which is the subject of  your letter, and which has 
been through life that of  my greatest anxieties. […] I leave its accomplishment as the 
work of  another generation. And I am cheered when I see that on which it is devolved, 
taking it up with so much good will, and such minds engaged in its encouragement. The 
abolition of  the evil is not impossible; it ought never therefore to be despaired of. Every 
plan should be adopted, every experiment tried, which may do something towards the 
ultimate object. That which you propose is well worthy of  trial. It has succeeded with 
certain portions of  our white brethren, under the care of  a Rapp and an Owen; and 
why may it not succeed with the man of  color? ‹https://seaofliberty.org/explore/jeffer-
son-frances-wright-quote-2/255› (25/09/2016).
Unlike those who called for immediate abolition, Wright advocated a program 
of  gradual abolition because it was essential to take into account the social, 
political and economic aspects peculiar to the south in particular, where the 
system of  slavery had brought about a structurally different society compared 
to the north. Firstly, this was because the economy was founded on the work 
of  huge numbers of  slaves, and secondly, because the at times severe climatic 
conditions made it difficult for the whites to adapt. One of  the consequences 
of  the conditions of  poverty and ignorance in which the slaves were kept 
was that they were unable to emerge from the yoke of  subjugation which, 
together with entrenched convictions of  them being an inferior race, made it 
difficult for them to become independent. Wright believed it imperative that 
there must be a phase of  transition in which they should be provided with an 
education, at the expense of  the state. 
She had distinguished, at an early age, that human enfranchisement-which is but another 
name for civilization- is, in its beginnings, a slow, gradual, and complex operation; and 
that, to ensure its certain advancement, it must be made to move forward simultaneously 
in the soul of  the internal man, and in the external influences which surround him 
(Wright 1844: 23).
She steadfastly believed then, that in order to reconcile the emancipation of  
the black population with the material interests of  the nation, to the reciprocal 
advantage of  ex-slaves and the plantation owners, the former should be guided 
through «a real moral, intellectual, and industrial apprenticeship» (ivi: 27-28). 
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Neither the red savage nor the negro slave can be converted into America citizens, by 
acts of  legislation; and this not because the one is black, nor the other red, but because 
the one is a savage, and the other a slave (ivi: 27).
Despite her repulsion for slavery, she understood that the demands of  slave 
owners had also to be heard; some of  them with whom she had engaged in 
dialogue claimed to support emancipation, provided that they would receive 
financial compensation for expenses incurred in finding a new workforce.
I found several intelligent planters of  Louisa & Mississippi decidedly agreed with me in 
opinion /that these states together with Georgia & Florida / must & will at no great 
distance of  time be filled with a colored population. The only population by the way 
suited to the soil & climate […] Before the fearful crisis it is highly important that a 
portion of  that people be prepared for liberty; they may then be the means of  civilizing 
the ignorant mass (Payne-Gaposchkin C. 1975a: 240)16.
One major problem, though, which she realized would be arduous to over-
come, was the total aversion expressed even by the more educated luminaries 
(including Jefferson) to the possibility of  blacks mixing with whites. As Wright 
noted, this mixing of  races had already occurred and would thus continue to 
be inevitable. In order to avoid resentment and confusion between legitimate 
and illegitimate heirs, it would be essential to guarantee parity of  legal status 
for all:
the fact is also that amalgamation is taking place slowly but surely under the present 
system […] When men acquire the blood & color of  their masters without acquiring 
their protection / or their privileges/ they sooner ‹feel› / conceive / resentment / & 
ambition./ So it was in St domingo – So it has been in Louisa ‹& in› where some years 
since a freightful insurrection was ‹effected› headed by a young mulatto who had been 
outraged in the most brutal / manner / by his half  brother, the white & legitimate 
son of  the master (ivi). 
In her efforts to find a concrete solution to the problem of  slavery, Wright 
decided to visit the south and to familiarize herself  with all the laws governing 
the management and the labour of  slaves. She determined to speak with both 
abolitionists and plantation owners, convinced as she was of  the profound 
effect of  the social environment and the need to study it closely before at-
tempting to tackle any issues or hypothesizing on effective solutions. 
Her arrival in New Orleans was a traumatic one.
16 Letter of  Frances Wright to Julia Garnett, 8 June 1825.
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Slavery I expected to find here in all its horrors, and truly in all its horrors it is found 
[…] For every man’s hand is against the hapless slave & every law of  man’s creation 
[…] In proportion as you travel south the features of  slavery grow harsher, until they 
find their ne plus ultra in New Orleans (Payne-Gaposchkin C. 1975a: 233)17.
6.3 the dIffIculty of transforMIng Ideals Into realIty
Wright received numerous proclamations of  esteem and verbal support for 
her project of  setting up her community, coming from various quarters such 
as some plantations owners in Kentucky, in Tennessee and from the gover-
nor of  New York De Witt Clinton etc., Nonetheless, she only managed to 
collect small sums. Refusing to give up, she decided to use her own financial 
resources.
She began her search for land somewhere in the south, possibly in the least 
racist of  the slave states, Tennessee. On the advice of  Lafayette, she turned to 
General Jackson, who helped organize the purchase at an extra low price of  
a piece of  territory that had once belonged to the Chickasaw Indians. And so 
it was her that Wright established the community of  Nashoba, to which she 
brought six men and four women, one of  whom was pregnant and already had 
five children. There were sixtheen in all.
Her visits to New Harmony18 in Indiana would be invaluable in ensuring 
the efficient structural planning of  her community project. Wright wrote to 
her friend Julia Garnett describing how she was able to observe the techniques 
imported by the original German owners and a miraculously efficient system 
of  “united labor” sponsored by Owen, far more productive than the tradition-
al individualistic system.
Various modes of  procedure have during this season occurred to me, but it was not until 
I had visited for the second time the settlement of  Harmonie in Indiana, considered 
attentively the practice of  its original German proprietors, together with the system now 
commenced by Mr Owen that I distinctly conceived the only scheme wch I believe capable 
of  being rendered general & consequently efficient in its effects (Payne-Gaposchkin C. 
1975a: 239)19.
17 Letter of  Frances Wright to Julia Garnett, 12 April 1825.
18 On New Harmony see also Owen (1927); Leopold (1940); Owen (1979); Pollard (1992).
19 Letter of  Frances Wright to Julia Garnett, 8 June 1825.
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Her admirations for Owen and his project continued to mature over the fol-
lowing months and her letters mention this increasing esteem: «I must speak 
another time of  Mr. Owen. He is working miracles & promises fair to revolu-
tionize a 2d time the North as I pray we may do the South» (ivi: 247). 
Clearly, her visits to New Harmony and her discovery of  Owen’s coop-
erativist theories were instrumental in devising her plan. Equally important 
though, was her meeting the Haitian Jonathas Granville, a man of  mixed race 
who had been a soldier in the French army. Having moved back to Haiti, he 
was given the task by the president of  the island to oversee the transportation 
of  freed black slaves from North America to Haiti, where they would be given 
land to be paid for by the fruits of  their labour. Fanny Wright had long con-
sidered the expediency of  taking black ex-slaves out of  America because she 
feared that the strong aversion of  whites towards any mixing of  the two races 
would confound the progress towards equal rights for all Americans.
The prejudice whether absurd or the contrary against a mixture of  the two colors is so 
deeply rooted in the American mind that emancipation without expatriation (if  indeed 
the word be applicable) seems impossible. ‹at least› In time indeed it wd in spite of  
prejudice take place - but how many years of  suffering & what a time of  evils inclu-
ding probably a servile war must ensue before that amalgamation cd ‹take effect› /be 
effected./ The apprehension of  this amalgamation will I think operate as not the least 
powerful incentive towards active measures (Payne-Gaposchkin C. 1975a: 230)20.
Despite careful planning that involved the setting up of  a school, building 
canteens and shared housing, creating farms for rearing animals and cultivat-
ing various kinds of  basic foodstuffs, the community struggled to become 
productive due to the lack of  experience not only of  the workers but also the 
organizers themselves, first and foremost Frances Wright. Moreover, the land 
itself  was not generating revenue. The few funds that had been collected were 
insufficient for the purchase of  reserve stocks and seeds, but were also inad-
equate for daily provisions of  food. Further and far more serious problems 
would arise. The area around Nashoba was in fact a malarial zone; the sisters 
became ill repeatedly with yellow fever and another disease similar to malaria. 
Frances herself  fell gravely ill for several days, almost dying, and never fully 
recovered her former health. In order to recover, she went first to New Har-
mony, where she formed a stronger friendship with Robert Dale Owen21, the 
20 Letter of  Frances Wright to Julia Garnett, 12 November 1824.
21 For a number of  years, Robert Dale Owen and Wright shared common hopes, dreams and 
plans. Having originally met him in New Harmony, she got him involved in the Nashoba proj-
ect, and they came to Europe together. On her return to Britain following the failure of  the 
Nashoba experiment, she and Owen became publishers of  the «New Harmony Gazzette», 
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eldest son of  ‘Mr.’ Owen. Robert had also taken up the cause against slavery, 
their shared convictions resulting in them travelling back to Europe together. 
Before leaving for Europe, Wright took the decision to transform Nashoba 
into a municipal area where everyone would have the same rights, both men 
and women, and where white and black children would grow together. She 
also assigned an equal portion of  property and equal share of  future profits 
to all her friends who had lent their support in creating and administrating the 
community. 
In Fanny Wright’s absence, however, a man called James Richardson, 
one of  the owners of  Nashoba, decided to write a detailed account of  life 
in Nashoba and to publish it in the anti-slavery journal The genius of  universal 
emancipation. Richardson had clearly neglected to consider the possible critical 
reaction that his article would incite. Indeed, seemingly unaware that his de-
scriptions of  life at Nashoba would offend common morals and inflame fears 
and entrenched prejudices, he gave a straightforward description of  how black 
and white children were educated together, and how parents were kept distant 
from their children to avoid them being a negative influence. He stressed that 
the slaves were treated with respect, but if  they neglected their duties they 
would be admonished and punished using traditional methods of  correction. 
Sexual relations outside marriage, even between people of  different color, 
were permitted provided that they were consensual. Richardson then went on 
to reveal that he himself  had a relationship with a black woman. The journal’s 
editor, Benjamin Lundy, was so shocked and outraged, in particular at the idea 
of  white and black children attending the same school and the revelations 
about sexual promiscuity, that he referred to Nashoba as «one great brothel, 
disgraceful to its institutors, and most reprehensible, as a public example, in 
the vicinity» (Morris 1984: 143). 
When called upon to explain himself, he only made things worse by public-
ly declaring that he was an atheist and by railing against what he saw as stupid 
taboos. Lundy expected Frances Wright to make a stand condemning Richard-
son’s revelations, but she did not explicitly do so. Instead, in an article entitled 
Explanatory Notes (Wright 1828: 124-125) that she wrote for the «New Harmo-
ny Gazzette» on 30 January 1828, while not making clear her disapproval of  
what Richardson had written, she also reaffirmed the principles that she saw 
as important to not only defend, but to apply in practice. These were liberty 
in all aspects of  life and equality, the only way to ensure the happiness of  man 
and the community as a whole. Besides, asserted Wright, she found herself  in 
the only country in the world that had declared: «all men ‘born free and equal’» 
subsequently called the Free Enquirer. Their friendship weakened over time, especially after 
Wright’s marriage to D’Arusmont, who accused Robert Dale of  cheating his wife. On Robert 
Dale Owen see among others Leopold (1940).
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and had «conquered the political freedom and equality of  its citizens – with 
the lamentable exception, indeed, of  its citizens of  color». It was for this very 
reason that that she insisted all citizens should have «equal advantages, equal 
means of  improvement and of  enjoyment» (ivi: 124). In addition, America 
was also a country that enjoyed political freedom, though unfortunately not 
moral freedom, without which freedom of  speech and action were under-
mined. It was thus necessary to acquire true freedom in all its forms, including 
moral, because only then would it be possible «To free ourselves of  thrones, 
aristocracies and hierarchies, of  sects and armies, and all the arrayed panoply 
of  organized despotism» (ibid.).
Richardson and Wright’s articles triggered the progressive demise and even-
tual failure of  the Nashoba experiment, tarnished by a moral condemnation 
that also damaged its founder, guilty as she was of  taking a stand, albeit not 
explicitly, against the traditional institution of  marriage, as well as against state 
religion and white supremacy. Over the centuries, the entrenched common 
popular belief  was that women were both mentally and morally weak. Frances 
Wright’s proven intellectual ability meant that she could not be easily attacked 
from a cultural viewpoint, but was open to attack from the moral crusaders 
who pointed to her evident lack of  moral propriety. She was an independent 
woman whose ability to make use of  freedom of  thought and expression, and 
whose active participation in intellectual circles set her apart from most other 
women of  her time22 Therefore, it was not difficult for her critics to distort 
and make believe that her demands for freedom and equality were a threat to 
natural order in all quarters of  society. It should be remembered that despite 
paying lip service to egalitarian ideals, the American people continued to be-
lieve that a woman’s place was in the home.    
The Nashoba experiment was officially considered to have ended in 1830, 
when she located and rented a ship to bring the members of  the Nashoba 
community to Haiti, where they could live free of  prejudices and oppressive 
laws.
22 Dale Spender draws comparisons between the lives of  Wright and Wollstonecraft, who the 
Scottish writer much admired and looked up to. Like Wright, she had been ostracized by con-
formist establishment society, who frowned upon a woman enjoying so much freedom «One 
woman who did continue in Mary Wollstnecraft’s disagreeable tradition, who flaunted just about 
every precept laid down for desiderable and decorous behavior in women […] she and her name 
became associated with a number of  outrageous activities» in Spender (1988: 160). Spender’s 
text also cites Lane, who described how Wright’s public figure was desecrated «because her aims 
appeared so outrageous to her contemporaries that they were in a hurry to forget her?» due to 
her unconventional lifestyle and her interests Lane (1972: 1).
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6.4 conclusIon
Despite the end of  the Nashoba community experiment, which with hindsight 
was destined to fail, it gave Wright the opportunity to make her own person-
al contribution, with both words and actions, to America’s unstoppable path 
towards progress. It had also enabled her to elaborate her ideas on the two 
cardinal concepts of  republicanism, liberty and equality, without which no 
state could function well and guarantee the happiness of  its citizens as active 
members of  a community. In other words, only these two fundamental attri-
butes could ensure social, political and economic stability. Moreover, if  the 
three questions of  social equality, slavery and women’s rights were not fully 
addressed, no progress would be possible. She wrote:
It is much to have declared men free and equal, but it shall be more when they have been 
rendered so; when means shall be sought and found, and employed to develop all the 
intellectual and physical powers of  all human beings, without regard to sex or condition, 
class, race, nation or color; and when men shall learn to view each other as members 
of  one great family, with equal claims to enjoyment and equal capacities for labor and 
instruction, admitting always the sole differences arising out of  the varieties exhibited in 
individual organization (Wright 1828: 124).
Her rediscovery in the United States of  the importance of  civic virtue, tan-
gibly apparent in the active participation of  citizens, was thanks in large part 
to her reading of  European philosophers such as the Scottish Enlightenment 
thinkers, but also Montesquieu from whom she had learned accurate methods 
of  research and analysis. Having initially become impassioned by the question 
of  slavery through reading the works of  Thomas Paine, author of  African Slav-
ery in America23, and those of  Montesquieu and Botta, it was by studying the 
writings of  Epicurus and Bentham that she determined the path she must fol-
low: work tirelessly for the advancement of  knowledge and human happiness 
because she believed: «men are virtuous, in proportion as they are happy, and happy in 
proportion as they are free» (ibid.).
Owen’s cooperativist system had the double merit of  attempting to elim-
inate competition and promoting education for all as a means to achieving 
equality among all individuals and secondly of  advocating absolute though not 
arbitrary or unregulated liberty.
23 Published in the «Pennsylvania Journal» and the «Weekly Advertiser» on the 8th March 1775, 
it was a strong condemnation of  the horrors of  slavery; Paine would subsequently be involved 
in the foundation of  America’s first anti-slavery association, set up in Philadelphia on April 
14th 1775.
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Wright’s personal dedication, her physical, emotional and financial com-
mitment is great testimony to her sincere love of  humanity and its progress 
that she so strongly believed in. Mary Shelley, author of  Frankenstein and 
daughter of  her much esteemed friend Mary Wollstonecraft paid homage to 
Wright’s noble soul:
a woman, young rich & independent, quits the civilization of  England for a life of  
hardship in the forests of  America that by so doing she may contribute to the happiness 
of  her species […] Such a tale cannot fail to inspire the deepest interest & the most 
ardent admiration. You do honour to our species & what perhaps is dearer to me, to the 
feminine part of  it (Wollstonecraft Shelley 1995: 180)24. 
 
As Wright wrote, Nashoba had been created 
not in a spirit of  hostility to the practice of  the world, but with a strong moral conviction 
of  the superior truth and beauty of  that consecrated by the legal act of  the founder. By 
a reference to that act, it will be seen that the principles on which the institution is based 
are those of  human liberty and equality without exceptions or limitations, -- and its 
more especial object, the protection and the regeneration of  the race of  color, universally 
oppressed and despised in a country self-denominated free (Wright 1828: 125).
24 Letter of  Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley to Frances Wright, 12 September 1827.
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Chapter Seven
the aMerIcan Journey of 
ernest duvergIer de hauranne: 
france and unIted states coMpared 
(1864-1865)
Claudia Giurintano
7.1 the land of frenzy and well-beIng
The main theme of  the days of  study held in Cagliari on Pluralism and monism 
in political and social patterns of  the modern and contemporary age has been declined 
in these pages through the comparison made by Ernest Duvergier de Hau-
ranne (1843-1877)1 between the personal government of  Napoleon III and 
1 Son of  journalist and politician Prosper (1798-1881), initiator of  the campaign of  banquets, 
Louis, Prosper, Ernest Duvergier de Hauranne contracted during the trip to America a lung 
injury that would later be the cause of  his untimely death at the age of  just thirty-four. Collabo-
rator of  the «Revue des Deux Mondes», after the travel notes, from 1866 to 1870, he published 
some articles on the French political debate, but also on the evolution of  American politics. 
During the Franco-Prussian War he was captain of  the Garde nationale mobile, the military 
corps employed primarily in opposition to the Prussian forces. Wounded in Beaune-la-Rolande, 
for his bravery he received the Légion d’Honneur. After the Second French Empire he leaned 
in favour of  the Republic. Since July 2, 1871 to March 7, 1876 he sat on the benches of  the 
centre-left at the National Assembly. On February 20, 1876 he was elected to the Chamber of  
Deputies always siding in the centre-left. A role, the latter, which he held until a few days before 
his death on August 19, 1877. During his term in office, he intervened in many discussions by 
voting against the resignation of  Thiers on May 24, 1873, against the confidence in the Broglie 
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the United States of  America in the last period of  the Civil war.
When still a boy, Duvergier had learned from the conversation he had with 
Alexis de Tocqueville, and especially from the reading of  Démocratie en Amé-
rique, the functioning of  the political institutions of  a country that is «unique 
in the world» which, as Tocqueville wrote, had «drawn the most profit» from 
the “powerful means” of  association; a link between democracy and associ-
ations, which offered the young French journalist, thirty years on from the 
“first” Démocratie, the possibility to compare once again France, this time being 
the France of  the Second Empire, with a markedly pluralistic model of  social 
reality, not without defects, but in which free association was presented as «a 
condition which avoids the extremes of  the individualistic closing in private 
life and statism»2. Pluralism as a multiplicity of  ideas, opinions, as well as a 
way of  organizing a State where power is not fully centralized, but is rather 
exercised through local organizations and social groups.
Faced with a political and institutional reality that seemed like the authori-
tarian degeneration of  the Second Republic, Duvergier decides to embark on 
his trip to America.
June 2, 1864 he began his journey from Liverpool to New York. In eight 
months of  permanence he travelled throughout the United States and Cana-
da3, approaching Cuba and the Antilles in March of  the following year.
He is a twenty-one year young man who, in the wake of  the great French 
intellectuals of  the generations that had preceded him, from Chateaubriand to 
Tocqueville, wants to know the New World and be an eyewitness of  the Civil 
War that has challenged the American political institutions. 
He decides to write a travel diary in an attempt to arouse the reader’s in-
terest for those events, but perhaps also to fully understand the feelings that 
Chateaubriand had cleverly set in his Voyage en Amérique, describing the dream 
of  the traveller as «une sorte de plénitude de cœur et de vide de tête, qui vous 
laisse jouir en repos de votre existence» (Chateaubriand 1827: 96), with a mix-
ture of  peace of  mind and anxiety.
That American route will be documented in the letters and notes published 
in 1866 in two full-bodied tomes under the title Huit mois en Amérique (1864-
government, against the seven-year period, against the laws on mayors. He voted in favour of  
the constitutional laws of  1875. See Robert and Cougny <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr>. 
See footnote 1 by Le Guillou and Roger-Taillade in Montalembert (2009: 457).
2 Gomarasca (2006: 8723). (Free translation by the author of  the present paper).
3 From June 16, 1864 to February 12, 1865 the journey of  Duvergier winds from Newfoun-
dland to New York, from Philadelphia to Washington, from Maryland to Saratoga, from Tren-
ton to Canada, up to the Great Lakes, from Chicago to the High Mississippi, from Saint Louis 
to Kentucky, from Cincinnati to Pennsylvania, before heading up towards Boston, Montreal 
and Toronto.
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1865), and published in the «Revue des Deux Mondes»4, from 15 August 1865 
to 1 April 1866, in twelve «excellent» articles, as Charles de Montalembert, the 
Catholic liberal, wrote in his Journal intime (Montalembert 2009: 457). 
In the avant-propos, imagining perhaps to address a reader too demanding 
and full of  expectations, Duvergier defines his works as ephemeral, not a 
criticism, nor an apology for democracy, but a tale about the «naive» emo-
tions of  a French liberal who lacking a sufficient preparation had fallen into 
American society with the illusion of  being able to find the imagined per-
fection, the «Platonically» loved freedom and ignoring, in fact, the practice 
of  free institutions.
He had arrived in the US when the cause of  the American union appeared 
severely impaired and had resumed his return journey when the victory of  
the Northern States was almost certain. He had been able to witness «aux 
inquiétudes, aux défaillances, aux fluctuations variées de l’opinion publique» 
(Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, I: II). 
Both the Democratic and Federative institutions were enable to resist «the 
violent shock» of  war by showing all their solidity as well as their flexibility 
and their ability to cope with situations of  serious crisis. The American people, 
often depicted as «anarchique, intéressé, ingouvernable, ramené, disait-on, à la 
barbarie par l’excès de l’égoïsme et de l’indépendance individuelle» (ivi: IV), 
had been able to manifest both order and discipline, as well as patriotism and 
perseverance. 
Duvergier provided his readers with the «simple impressions», the «famil-
iar» details of  the serious contemporary events he was witnessing. The nar-
ration of  the facts, by his own statement, would not follow a «logical and 
artificial order». These were personal and daily accounts:
J’ai pensé – it can be read from the first pages of  his diary – que les impressions les 
plus simples, les détails les plus familiers empruntaient de l’importance à la gravité 
même des événements contemporains. Je n’ai pas voulu imposer un ordre logique et 
artificiel à des récits tout personnels, écrits au jour le jour, et sans aucune arrière-pensée 
de publicité. J’ai cru qu’il valait mieux livrer au lecteur mes impressions de chaque jour, 
les péripéties, les contradictions même de ma pensée, et le faire assister pour ainsi dire à 
la formation de mon jugement, que de lui donner une conclusion dogmatique qui n’eût 
montré qu’une des faces de la vérité (ivi: V).
4 Founded in July 1829 by Prosper Mauroy and Pierre de Ségur-Dupeyron, in 1831 it was bought 
back by Auguste Auffray and began being directed by François Buloz. The «Revue des Deux 
Mondes», journal de voyages, de l’administration et de moeurs chez le differents peuple du globe, expressed 
through such name its interest for the two “Worlds”: Europe and America <http://www.re-
vuedesdeuxmondes.fr/qui-sommes-nous/>.
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Describing in detail the American character as it had appeared to him in the 
eight months of  travel, Duvergier never claimed to add new features to an «al-
ready overburdened profile» of  elements, but instead wanted to mitigate «the 
grotesque» shades with which it was covered by imagination - or as he stated – 
by the «charlatanism of  European caricaturists» (ibid.). And among those who 
went to America with prejudices and stereotypes, he included himself. 
He had arrived in the new continent with an exaggerated consideration 
for the American freedom, and he returned with «an almost childish fear of  
his costumes». Literature had contributed to this idealization by painting the 
American custom as fairy-tales to attract the attention of  the European public. 
Stereotypes that had competed to represent the American like a ridiculous and 
intractable being, as a kind of  civilized wild.
Duvergier just presented a true, sometimes hard, judgement on the Amer-
ican people yet without boasting or flattering the French. On the contrary, he 
intended avoiding to propose an explicit comparison between the two political 
systems, because it would have been dangerous and certainly not glorious for 
France. But, if  you asked indulgence for France, it was necessary, however, to 
respect the legitimate pride of  a free nation, «notre ainée en bien des choses, 
notre cadette en quelques autres» (ivi: XI), whose greatness could not be de-
nied.
The first impact with the American reality had requested from the outset a 
twist in the preconceived idea of  freedom. Upon his arrival in New York, Du-
vergier had experienced red tape, the “tyranny” of  searches and of  the seizure 
of  some personal items. But America had immediately appeared as the land of  
frenzy, of  tireless activity, of  the excesses of  wealth that had ended up perhaps 
weakening the intelligence and sense of  beauty, and leaving the monopoly to 
the «utilitarian positivism».
A Tocqueville scholar, Duvergier shared his rational love for democracy, 
but also his aristocratic instinct, enough to paraphrase the well-known note 
Mon instinct, mes opinions5 by the author of  Démocratie en Amérique, writing the 
following words on September 7, 1864: «Plus j’avance dans le pays de la dé-
mocratie, plus je mes sens aristocrate à mon insu» (Duvergier de Hauranne 
1866, I: 238).
In his American journey Tocqueville had witnessed the contradictions be-
tween extreme freedom and slavery, the inconsistencies of  those who love so 
5 «Experience has proved to me that in almost all men, certainly in me, it always comes back to 
basic instincts, and one does well only what conforms to one’s own instincts. Therefore, let’s 
honestly look for where my basic instincts and my serious principles may be. I have a taste of  the mind 
for Democratic Institutions, but I am an aristocrat by instinct, that is, I contempt and fear the 
crowd. I love passionately freedom, the rule of  law, the respect for the rights, but not demo-
cracy. This is the depth of  the soul». Tocqueville (1994: 12-13). (Free translation by the author 
of  the present paper).
The AmericAn journey of ernesT Duvergier De hAurAnne 117
much equality, but think it is natural, as he had denounced, «to hold by side 
and under their feet» millions of  individuals in an «eternal and irremediable 
servitude!» (The irreplaceable role of  the State, Tocqueville 1994: 339). The Ameri-
can society was now trying to resolve such contradictions with a civil war that 
in Duvergier’s opinion was the emblem of  the antagonism between two rival 
societies, North and South, on one side the murmur of  the city, industry and 
human activity, on the other side the loneliness, the fatal immobility due to 
the ambition of  the Southerners who had tied slavery to the land ownership 
(Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, I: 86).
7.2. the “secret” of aMerIcan freedoM: 
the organIzatIon of polItIcal partIes
Since the crossing, Duvergier had had the opportunity to converse on Amer-
ican political issues, on the presidential elections that would re-elect Republi-
can Abraham Lincoln, and to hear comments on the guilt of  the South (ivi: 8). 
He had heard the thesis and the antithesis, the opinion of  both the northerner 
and southerner, the opinion of  the Republican - defender of  the union, willing 
to bend the rights of  the Member states to the federal domain, - and of  the 
democratic6, partisan of  autonomy to the bitter end and of  the absolute in-
dependence of  the individual Member States (Duvergier de Hauranne 1868c, 
note 1).
The presidential election campaign - described by Duvergier as a sort of  
interregnum and of  apparent disorder, of  suspension of  authority, of  war 
between the parties - had revealed to him the power wielded by popular vote.
The American spirit had, in fact, proved capable of  ensuring law and order 
even immediately after the election campaign:
6 The Southern States placed their purported right to secede under the aegis of  the democratic 
doctrine. The Northern ones defended the union and consequently they supported the Republi-
cans. The Republican party was internally divided into moderates, who declared themselves as 
respectful of  a limited independence of  the States, and radicals, concerned with the abolition of  
slavery and the simple maintenance of  the Federal Union, enough to want to impose on the ab-
solute equality of  the races on all States in both North and South. The civil war had fragmented 
the Democrats, who were divided on the proclamation of  the emancipation drafted by Lincoln 
and presented, on the one hand, the War Democrats joining the Republicans who were lined up 
in support of  the president, and on the other hand the Peace Democrats, close to the Souther-
ners, supporters of  peace and for this ridiculed by Republicans with the name Copperhead 
which became synonymous with traitor. See Auman (2014: 51). See also Weber (2011: 33-47).
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Voila - commented Duvergier on November 8, 1864 – le grand mérite de la démocratie 
américaine et l’utilité de cette insouciance même du juste qui étonne des esprits accou-
tumés à voir partout la valeur absolue des choses. Les Américains sont des hommes 
pratiques qui savent accepter sagement les faits accomplis et irrévocables (Duvergier de 
Hauranne 1866, II: 21). 
Once the elections were over everything was silent and the signal of  that threat 
of  insurrection or of  the state of  general anarchy was immediately contradict-
ed by the strength of  American democracy: «tumultueuse, qui semblait prête 
à se déchirer, - noted Duvergier - éprouve elle même le besoin de s’imposer 
la discipline et d’imprimer un caractère de stabilité solennelle à la constitu-
tion des pouvoirs nouveaux» (ivi: 23). Such protection, «tutelary genius» of  
democracy, resided in his opinion in the organization of  political parties (ibid.). 
This was the «secret» of  American freedom: 
Ces conventions improvisés – he wrote – qui s’organisent au nom du peuple pour désig-
ner les candidats et fixer la politique des partis sont obéies avec un ensemble qui prouve 
l’intelligence politique du pays (ibid.). 
The organization of  political parties conveyed the habit to deliberate and act 
jointly, to give priority to the collective interest on self-interest, to teach mod-
eration (Duvergier de Hauranne 1868b). 
Duvergier was aware that to the eyes of  a European, the organization of  
political parties in America could present itself  as a State within a State, but 
still it had allowed the regular exercise of  democratic freedoms. Four years of  
civil war would have crippled any nation, it would put into question the invio-
lable right of  association. America, however, had offered a great lesson. Rep-
resentative institutions, accompanied by all the necessary freedom, were the 
sign of  the civilization of  the peoples, the object of  their legitimate ambition, 
«the natural condition of  all civilized nations» (Duvergier de Hauranne 1868a).
Faced with this representation of  the American model, and with the free-
dom of  fact as well as the experience and contribution of  social progress, 
France, according Duvergier, had preferred the sterile abstraction of  universal 
suffrage without limits, pure theory7.
7 Duvergier de Hauranne (1866, II: 413). On the issue of  political representation, Duvergier 
defines as «seductive systems», proper to the ideal sciences and to pure justice, the proposals of  
the Single transferable Vote of  Thomas Hare and John Stuart Mill’s multiple votes. In this regard, 
he writes: «Nous ne devons jamais perdre de vue les grandes idées de justice qui dominent les 
institutions libre et qui sont l’âme de nos droits; mais il ne faut pas oublier qu’en politique, com-
me en morale, ce sont les œuvres qui sauvent encore plus que la foi». Duvergier de Hauranne 
(1868a ). The author believes that the electoral law should not be «left at the mercy» of  the pas-
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The French political system outlined by Duvergier is an autocratic model 
that only in appearance, «officially», maintains universal suffrage as a demo-
cratic element, as well as public freedoms, but prohibits the national will to 
express itself8. The author minimizes the liberal openings of  Napoleon III, 
inaugurated by the decree of  November 24, 18609, so as to grasp more its 
«authoritarian twists» than its authentic liberal evolution10.
His nation would have to choose, then, between «the reassuring agitation 
of  representative government» and «the frightening silence of  personal gov-
ernment»; to choose between the safety of  a liberal system in which the coun-
try discussed publicly and the instability of  a despotic regime that would lead 
to new and «more terrible» revolutions, in which everything depended on the 
whims and the «fantasy of  one single man» (Duvergier de Hauranne 1869: 9)11.
What strikes the young French journalist is that in America every local issue, 
even private ones, ends up being reconnected to a major national issue. The 
same presidential elections implied the appointment of  the Lieutenant-Gov-
ernor, of  the representative of  the first district, and had consequences on the 
choice of  a policeman or of  a simple street sweeper.
Each party had its own organized government and an “army” of  under-
lings ready to «invade» the little jobs sector: «Tous les quatre ans, – commented 
Duvergier – l’administration entière est menacée. Si le président change, elle 
change aussi de la cave au grenier, partout du moins où le nouveau pouvoir a 
obtenu la majorité» (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, II: 25).
sions of  an ignorant crowd; the citizen, in his view, can make his voice heard in different ways 
than «jeter un morceau de papier dans une urne ou même de prononcer à haute voix le nom du 
candidat qu’il choisit». Duvergier (1868b).
8 (Ellul 1976, III: 385). Today, the judgement on Napoléon le Petit, according to the well-k-
nown epithet by Victor Hugo, was revised from an historiographical perspective thus allowing 
a reconstruction of  the Second Empire which highlights the social, economic and industrial 
progress sponsored by Napoleon III from 1848 to 1870. For an in-depth investigation, see the 
biographies of  Girard (1986), Séguin (1991), Milza (2004), Cardini (2010). Milza in particular 
judges, among other things, the Second Empire as a step in the democratization process of  
France, a period that «a familiarisé les Français avec le vote» Milza (2004: 646).
9 Saitta (1975: 748-749). The decree of  November 24 had returned to the Senate and the Leg-
islative Body, «the right to address in response to the Crown’s speech» and had given back the 
Legislature the right to amendment. Ibid.: 730.
10 Ellul (1976, III: 385, 393). Still in 1869, on the eve of  the elections, in the brochure Le gouver-
nement personnel while denouncing that the official candidates would lean on the «personal pro-
tection of  the prince», Duvergier writes: «Les élection que nous allons faire décideront de l’exis-
tence même et des fondements du gouvernement représentatif. Elles mettent en présence deux 
principes absolument opposés. Tandis que l’opposition invoque le principe libéral et réclame 
l’exercice sérieux des institutions représentatives, le gouvernement s’appuie en revanche sur 
le principe d’autorité, c’est-à-dire sur le droit qu’il prétend avoir d’exercer sur la nation une sorte 
de tutelle, et de la diriger dans le choix de ses mandataires». Duvergier de Hauranne (1869: 4).
11 Free translation by the author of  the present paper.
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Therefore, in American democracy the organization of  parties formed 
and maintained the national line. And although the federal constitution would 
leave spaces of  autonomy to the Member states, the political organization was 
a unifying force created by the sharing of  ideas and obedience to the same 
political address. 
American democracy could have found itself  weak and helpless in front of  
an unforeseen danger, it could have lost the material resources that an absolute 
power, maybe, would have been able to exploit better, but its moral “spring” 
would not have failed, since its strength is not derived from the administration 
or the army, but from the very heart of  the nation, from the roots of  the major 
political parties, basic elements of  the pluralist theory (Duvergier de Hauranne 
1866, I: 27).
7.3 agaInst the doMaIn of centralIzatIon
In Duvergier’s opinion, the administrative unit would lead to a progressive 
centralization that would be fatal for freedom. The solution, the remedy, was 
to be identified in a wider local division (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866: II: 
124).
In his famous pages of  Démocratie en Amérique, Tocqueville had already 
properly differentiated political centralization from administrative centraliza-
tion typical of  France at that time.
If  the interests shared by all parties of  the nation, «the formation of  the 
general laws and relations with foreign countries» fall within the political cen-
tralization, the concentration and direction of  special or local interests instead 
concern the administrative centralization:
I cannot conceive - wrote Tocqueville - that a nation can live and prosper without a 
powerful centralization of  government. But I am of  opinion that in centralized admi-
nistration is fit only to enervate the nations in which it exist, by incessantly diminishing 
their local spirit (Tocqueville, 1984: 64; 1991: 110)12.
Based on the American experience, Tocqueville had attributed to the judiciary 
the role of  corrective for the tyranny of  the majority, an autonomous power, 
able to bring back the majority within its limits. Duvergier shared this analysis 
so as to give the judiciary the task of  safeguarding the institutions, a conserva-
12 Free translation by the author of  the present paper.
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tive and liberal role that maintained the balance of  powers and the hierarchy 
of  powers, thus giving powerful guarantees to the freedoms of  the individual.
In France, where the centralized structure was dominating, all the laws ema-
nated from the same power, disguised under different names. The laws formed 
a single, homogeneous set, and although there were some general principles in 
the French constitution, they appeared as mere outward trappings. The princi-
ples of  the 1789 revolution were present as a decoration, as an ornament; in the 
application, the law of  detail had taken over the general law. 
The situation that Duvergier caught in America was instead very different. 
Here the Constitution of  the United States is the real supreme law which domi-
nates all laws. The judiciary intervenes every day in public affairs. And when a cit-
izen believes he has been injured in his right, he denounces not the government, 
but the official who represents it and has been made responsible by the law.
In France, the construction of  the administrative machinery was imper-
sonal and indivisible, cloaked with the inviolability of  the official. In America 
instead every officer knew he had to account for abuses committed in the 
ordinary courts. The judiciary was the real controller, the real counterweight 
essential to democracies, while in France it was a great administrative machine, 
governed as a regiment. Here, as Duvergier denounced, the voice of  the citi-
zen remained isolated before the guilty official and the claim for the enforce-
ment of  the law remained a dead letter. In America, the ministers were agents 
of  the president, but the responsibility of  all officials in front of  the common 
justice advantageously replaced the accountability of  government leaders in 
front of  the assembly (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, II: 111-112).
The press, thanks to the American freedom, was the indispensable inter-
mediary, the tool without which the parties could not have formed, the opin-
ions could not have been expressed and spread throughout the country. It 
divulged, but did not taught anything, and thanks to the freedom it enjoyed, 
was less damaging than a docile and gagged press (Duvergier de Hauranne 
1866, I: 342).
The American administrative decentralization had therefore allowed each 
location to have its particular laws, and each institution its regulations. An ex-
ample was offered by free education, the revolutionary innovation that existed 
in America for two centuries, established in the colonies by the Puritans from 
which «ce vaste et admirable système d’éducation populaire» originated (Du-
vergier de Hauranne 1866, II: 88).
Duvergier had watched, amazed, the presence of  schools of  all kinds: state, 
municipal, private. Americans were aware of  the excellence of  their system of  
public education, “keystone” of  the republican institutions. They understood 
how foolish it was to put political power in the hands of  an ignorant mass and 
had invested in the training of  citizens.
122 MonisMs and PluralisMs in the history of Political and social Models
In Europe, and particularly in France, free education appeared as the ex-
pression of  political economy aimed at creating strictly identical services. A 
reform that would have been labeled in a simplistic way as an expression of  
socialist doctrine. Duvergier warned to look at the results and not the doctrine; 
an abstract calculation of  the ideas was of  no importance when the general 
welfare, the morality, the freedom of  an entire people could be reached. It 
was not just to accept a syllogism or an equation, but to agree with a practical 
experience that America taught. 
Free education was a basic need of  every true democracy. French adminis-
trative centralism was a too heavy machine, too complicated, and free educa-
tion would be prohibitively expensive for a State responsible for ensuring the 
right and the obligation to free education. It was necessary, first, to emancipate 
the communes.
With its representative institutions, accompanied by all the necessary free-
dom, America, instead, offered a great lesson in civilization of  peoples.
The American habit of  self-government had been able to survive any ordeal. 
The war, the defeat of  the secessionist government had failed to strangle the 
independence and the legal order (Duvergier de Hauranne, 1866 II: 88: 490). 
In less than a year, in fact, the whole South had returned under the legal au-
thority and in the pacific exercise of  its freedoms: «Voila le spectacle unique et 
admirable que la démocratie américaine vient de donner au monde» (ivi: 491). 
But the great merit of  American democracy was also its extraordinary 
ability to train men and citizens, to practice the institutions and not only in 
an apparent form. The possibility to enter the White House, to freely shake 
hands with the President, was not just a ridiculous formality: it was the sign 
of  the democratic union between the government and the governed; the pos-
sibility to «honour» power not under the image of  a soldier in uniform or of  
a prince with royal coat, but in the form of  a simple man of  the people, of  
an older worker as Jackson, of  a woodcutter like Lincoln, or of  a young tailor 
as Johnson13. These men of  democracy were formed modestly in the daily 
13 In 1868 Johnson was subjected to impeachment for suspected abuses of  power against the 
Congress which was in favour of  a punitive policy against the Southern States. The failure to 
achieve the 2/3 majority required by the Constitution, by one vote, enabled him to reject the 
first impeachment of  the executive in American history. Duvergier had the opportunity to deal 
widespread with this matter in an article published on the «Revue des Deux Mondes», L’élection 
présidentielle aux États-Unis, Le général Grant et les partis en Amérique, 1868. The destitution of  the 
president of  the United States by an Assembly was a «curious spectacle» which turned «le pre-
mier personnage de l’état» in the «plus minime des fonctionnaires». And he wrote: «Accoutumés 
que nous sommes à des pratiques toutes différentes, nous serions certainement moins étonnés 
si c’était le pouvoir exécutif  qui s’avisât de congédier les chambres et de gouverner le pays sans 
elles. Tel est pourtant le seul moyen qu’ait inventé la constitution américaine pour trancher les 
disputes du président et du congrès; mais on conçoit que cette arme formidable ne pouvait pas 
être d’un usage quotidien» (Duvergier de Hauranne, 1867).
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exercise of  their political rights; they owed their fortune just to the free choice 
of  their fellow citizens. No one could ever scold their humble origin, nor the 
lack of  theoretical knowledge; no prejudice had banned the conquest of  the 
highest summits of  the American administration. Tocqueville had beautifully 
described it as «the equality of  conditions», as the possibility for each single 
individual to rise in society without finding moral barriers, jealousies of  divi-
sions between classes which continued instead to exist in Europe as legacies 
of  the Ancien Régime (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, II: 494).
American democracy did not know these vices of  French society and its 
administrative centralization. The words “aristocratic” and “proletarian” were 
unknown and equality was not a barren appearance imposed by the fear of  a 
democracy shaken by social fears.
America was the only modern country where, in the strict and figurative 
sense, the man had a space in front of  him; the only country where the man 
had no need to live as a parasite on other people’s wealth. The property was 
respected because it was accessible to all, and the citizen was generous because 
«[he pushed] forward without looking at what he [was leaving] behind» (Du-
vergier de Hauranne 1866, I: 434).
In his usual use of  metaphorical images, Duvergier likened a centralized 
country like France to a man who ends up atrophying his limbs because de-
spite having two legs he prefers to tie them together and replace them with 
crutches. In a state so organized, rest and silence become then the only desire 
and need of  the people. The lower classes become accustomed to passive obe-
dience or to anarchy, to the contempt of  legal rights and freedom. Tocqueville, 
«le génie sagace», had appropriately defined this society in «ineffaçables» terms 
as “revolutionary”, but not democratic.14 
Duvergier exemplified the confrontation between the two political models, be-
tween the American and French institutions of  his time with the following words:
Quand je compare les habitudes si larges des Américains à nos mœurs défiantes et 
chicanières, il me semble voir d’un coté un coureur hardi qui s’allège pour atteindre plus 
vite le but désiré, de l’autre un flâneur qui s’arrête pour ramasser tous les cailloux de la 
route. L’un est affairé, taciturne, tendu vers son unique pensée: s’il ne vous renverse au 
passage, il vous repoussera brusquement de son chemin; l’autre est sans contredit plus 
aimable, et tous ces petits cailloux inutiles qu’il aime à ramasser sont les plaisirs et les 
ornements de la vie (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, I: 434).
14 Tocqueville (1991: 676-678); Duvergier (1866, II: 496). According to Duvergier, in France the 
aristocratic sentiment hard to destroy, but publicly concealed behind the «politesse», prevailed 
on the love for equality. An ability to camouflage that concerned the most wicked acts much 
to write: «trop de gens chez nous sont habiles à commettre des crimes avec des gants blancs, et 
sans qu’il leur reste aux mains une goutte du sang versé». Duvergier de Hauranne (1866, I: 237).
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Chapter Eight
between natIonalIsM and InternatIonalIsM: 
luIgI sturzo’s regIonalIsM
Carlo Morganti
Luigi Sturzo (Caltagirone 1875, November 26th – Roma 1959, August 8th) 
was a Sicilian priest and politician. He is well known as the founder of  the 
Italian People’s Party (PPI), which he founded in 1919. «Priest, poet, philos-
opher, political scientist, statesman, one of  Italy’s great glories, Don Luigi 
Sturzo, after his high calling of  priest, the vocation closest to his heart and 
the one that he put above all others, preferred to think of  himself  as a so-
ciologist, in the European sense of  being a student of  society» (Lograsso 
1964: 192)1. Soon he turned into a famous social scientist with an in depth 
knowledge of  the Italian society, particularly in its historical making process 
(Gargano 1999: 10)2.
Among his various writings, we can not therefore forget those dedicated to 
the idea of  society, e.g. Inner Laws of  Society: A New Sociology written in 1935 and 
published in 1944 (Sturzo 1944a), or those numerous articles which Sturzo 
1 About Sturzo see also Malgeri (1993); Fanello Marcucci (2004). About his political thought: 
De Rosa (1973); Campanini – Antonetti (1979); Guccione (1987); Guccione (1988); De Rosa 
(1990); De Rosa (2001); Guccione (2004).
2 See Gargano (1999: 10): «Sicilian by birth but, following his ordination, soon mixing in the 
ecclesiastic circles of  Rome, Luigi Sturzo was a witness to the constitution of  the Italian na-
tion-state, living through his country’s transition from kingdom to republic. He experienced the 
difficulties of  government at local level and also observed the terrible events of  the two world 
wars, events which rendered the question of  a world government a pressing issue both in Italy 
and in Europe (where the dreadful experiences of  Nazi-fascism and Bolshevism had made 
democracy and freedom the only legitimate way forward)».
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wrote during his exile from Italy ( see e.g. Sturzo 1949b) – Sturzo was forced 
to emigrate to England in 1924; he lived in London till 1940, when the Second 
World War and the Nazi bombings on the British capital led him to move to 
the USA, to New York, where he stayed just for a few months because of  the 
very cold climate, and then to Jacksonville, in Florida – e.g. Italy and Fascism, 
published in 1926 (Sturzo 1926a), The international community and the right of  war, 
published in 1929 (Sturzo 1929a), Nationalism and internationalism, published in 
1946 (Sturzo 1946) and containing some articles and letters written for Amer-
ican newspapers and scientific reviews. La regione nella nazione, published in 
1949 (Sturzo 1949a) is an emblematic text of  Sturzo’s regionalism.
Regionalism – based on a particular attention that the Sicilian priest trib-
utes to regions, local government and local communities – mirrors Sturzo’s 
pluralistic vision of  the Italian society and characterizes his political thought. 
He learned to pay attention, as a statesman and Mayor of  Caltagirone, to peo-
ple’s practical necessities, and as a Sicilian, towards the ideas of  legislative au-
tonomy and self-government for those regions of  Southern Italy which felt 
abandoned by the post-unity liberal Governments.
However, Sturzo’s regionalism is to be set in a larger context and analyzed 
as it were not an isolated aspect of  his political thought, but a fundamental 
part of  his political vision which entwines nationalism and internationalism, 
attention to traditions and local elements and larger social, cultural and polit-
ical contexts – in a society where the individuals are opening to the other hu-
man beings, the States to other States until creating that «inter-nazione» which 
is, for Sturzo, the real aim of  a christian-oriented human society.
8.1 fIrst fraMework: natIonalIsM and natIon
We start from the first point: nationalism. More precise information is re-
quired. Sturzo grows up and studies between the end of  the XIX century and 
the beginning of  the XX – in those years bourgeois ideals of  development and 
progress of  civilization and sciences characterize, in Sturzo’s vision, Italy and 
Europe, but they lead peoples and States not to that progress towards which 
they are aiming, but to the great disaster of  the First World War. After the war, 
the world seems to be informed by nationalistic ideals and visions – from the 
idea of  nation, the political thought moved towards the idea of  nationalism, 
but it is often difficult to distinguish the former from the latter; nationalism 
has moreover good aspects: self-determination of  nations, minorities respect 
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etc.; but it has also bad aspects: ideas of  hierarchy among peoples and nations, 
domination, indifference to other peoples’ destiny.
Thus, it is necessary to determine the real meaning of  the term nation-
alism in Sturzo’s thought. In his vision, in fact, the idea of  nationalism, as 
well as many other political, economic and social phenomena, e.g. socialism, 
communism, liberalism, belongs to a particular category of  political concepts 
he defines as «ismi» – from the terminations of  these words – involving not 
only new words to indicate ancient and lofty concepts – nation, liberty, society, 
community – but also a new and different sense. And the idea of  nationalism, 
in this respect, makes no exception. It involves, in a sharp meaning of  the 
term, an idea of  the nation being a political and ethic primum, at the same time 
origin and aim of  a community, he strictly condemns. So nationalism ranks, in 
Sturzo’s theory, at the same level of  the other «ismi». However, Sturzo argues 
that the term nationalism is often used in other less fanatical meanings, so that 
it can appear acceptable and even deserving – i.e. as love of  one’s country, as 
an affectionate sentiment that entwines the individuals and their birthplaces. 
Even Pope Pius XI in his encyclical Ubi Arcano Dei (1922, December 23rd) 
distinguishes among a right nationalism (giusto nazionalismo) and an exagger-
ated nationalism (nazionalismo esagerato); he approves the former, but con-
demns the latter as an anti-christian idea.
To summarize, according to Sturzo’s political vision, it is always important 
to understand the real meaning of  the words we use in order to avoid mis-
takes and misunderstandings, for it is not simple to seize the exact connection 
between a word – and especially a new word – and its real meaning or, to use 
Sturzo’s words: «cogliere l’intrinseco nesso tra la parola ed il significato [so 
that] si va per approssimazione verso i significati che prevalgono in un dato 
ambiente e in un dato momento» (Sturzo 1946: 5).
Then, we can not forget that Sturzo writes some articles, especially during 
the First World War, by using tones we can consider – apparently – national-
istic, but he has not let up in front of  any nationalistic temptation. In them, 
we can simply find Sturzo’s will to be on the young Italian soldiers’ side, those 
young soldiers who have been compelled by the wartime circumstances to 
fight in an apparently never ending trench war.
Nevertheless, that of  Nation – and not that of  nationalism – is, in Sturzo’s 
view, a really acceptable concept, referring to a particular form of  the human 
society. A society that Sturzo sees as a result of  the individual: society is a 
«multiple, simultaneous and continuative projection of  individuals» (Sturzo 
1944a: 18), he writes at the beginning of  Inner Laws of  Society: A New Sociology 
– the individual being therefore the starting point of  his own political analysis. 
The individual or, better, the individuals, with all their personalities, specifici-
ties, pluralities. And of  course with all their natural processes of  association. 
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Sturzo argues that everything that is human is also associative: «nulla esiste 
dell’attività umana che pur essendo originariamente individuale non abbia va-
lore associativo; nulla fra gli uomini può entrare in essere che non richiami una 
qualche forma di associazione» (Sturzo 1944a: 6).
Sturzo admits however that it is often complicated for the individuals 
themselves to understand their own natural associative tendencies, for they are 
used to consider classical social forms – family, State, class, nation – as they 
were independent social structures, while every merely individual act is at the 
same time associative, it contains an inter-individual relation and is aiming to 
goals which are both individual and collective.
So Sturzo gives a great importance to these social structures, both Nation 
and State, which he considers a natural consequence of  a continuous human 
process and within which he develops all his analysis3.
Hence, by shifting from an individual perspective to an individual and col-
lective one, the natural associative process, characterizing the creation of  na-
tions and States. It represents a peculiar feature of  Sturzo’s political analysis. 
So a natural associative life of  the individuals constitutes a key concept in 
order to move, then, towards the idea of  international community as intended 
by Sturzo.
8.2 second fraMework: the InternatIonal coMMunIty
If  a society is created by organized relations among individuals and the indi-
vidual has natural tendencies to an associative life, so does also a community, a 
nation – whose natural tendencies have, mutatis mutandis, the same goal of  the 
individual – when it joins other nations and communities, with different cul-
tures and traditions, aiming to the creation of  a real international community 
or, by using Sturzo’s words, an «inter-nazione»4.
3 Sturzo writes that: «Human reality is process [not a “progress” but, instead, a “process”] We 
say process, that is, succession, and not progress, nor evolution, because all human activity is 
individual, even if  developing, as it does, collectively or by groups. Every individual activity is, 
above all, experience, experiment, the reduction of  the experience of  others into our own, re-
ally personal”. For Sturzo, then, “in associated life there are contemporaneously developments, 
arrest, renewals, involutions, all the stages that experience implies. Hence, there is not always 
progress, never a real regression, but in a relative sense both progress and regression, that is, 
experimentation and achievement» Sturzo (1944a: 18).
4 See for example Sturzo 1944b: «Today there is only one alternative: either a League of  
Nations with its own juridical and political powers, with its own international police, and a 
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Sturzo thinks in fact that modern nations have been created by a union 
of  local level units – cities, counties and provinces – within a larger mark, 
e.g. kingdoms, states, nations. And this unity has been difficult, due to the 
contemporary presence in this process of  local rights and traditions and 
larger national aims. However, as this unit of  cities and counties has been 
completed, especially during the modern age, it can be then possible also a 
unit of  States and Nations within the even larger international community 
framework. Near the end of  Nationalism and Internationalism Sturzo writes: 
«We are going toward an international life in spite of  our mistakes and fail-
ings» (Sturzo 1946). He finds the roots of  this idea in the Christian theme of  
human equality before God and in the religious duty to love one’s neighbour 
in a manner that transcends the traditional boundaries of  the ancient world. 
Thus the social values of  the pre-Christian world are inverted, and human 
personality assumes the mantle previously held by the social and ethnic bonds 
of  that era. 
Sturzo is really persuaded by the fact that Nations and States can reach 
a pacific international community, he is a great supporter of  the League of  
Nations, as well as, even if  a bit more frustrated, of  the Organization of  the 
United Nations. And he can be remembered also for his commitment for a 
European unity5. 
The international community is, in other words, the natural political frame-
work within which nations and peoples can find its own historical realization.
contribution of  armaments from every state: or an imperialistic supremacy (to give it its true 
name) of  great powers which take on the responsibility of  world order and direct protection, 
or protection by means of  spheres of  influence, of  other states. None of  the spectrum of  
possibilities we can think up between these two poles will be able to make either one or the 
other system prevail. We are in favour of  a League of  Nations with all the necessary powers 
to create a new order in the world», cit. in Martini (1988).
5 «In the more general context of  his commitment to world democracy, his support for 
the post World War II movement towards European unification can, in this regard, also 
be considered significant, giving substance to some of  the assertions he made during the 
period of  his exile from Italy. If  we consider that the process of  European integration 
actually originated (if  we leave aside the general aspirations of  Count Coudenhove-Kaler-
gi’s Pan-Europa committee and the work and goodwill of  Briand and Stresemann in the 
interwar years) from the meeting and shared feelings of  three men, Adenauer, Schuman 
and De Gasperi, all members of  Christian Democratic parties, then the intellectual oeuvre 
of  the Sicilian priest who, for many years had represented the driving force and energy 
behind a new approach to politics which combined an elevated, ethical sense of  duty with 
an admirable determination to establish new political orders, emerges as particularly signi-
ficant» Gargano (1999).
132 MonisMs and PluralisMs in the history of Political and social Models
8.3 sturzo’s regIonalIsM
We have to consider that Sturzo’ s analysis, although not in favour of  national-
istic tendencies, develops almost completely within a national framework, i.e. 
the nation is the political and cultural context within which we have to insert 
Sturzo’s reflections.
A nation, we can also say, that is open to larger forms of  community but in 
continuity with its own traditions and its own culture, as if  this continuity, for 
a nation, were a guarantee of  its own existence in history.
In this framework, composed by nations and international community, 
even regions are pointed out. The young Sturzo’s support for an autonomist 
view of  relations between national government and local communities soon 
becomes evident and, it might be said, accompanies him throughout his life. 
He gives special emphasis to regions, which are a «geographic, ethnographic, 
economic and historical fact» nobody can ever deny. According to Sturzo’s 
political theory, Italian regions, whose personality is individual and multiple 
at the same time, multiple or plural – to use a more proper term – have 
acquired these characters since at least the Middle Ages. History itself  con-
tributed to improve their will of  freedom and independence – Italy has been 
the land of  conquest since the end of  the Roman Empire. A freedom that 
is like the air, indispensable to live, without which individual life is destined 
to death.
Politically speaking, this freedom expresses not only a strong critic against 
centralizing statism of  the Italian liberal post-unity governments or a condem-
nation of  all attempts against regional autonomy during the Fascist era, but 
also a great support to the idea of  regional autonomy itself  – autonomy that 
Sturzo sees both bureaucratic and institutional. And this autonomy reflects 
then the plural character of  Sturzo’s idea of  society.
He considers himself  not a separatist, but a federalist, whose federalism 
aims to build this autonomy – from an economic and governmental point of  
view – for regions, not apart from, but within a national frame. To this end, it 
is necessary to work to implement individuals’ and society’s freedoms6.
6 Sturzo considers in fact the Italian unification as a fundamentally positive process and repeatedly 
expresses aversion to any separatist design that arose in Italy after the World War II, especially by 
his famous speech on New York Radio: Autonomia sì, separatismo no, see for example Guccione 
(1994). Maybe we can find in Sturzo’s words a bit of  confusion between the term autonomism 
and the term federalism he usually uses, but «While there can be no doubt that the Sicilian priest 
never really considered promoting the cause of  independence for the island, it is however quite 
probable that his indiscriminate use of  two conflicting terms: decentralization and federalism, can 
be attributed to his need to seem not to oppose the regime of  the unitary state that emerged from 
Porta Pia and not to place too much emphasis on questions of  form (institutional issues) rather 
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A debate about regional autonomy in Italy grows between the end of  the 
XIX century and the beginning of  the XX: among favourable and opposing 
opinions, Sturzo points out the silence of  many liberal Mps, culpably reluc-
tant, in his opinion, to take side in favour of  regional autonomy. On July 12 th, 
1903, in Pro e Contro il Mezzogiorno, he writes:
This is the real issue: we are regionalists […] a new Monroe doctrine, Sicily for the 
Sicilians, is the only basis on which to build a true Sicilian political movement […] 
which, bearing the banner of  administrative and financial autonomy, and characterised 
by its opposition to central government, would win the support of  all the other parties 
[and then he added] the proud Sicilians of  yesteryear know that this is a land that was 
not born to serve — and yet through the cowardice of  its sons, serve is what it has nearly 
always had to do (Sturzo 1903).
However, just two years earlier, declaring: «I am in favour of  the unity of  the 
Italian state, but unashamedly federalist» (Sturzo 1901b), he had written that 
the remedy for Italy’s ills (meaning, above all, the uneven fiscal burdens in 
different parts of  the kingdom): «would be a carefully weighted regional and ad-
ministrative decentralisation and a federalisation of  the various regions, leaving 
intact the unity of  the existing order» (Sturzo 1901a).
We have, in this respect, always to remember that these Sturzo’s words are 
worth for any region in Italy and not for Sicily alone, for his «Southernism» 
aims to a general autonomy of  local units and not to create in the South of  
Italy a new Sicilian State federated within a new federal Italian State, his de-
clared federalism aiming more to a form of  regional autonomism than to a 
real juridical federalism.
Problems correlated to the economic difference between an industrial 
northern Italy and an agricultural South are in those years treated also by 
Francesco Saverio Nitti in his book Nord e Sud, published in 1900 (Nitti 1900), 
and then in Napoli e la questione meridionale, printed in 1903 (Nitti 1903). In the 
former the future Prime Minister observes the economic and fiscal differences 
among North and South, that he considers to penalize the southern yet eco-
nomically disadvantaged territories; in the latter he treats the old problem of  
the institutional and economic integration of  the ancient Kingdom of  Naple 
in the new Italian post-unity State.
This debate stops, understandably, with the First World War. It begins again 
after the war, but it is conditioned by new problems raised as a consequence 
of  the deep economic crisis affecting Italy in the years 1919-1920 as well as 
by the seizure of  power by political parties which are against every form of  
decentralization – especially after 1922, with the fascist Government.
than of  content (the urgent problems of  the peasant classes)» Gargano (1999).
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Sturzo remains resolute in supporting his own ideas of  regional autonomy 
– particularly, he fights for a legislative as well as administrative autonomy of  
regions within the national framework of  the Kingdom – even against differ-
ent opinions of  many members of  his Party.
On 18th January 1919, in Rome, in fact, Sturzo founds the Italian People’s 
Party by issuing his appeal to «all men who are strong and free». And in the 
party’s program, sixth item, we can read that the party will sustain regional 
bodies’ freedom and autonomy, municipalities’ administrative importance, a 
reform of  bureaucracy7. This represents a great novelty in the field of  Italian 
parties’ programs. It’s the first time that an Italian party recognizes local auton-
omy importance within the constitutional framework – e.g. before, just repub-
licans and socialists supported regional autonomy, but more against, respec-
tively, the monarchy and the liberal governments, than for a real conviction.
However, notwithstanding this – and despite the bond among regional, na-
tional and international perspectives, that is the real novelty – public opinion 
and newspapers showed they were indifferent, more interested in Catholics 
organized in a political party after the papal abrogation of  the non expedit than 
in the contents of  their political program – although the Italian People’s Party 
is not a religious party, even if  christian-oriented.
Regionalism is supported in those years also by the National Association 
of  the Italian Communes (ANCI) – it was created in 1901 and Sturzo was 
councillor and vice-president till 1924 – and by the Association of  the Ital-
ian Provinces, with a strong fight, in Sturzo’s opinion, against bureaucratic 
centralization and against central Government interferences in regional po-
litical life.
Concerning this, Sturzo, in Riforme statali e indirizzi politici (Sturzo 1923), 
which he publishes in 1923, carries out his courageous policy about the reform 
of  the state, by implementing his fight for introducing decentralization and, 
electorally speaking, a proportional electoral system.
However, these proposals – which make the Italian People’s Party a relevant 
political actor and, with the socialists, the second Italian mass party – have no 
grip over the liberal electorate, which still constituted the majority of  voters.
To the electoral body, in fact, the Italian People’s Party seems to be an 
advanced democratic party, in some cases like the Socialist Party, not able to 
resolve the Italian citizens’ practical problems. To many conservative voters, 
then, it seemed a revolutionary party, while Sturzo wanted a party that were 
7 «Libertà e autonomia degli enti pubblici locali. Riconoscimento delle funzioni proprie del 
comune, della provincia e della regione in relazione alle tradizioni della nazione e alle necessità 
di sviluppo della vita locale. Riforma della burocrazia. Largo decentramento amministrativo 
ottenuto anche a mezzo della collaborazione degli enti industriali, agricoli e del capitale e del 
lavoro».
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not anti-system, but deeply rooted into the Statute framework, even if  aiming 
to freedom and democracy.
It is not an anti-liberal party – if  we consider the adjective liberal as re-
ferred to the idea of  citizens and State’ s freedom and not to the liberal po-
litical theory. It is however really liberal in the sense of  sustaining a freedom 
able to bring economic, cultural and political progress – we can qualify the 
People’s Party activities as anti-liberal just by referring them to the electoral 
fight against the liberal political forces in the Parliament. And the region is the 
antidote to centralizing statism, not to the State.
In fact we have to remember that some years ago Gianfranco Miglio yet 
pointed out that Sturzo’s political vision – by not setting the region against 
the State and on the contrary by entwining the former to the latter – was not 
against but in favour of  the liberal State: a «battaglia politica non già contro lo 
Stato liberale, ma per lo Stato liberale, anzi, per uno stato veramente liberale, 
quale l’esperienza italiana non gli aveva consentito di conoscere» (Miglio 1963; 
Rotelli 1970).
One can not fail to appreciate in Sturzo’s political view its character of  
pragmatism. In this respect we have in fact to remember Sturzo’s ability to 
combine great visions of  the future with the statesman pragmatism, the for-
mer typical of  the Latin peoples, the latter of  the Anglo-Saxon peoples, Bri-
tons and Americans, with which he stayed during his exile and for which he 
demonstrates a great admiration.
Concerning this, Piero Gobetti, in his La rivoluzione liberale (Gobetti 2008 
[1924]), in some pages he dedicates to Sturzo, points out two characters of  
Sturzo’s figure: political messianism and methodological concretness [messia-
nismo politico e concretismo metodologico] that he thinks Sturzo had acqui-
red by Gaetano Salvemini’s thought (Gobetti 2008 [1924]; Salvadori 1973).
In all these praises, there is also the awareness that Sturzo must be consi-
dered belonging to the field of  freedom and democracy – that are ideals in the 
name of  which he suffered 22 years of  exile and refused any possible autori-
tarian or totalitarian alternative. He was an out and out democrat, convinced 
that, to avoid present problems of  Italy, it would never must to embrace any 
of  such forms of  regimes, neither Fascism, nor Communism. And it mat-
ters even more after the end of  the Second World War (Grottanelli de’ Santi 
2006:4)8
8 «At the end of  the war, with the new republican constitution (1948), the atmosphere of  re-
newal favoured decentralization. The idea was to bring government and administration closer 
to the citizen. Decentralization, together with individual liberty and a return to a parliamentary 
form of  government, were seen as a means of  creating a democratic system. A particularly 
strong drive towards decentralization was evinced in those regions which had suffered most 
from centralization in the past and by large islands of  Sicily and Sardinia. It is worth remembe-
ring here that don Sturzo, one of  the most important founding fathers of  our constitution, was 
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8.4 conclusIons
To conclude, for analyzing Sturzo’s regionalism, it is important not to consider 
just the single aspects of  his political view. Ettore Rotelli’s important studies 
on Sturzo’s autonomist thought (Rotelli 1970; Rotelli 1973) have been com-
pleted in the past decades by those of  Gabriele De Rosa (see e.g. De Rosa 
1990), Eugenio Guccione (Guccione 1994; Guccione 2004), Nicola Antonetti 
(Campanini-Antonetti 1979). And all of  them have considered single aspects 
of  Sturzo’s thought as they were not isolated points, but as they were parts of  
a unique analysis of  a plural and multilevel society.
My personal judgment in this short essay is that Sturzo’s regionalism can 
not be considered as an important analysis of  regional politics, as it were just 
oriented to institutional, administrative and governmental aspects of  regions. 
And Sturzo can not be considered simply a supporter of  the creation of  a new 
level in Italian governmental structure, i.e. the Regions.
Furthermore, I don’t think that all the activity of  the Sicilian priest could 
be reduced to a mere «Southernism», that would be more separatistic than 
patriotic.
Sturzo’s regionalism is on the contrary the obvious and practical conse-
quence, politically speaking, of  his plural view of  the society – that is always, 
we have to remember, a «multiple, simultaneous and continuative projection 
of  individuals» –, of  a pluralism that characterizes the society – or, better, 
societies – and its political institutions.
There is neither aversion nor competition among the State and the Regions 
in Sturzo’s theory, for they mirror the plural nature of  a complex society. And 
an individual stays in front of  a nation exactly as well as a region stay in front 
of  a State and a State in front of  the international community of  the States. 
Sturzo’s theory is here easy to understand, less easy to turn into practice.
not just Sicilian, but extremely Sicilian and a great champion of  its special autonomy that is to 
say endowed with more effective powers than those granted to other regions […] furthermore, 
the two big Italian political parties – Christian democracy and the Left (Communist and Socia-
list parties together) – were in favour of  strong regional decentralization as they both hoped to 
obtain dominant positions at least in some regions even if  their respective parties did not win 
the national elections». 
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Chapter Nine
reductio ad unum . 
the newspeak of oceanIa, 
a lIterary paraMeter of polItIcal scIence 
concept of totalItar IanIsM
Giorgio Scichilone
George Orwell published Nineteen Eighty-Four in 19491. The Origins of  Totalitari-
anism appeared in 1951, and another fundamental work on totalitarianism, that 
of  Carl Joachim Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and 
Autocracy, was published in New York in 1956.
As the title reveals, the Jewish philosopher tries to investigate on the genesis 
of  the phenomenon, and explains the origin of  totalitarianism as the synthesis 
of  different elements that had taken shape in Europe during the nineteenth 
century: anti-Semitism, imperialism, colonialism and racism. The last chapter 
of  the book is devoted to totalitarianism. Proceeding by analysing the histori-
cal-cultural, sociological and ideological components, Arendt notes that at the 
turn of  the century a new kind of  nationalism had raised, founded on the alli-
ance between the capital and the crowd. Populism, demagoguery, xenophobia, 
hatred of  Jews were all its essential ingredients. That modern anti-Semitism, 
which was not religious but racial, did not seek to eliminate the Jewish other-
ness through assimilation; it wanted rather to make it the catalyst of  nationalist 
hatred. Imperialism conceived the non-European world as a huge pool of  col-
1 About Orwell see A. Arciero, George Orwell. Contro il totalitarismo e per un Socialismo democratico, 
FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2005.
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onizable lands, open to the expansion of  capital and to the conquest of  “living 
space” for the Western powers. In the mid-nineteenth century the division of  
the world was justified thanks to an ideology that hierarchized humanity in 
lower and higher classes (Arendt followed its development especially taking 
into consideration the work of  Gobineau), based on an approach that the 
European racism had to reinterpret later in a biological perspective and that 
Nazism would radicalise to the extreme. Reconciling extermination and bu-
reaucracy, Arendt took over the British formula of  «administrative massacres»; 
colonialism was an irreplaceable laboratory for the genocides of  the twentieth 
century. In Asia and Africa, it had started, by means of  its armies and its co-
lonial administration, to achieve a «civilizing mission» the corollary of  which 
was, in many cases, massacre seen as a legitimate policy towards the “inferior 
races”. Nazism would only apply such policy within Europe.
According to Arendt, the novelty of  totalitarianism was the creation of  an 
unprecedented social institution: the concentration camp, which became the 
hermeneutic figure of  that new form of  domination. In Arendt’s book the 
concentration camp is presented as the culminating point in the discussion. 
Here Arendt examines the two levers of  the totalitarian regime, propaganda 
and terror:
Propaganda is indeed part and parcel of  “psychological warfare”; but terror is more. 
Terror continues to be used by totalitarian regimes even when its psychological aims are 
achieved: its real horror is that it reigns over a completely subdued population. Where 
the rule of  terror is brought to perfection, as in concentration camps, propaganda di-
sappears entirely; it was even expressly prohibited in Nazi Germany. Propaganda, in 
other words, is one, and possibly the most important, instrument of  totalitarianism for 
dealing with the nontotalitarian world; terror, on the contrary, is the very essence of  its 
form of  government. Its existence depends as little on psychological or other subjective 
factors as the existence of  laws in a constitutionally governed country depends upon the 
number of  people who transgress them (Arendt 1958: 344).
In my humble opinion, I found an unsurpassed explanation of  this represen-
tation of  totalitarianism in a page of  Primo Levi’s Se questo è un uomo, written 
between the years 1945-1947. The image is taken from the first sequences 
narrated by the protagonist, who sees the gradual slide towards hell. Here we 
are still in the station of  Carpi, where the German soldiers line up a group of  
unarmed and ‘docile’ men.
With the absurd precision to which we later had to accustom ourselves, the Germans 
held the roll-call. At the end the officer asked - Wieviel Stück?. The corporal saluted 
smartly and replied that the «pieces» were six hundred and fifty, and that everything 
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was in order; they then loaded us on the coaches and took us to the station of  Carpi. 
Here the train and escort for the journey was waiting for us. Here we received the first 
blows: and it was so new and senseless that we felt no pain, neither in the body nor in 
the soul. Only a deep astonishment: how can one hit a man without anger? (Levi 1989: 
20)2.
Hannah Arendt’s book, written almost simultaneously with the novel of  Levi, 
would speak, like the passage quoted above, of  massacres which did not take 
any care in differentiating between ‘guilty’ and ‘innocent’. But it was Primo 
Levi who signified first how the essence of  totalitarianism, of  the concentra-
tion camp that becomes the metaphor of  the society controlled by a totalitari-
an regime, is the arbitrary use of  violence. The degeneration of  the theory of  
the state carried out by Max Weber according to which the state is «an entity 
that claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of  physical force» is significant 
also for the historical and intellectual context in which the German scholar ex-
plores these themes. The failure of  the Weimar Constitution, the heir of  nine-
teenth-century liberal tradition inaugurated in Forty-eight, plastically marks 
the transition between these two conceptions of  power. The dictatorships 
that rose in Europe after the First World War claim the monopoly of  power 
depriving and emptying the forms, procedures and institutions of  liberal legiti-
macy. To the point that the raison d’être of  such a regime is that the monopoly 
of  force is conditional upon the cancellation of  the legitimacy produced by 
constitutionalism. Namely, the lack of  (Liberal) legitimacy is essential for the 
use of  force in the totalitarian state. At that point the monopoly becomes 
devastating, because it is arbitrary and irresponsible. 
People are not punished because of  the violation of  a rule, the “pieces” 
– as the complacent soldiers even call them - are in order and do not give 
any trouble to the keepers of  order. People are beaten randomly just without 
any reason at all: it is this that creates anxiety, not the certainty of  the law, 
but the certainty that there is no rule or law one can stick to in order to es-
cape from the retaliation of  power. No one should be safe in a condition in 
which the Leviathan has the full force and uses it arbitrarily against anyone. 
Fear, as Montesquieu had taught, is the principle of  despotism. Exactly the 
opposite of  the republic, which in order to “work” requires virtuous citizens. 
This radical opposition between the two forms of  power, which fits into the 
groove of  the republican tradition, reproduces in some way, as it will be seen, 
the decisive confrontation of  political theory at the dawn of  modern consti-
tutionalism, when the controversy between Hobbes and Harrington saw the 
clash between the principles of  fear and virtues as the basis of  legitimacy of  
political obligation.  
2 Translation is mine.
142 MonisMs and PluralisMs in the history of Political and social Models
Yet, turning back to the contemporary tyranny analysed by the Jewish phi-
losopher, there’s more to say. The leap would not be complete if  not accom-
panied by the ideological element as the foundation of  the new totalitarian 
dictatorship. In The Origins of  Totalitarianism, despite the fleeting mention of  
Montesquieu as a theorist of  despotism and its reference to fear as its princi-
ple of  action3, the new tripartite division of  the forms of  power he introduced 
in De l’esprit des lois is however crucial because it allows Arendt to clarify, if  
not to formulate, her decisive move away from the Montesquieian fear to the 
totalitarian terror, and to combine the latter with ideology. The page containing 
this reasoning is vital.
It is still for Montesquieu the supreme proof  for the badness of  tyranny 
that only tyrannies are liable to be destroyed from within, to decline by them-
selves, whereas all other governments are destroyed through exterior circum-
stances. Therefore what the definition of  governments always needed was 
what Montesquieu called a “principle of  action” which, different in each form 
of  government, would inspire government and citizens alike in their public 
activity and serve as a criterion, beyond the merely negative yardstick of  law-
fulness, for judging all action in public affairs. Such guiding principles and 
criteria of  action are, according to Montesquieu, honor in a monarchy, virtue 
in a republic and fear in a tyranny. 
In a perfect totalitarian government, where all men have become One Man, 
where all action aims at the acceleration of  the movement of  nature or history, 
where every single act is the execution of  a death sentence which Nature or 
History has already pronounced, that is, under conditions where terror can be 
completely relied upon to keep the movement in constant motion, no princi-
ple of  action separate from its essence would be needed at all. Yet as long as 
totalitarian rule has not conquered the earth and with the iron band of  terror 
made each single man a part of  one mankind, terror in its double function as 
essence of  government and principle, not of  action, but of  motion, cannot 
be fully realized. Just as lawfulness in constitutional government is insufficient 
to inspire and guide men’s actions, so terror in totalitarian government is not 
sufficient to inspire and guide human behavior. 
While under present conditions totalitarian domination still shares with 
other forms of  government the need for a guide for the behavior of  its citi-
zens in public affairs, it does not need and could not even use a principle of  
action strictly speaking, since it will eliminate precisely the capacity of  man 
3 In The Origins of  Totalitarianism this is the only true quote to Montesquieu (the other three are 
even more marginal), which is surprising, given that it is clear the dependence of  the theoretical 
construction of  the category of  totalitarianism developed by Arendt from Montesquieu’s one 
to despotism. In this regard, reference is made to two works by Casadei, (2002, II: 625-673) and 
Id. (2005, II: 805-838).
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to act. Under conditions of  total terror not even fear can any longer serve 
as an advisor of  how to behave, because terror chooses its victims without 
reference to individual actions or thoughts, exclusively in accordance with the 
objective necessity of  the natural or historical process. Under totalitarian con-
ditions, fear probably is more widespread than ever before; but fear has lost its 
practical usefulness when actions guided by it can no longer help to avoid the 
dangers man fears. The same is true for sympathy or support of  the regime; 
for total terror not only selects its victims according to objective standards; it 
chooses its executioners with as complete a disregard as possible for the can-
didate’s conviction and sympathies. The consistent elimination of  conviction 
as a motive for action has become a matter of  record since the great purges 
in Soviet Russia and the satellite countries. The aim of  totalitarian education 
has never been to instill convictions but to destroy the capacity to form any. 
The introduction of  purely objective criteria into the selective system of  the 
SS troops was Himmler’s great organizational invention; he selected the can-
didates from photographs according to purely racial criteria. Nature itself  de-
cided, not only who was to be eliminated, but also who was to be trained as 
an executioner.
No guiding principle of  behavior, taken itself  from the realm of  human 
action, such as virtue, honor, fear, is necessary or can be useful to set into 
motion a body politic which no longer uses terror as a means of  intimidation, 
but whose essence is terror. In its stead, it has introduced an entirely new 
principle into public affairs that dispenses with human will to action altogether 
and appeals to the craving need for some insight into the law of  movement 
according to which the terror functions and upon which, therefore, all private 
destinies depend. 
The inhabitants of  a totalitarian country are thrown into and caught in 
the process of  nature or history for the sake of  accelerating its movement; as 
such, they can only be executioners or victims of  its inherent law. The process 
may decide that those who today eliminate races and individuals or the mem-
bers of  dying classes and decadent peoples are tomorrow those who must be 
sacrificed. What totalitarian rule needs to guide the behavior of  its subjects is 
a preparation to fit each of  them equally well for the role of  executioner and 
the role of  victim. This two-sided preparation, the substitute for a principle of  
action, is the ideology (Arendt 1958: 461-462).
What allows to innovate the Montesquieuian category of  despotism is 
therefore the combination of  terror and ideology, a pair that makes unreleased 
what will be called totalitarianism at the dawn of  Italian fascism, a regime in 
the history of  the forms of  power so new that it makes the traditional term 
dictatorship, which contains in itself  and in its millennial use even a positive 
sense, unusable. To break such a lexical ambiguity, given Mussolini’s resort to 
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the myth of  Rome on the one hand, where the institution of  the dictatorship 
was a Constitutional exception provided for the salvation of  the state; and on 
the other hand due to the latest Risorgimento tradition, which in the myth 
of  Garibaldi, “Dictator” of  the unification process in the name of  the Savoy 
dynasty, were expedients to attempt gaining a cultural and political legitimacy, 
anti-fascist intellectuals coined a new term which could give account of  the 
radical newness of  the regime that turned systematic violence and pervasive 
propaganda an unprecedented and terrifying kind of  dictatorship4. On these 
historic premises of  the neologism, not taken into account by Arendt, is based 
the interpretation of  Nazism and Stalinism in The Origins of  Totalitarianism.
The one study, which along with Arendt’s book would impose both the 
term and concept of  totalitarianism in the investigation of  the social sciences 
is the work, mentioned previously, by Friedrich and Brzezinski, which formal-
ized a vision of  totalitarianism as an immovable and immutable regime, capa-
ble of  self-reproduction, yet not of  transformation. The two scholars pointed 
out the elements, both interrelated and inseparable, of  totalitarian regimes, 
as part of  a scheme that will make school for many years in the Anglo-Saxon 
world: the ideology, extended over all spheres of  society; the single party, or-
ganized hierarchically and directed by a dictator; terror, put in place by a secret 
police; monopoly of  media (radio, press, cinema etc.); monopoly of  violence 
in its various forms; finally, the centralized planning of  economy.
I will not deal with the criticism these books, so decisive in the study of  the 
concept of  Totalitarianism, have aroused. But as in the case of  Primo Levi, I 
like to move on the parallel slope of  literature to gain other useful perspectives 
excluded by the categories of  political science in the strict sense. If  already in 
the testimony of  Primo Levi, with the dry language of  that narrative, there 
was condensed a substantial portion of  the totalitarian paradigm, in my opin-
ion Orwell provides another unique parameter on the characteristics of  the 
nature of  the totalitarian regime. Maybe not enough to be acknowledged by 
political science nor by political philosophy. 
The first passage I quote from 1984 is a dialogue between Winston, the 
protagonist, and Syme, his colleague at the Ministry of  Truth who is working 
on the new edition of  the Newspeak Dictionary:
Don’t you see that the whole aim of  Newspeak is to narrow the range of  thought? In 
the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible, because there will be no words in 
which to express it. Every concept that can ever be needed, will be expressed by exactly 
one word, with its meaning rigidly defined and all its subsidiary meanings rubbed out 
and forgotten. Already, in the Eleventh Edition, we’re not far from that point. But the 
4 I beg to defer to Scichilone (2014: 247-264), as well as to my definition of  Totalitarianism, 
contained in Enciclopedia Filosofica (2006: 11707-11711).
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process will still be continuing long after you and I are dead. Every year fewer and fewer 
words, and the range of  consciousness always a little smaller. Even now, of  course, there’s 
no reason or excuse for committing thoughtcrime. It’s merely a question of  self-discipline, 
reality-control. But in the end there won’t be any need even for that. The Revolution will 
be complete when the language is perfect. Newspeak is Ingsoc and Ingsoc is Newspeak,’ 
he added with a sort of  mystical satisfaction. ‘Has it ever occurred to you, Winston, that 
by the year 2050, at the very latest, not a single human being will be alive who could 
understand such a conversation as we are having now? (Orwell 1949: 26). 
Of  course this is a literary hyperbole. But this intuition that the narrative regis-
ter grants the intellectual, reveals a prodigious reflection on the essence of  to-
talitarianism that historiographical tools and social and political science could 
not and would not be able to provide for a broader and therefore complete 
reflection on the phenomenon of  totalitarianism, that project historically at-
tempted in the twentieth century to create a new society by shaping a new 
man. A single individual conceived as an active part of  a mechanism through 
which he himself  alienates his conscience and, as appropriately suggested by 
Orwell, even his own memory. It is worth to point out that the literary free-
dom of  the writer allows him to build fictional images that eventually amaze 
due to the after-taste adhering with reality and that help to identify essential 
aspects of  the nature of  the phenomenon and of  the actual mechanisms of  
the regime, although they were not brought to reality as ‘narrated’ by the writ-
er. Of  course none of  the existing totalitarian regimes has ever invented a 
newspeak5. But the control of  opinions and of  thought, of  public language, 
culture, education and of  school, was the most stubborn obsession of  all re-
gimes which based its raison d’être on a consensus manipulated and drugged 
by the indoctrination of  each and every subject, through a widespread and 
overwhelming propaganda fuelled by terror. It is to show all this that Orwell, 
with a shock similar to the metamorphosis of  Kafka who opens his novel 
with the staggering protagonism of  a monster now given for granted, speaks 
to us from the beginning of  a new language built by the regime to replace the 
traditional language. It is an essential passage that must be analysed. 
Newspeak, indeed, differed from most all other languages in that its vocabulary grew 
smaller instead of  larger every year. Each reduction was a gain, since the smaller the 
5 The use of  language in politics is one of  the central themes in Orwell’s thought and deserves 
more thorough attention. The author of  1984 devoted a constant reflection to it and simultane-
ously to the composition of  the novel he published an essay Politics and the English Language 
(1946) in which he states that language «is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder re-
spectable, and to give an appearance of  solidity to pure wind». Of  all the vast literature aroused 
by what Orwell wrote on the relationship between language and politics is worth remembering 
at least Chomsky (2004).
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area of  choice, the smaller the temptation to take thought. Ultimately it was hoped to 
make articulate speech issue from the larynx without involving the higher brain centres 
at all. This aim was frankly admitted in the Newspeak word duckspeak, meaning ‘to 
quack like a duck’(Orwell 1949: 153). 
This is the Newspeak of  Oceania, the country in which Big Brother rules. The 
dystopian description of  the totalitarian regime in 1984 is well known and I 
will not dwell on this. The allegorical meanings, beginning with the name of  
the protagonist, Winston Smith, as a figure of  Churchill, would deserve ade-
quate reflections that I have to sacrifice here. But concerning Oceania, which 
in the vision of  Orwell is the Atlantic West, from England to America to 
Australia, and whose capital is London, I hazard the idea that this is a further 
reversal than the obvious and evident one. Of  course the roll-over could not 
deliver a more radical suggestion than by turning the home of  constitutional-
ism in the state where Big Brother dominates: the reductio ad unum of  pluralism 
is the disconcerting epilogue to a story in reverse; from the English revolu-
tions, from which came the rule of  law, to a utopian future in which the law 
does not exist any more:
A Party member lives from birth to death under the eye of  the Thought Police. Even when 
he is alone he can never be sure that he is alone. Wherever he may be, asleep or awake, 
working or resting, in his bath or in bed, he can be inspected without warning and without 
knowing that he is being inspected. Nothing that he does is indifferent. His friendships, 
his relaxations, his behaviour towards his wife and children, the expression of  his face 
when he is alone, the words he mutters in sleep, even the characteristic movements of  his 
body, are all jealously scrutinized. Not only any actual misdemeanour, but any eccentri-
city, however small, any change of  habits, any nervous mannerism that could possibly be 
the symptom of  an inner struggle, is certain to be detected. He has no freedom of  choice in 
any direction whatever. On the other hand his actions are not regulated by law or by any 
clearly formulated code of  behaviour. In Oceania there is no law. Thoughts and actions 
which, when detected, mean certain death are not formally forbidden, and the endless pur-
ges, arrests, tortures, imprisonments, and vaporizations are not inflicted as punishment for 
crimes which have actually been committed, but are merely the wiping-out of  persons who 
might perhaps commit a crime at some time in the future (Orwell 1949: 104).
Therefore Oceania – this is my idea – is not only the overthrowing of  En-
gland, but also of  Oceana: Orwell’s dystopia is the overturning of  James Har-
rington’s utopia. The Republican English writer of  the seventeenth century 
had overthrown the England of  his time by turning it into a republic and 
calling it Oceana. Orwell overturns the constitutional monarchy of  his age 
(who defeated Hitler) by turning it into a totalitarianism and calling it Oceania. 
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Orwell’s Oceania is the opposite of  Harrington’s Oceana. But the emphasis I 
put into this interpretation is due to the fact that Harrington is the proud op-
ponent of  the idea proposed by Hobbes on the substantial lack of  difference 
between the freedom enjoyed by the citizens who live in Lucca, where the 
inscription LIBERTAS dominates the city towers, and those living in Con-
stantinople, in hand to a sultan. It is evidently the contrast between the rule of  
law and arbitrariness6. But in their dispute both Hobbes and Harrington are 
acknowledging a topos at the dawn of  European politics and intellectual tra-
dition: the opposition between East and West, inflected in terms of  freedom 
and despotism, polis and empire, civilization and barbarism. Even in this case 
I can not dwell on the fact that it is Hobbes who cancelled (instrumentally) 
the traditional dichotomy to equalize the oriental despotism with the consti-
tutional political forms. And it was Harrington who insisted on the fact that 
in the absence of  the law freedom is lost. The ‘Republican’ genealogy of  this 
concept of  freedom is easily traced in classical culture: «Freedom (...) does not 
consist in having a good master, but in having none at all»7. Yet it is interest-
ing that a similar opposition is based on the word. And how the distinction 
between polis and empire, freedom and despotism, civilization and barbarism 
has the word as discriminant element, without which, in fact, there is no agora, 
discussion, public deliberation, in other words politics. Who does not have the 
word is devoid of  all this. Man without word is not a political animal8. He is 
not a man. And it is natural, right, legitimate he is governed by a master, just 
like an animal. Who does not have the word lacks politics, that is humanity. 
In other words, he is a barbarian. For the Greeks, the term barbarian means 
exactly this: to be devoid of  speech, to babble in a gibberish way. 
My final interpretation is that with his Newspeak George Orwell, by re-
ducing totalitarian language to a word only to decrease the rational faculties of  
discernment, of  choice, of  freedom of  the single individuals up to the point of  
conceiving duckspeak, this expression through sounds from the larynx discon-
nected with the brain, to prevent men simply to think; all this brings the dysto-
pia projected into the future back to the origin of  political thought. Blasting, as 
Hobbes did, the dichotomy between East and West, since the new Constanti-
nople is an unexpected London, Orwell reproposes together with Harrington 
the age-old idea that without the word there can be no politics, and without 
freedom men are reduced to “pieces”, as Primo Levi has tragically witnessed.
6 On this point, also in this case, the literature is so vast that it is impossible to mention it all; 
however, I shall hint at Quentin Skinner’s studies, which are now canonical, from (Skinner 1988) 
to (Skinner 2008: 211-213), and at least Parkin (2007: 177-185) and Scott (2004: 151-169).
7 Cicero M.T., De re publica, II, 23: «Libertas (...) non in eo est ut iusto utamur domino, sed ut 
nullo».
8 See what Hannah Arendt wrote in (Arendt 1958).
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Chapter Ten
a new forM of deMocracy: 
aldo capItInI’s open socIety and “oMnIcracy”
Nicoletta Stradaioli
Aldo Capitini (1899-1968) was an atypical intellectual in the Italian cultural 
and political panorama of  his time: pacifist and convinced activist (his was the 
idea for the peace march from Perugia to Assisi), he perceived, long before 
others, the need to reconsider democracy in order to transform it with a new 
form of  political and social organization. Challenging the society of  his time 
and criticizing its inadequacies and its ills, the Umbrian intellectual theorized 
and put into practice new forms of  citizenship with the aim of  arriving at a 
different way of  administrating power. The transformation he had in mind 
would modify not only power relationships, but also the methods of  manag-
ing power – including institutional power, even when representative. This was 
necessary in order to achieve a broad-based and capillary political space able 
to reconcile the single and the community: an open society, in flux, «in which 
[there would be] freedom, attention to each citizen, space for his growth and 
development, and which [would embrace], at least as a principle, all mankind» 
(Capitini 1950: 108, 267)1. 
Capitini’s thesis concerning the issue of  democracy is developed around 
the idea of  ‘openness’. Such a thesis is achieved politically through a society 
that includes everyone, in a new society and social organization focused on 
all citizens and all people, in which they participate actively in civic life. This 
political model is opposed to a ‘closed society’ which the philosopher recog-
nizes in the institutional structures of  his time, whether political, economical 
1 Translation of  cited texts from Capitini works is by the author.
150 MonisMs and PluralisMs in the history of Political and social Models
or ecclesiastical: in such structures the individual is constrained, becoming 
indifferent and selfish toward one’s neighbors. 
The debate on open society and its theoretical forms has been interest to 
a large number of  authors, such as Henri Bergson and Karl Popper, to name 
a few, among whom Capitini not only occupies an important place but is also 
one of  the first to have furnished a fully-rounded concept of  the character-
istics such society should possess2. The idea of  openness propounded by the 
Perugian intellectual intended to modify the relationship between State and 
citizen, between State and society, and – critical of  the ‘closed’ logic of  the 
State-individual dichotomy – set forth an original concept of  pluralism to be 
achieved in the harmonious integration between governing bodies-individu-
al-society-economic structures, that is, between the public and private aspects 
of  life3. Having said that, I have no intention to scrutinize the complexity of  
Capitini’s entire thought, but rather to reflect on some traits of  his political 
project, focusing on forms of  development of  a plural and collective edifica-
tion of  the State and of  politics4. In this context, this paper represents a first 
step in a study currently underway. 
Throughout his life, Capitini was constantly engaged in the project to re-
new democratic society. It was a path that can be broken down chronologically 
into four phases:
1. the period of  training at Pisa’s Scuola Normale Superiore: the 1930s and 
the early 1940s witness the founding of  Capitini’s political theory, marked 
by antifascism and his liberalsocialist experience;
2. the period after World War II, during which the political paradigm is refi-
ned, culminating in the first experiences of  grass-roots democracy;
3. the 1950s represent an important turning point: if  nationally the struggle 
between fascism and antifascism appears to have been overcome, on the 
international level the Cold War looms ahead. This new historical-political 
context causes Capitini to further develop his political theory, which now 
concentrates on the theme of  ‘open revolution’ and ‘nonviolent revolu-
tion’;
4. the 1960s, finally, are particularly intense and creative: the Umbrian phi-
losopher’s thought turns to the transformation of  political and social life 
through forms of  democracy which are decentralized and direct.
2 See Capitini (1950: 108-112, 264-265, 267), Bergson (1959), Popper (1977). Moreover, see De 
Sanctis (1993: 230-231).
3 Here we can note, with some differences, how close Capitini’s position is to that of  Gobet-
ti, for whom the State not only should take individuals into its sphere of  action but also has 
the obligation actively to promote citizen participation through civic education. See: Gobetti 
(1960); Gobetti (2008); Capitini (1968); Polito (1994: 179-183).
4 With regard to Capitini’s political writings see: Capitini (2016).
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This progression highlights the evolution of  Capitini’s political design, i.e.: 
a) the historical, theoretical and political components underlying certain choic-
es made by the Perugian thinker; b) the experimentation with new models of  
participation. 
1. The context in which Capitini lived was fraught with anguish and tragedy: 
they were years of  harsh ideological clashes and preparation for war, in which 
irreconcilable positions opposed each other and so invariably demanded that 
every citizen take a stand. Capitini’s political reform had its beginning, in fact, 
in a concrete opposition to the totalitarian monism of  the Fascist dictatorship 
– an opposition which, according to Capitini, had to begin with the individual, 
with his «intimate self», in order to be a concrete struggle against every form 
of  intolerance and exclusion. For young people to overcome their attachment 
to fascism and to Mussolini, they had to experience an inner ‘conversion’, a 
‘fervor’ of  a different kind, which the intellectual identified as an appeal to 
the inner self, which is also a religious appeal (De Sanctis 1993: 230-233). The 
religion alluded to by the Umbrian philosopher, however, has absolutely no 
theistic references, much less metaphysical ones, but refers to man (Parodi 
2012: 416-417): human beings must be at the center of  a political change 
regarding the development of  the human person, his qualities, his freedom. 
Man, in fact, is the «moral center of  decision, responsibility and freedom» 
(Capitini 1942: 35). 
In Capitini’s vision, the search for a new form of  social and political life as 
an alternative to Fascist monism was therefore, first of  all, a religious openness 
which would translate into a firm commitment in the political field. Keeping 
in mind that religious openness and political openness are inextricably linked, 
and concentrating on the political logic of  Capitini’s open society, we see that 
the individual and political transformation which the philosopher wished to 
effect was, in the first instance, to take a position against the Fascist dictator-
ship, against the authoritarian collectivism on the Soviet model, and against 
capitalism5. These are three facets of  the same trait: fascism, Soviet collec-
tivism and capitalism all level human life, they all deprive it of  any ‘interior 
growth’, they all are obstacles to freedom which annul the human person. If  
in fascism Capitini could not accept the nationalism, the colonial imperialism, 
the absolutist bureaucratic centralization, the police power, the exaltation of  
violence, the conservatism, the corporate State and the egoistic omnipotence 
of  man, in Soviet collectivism he rejected the centralized control of  the econ-
omy which translated into a bureaucratic plethora (Capitini 1960: 36-37): a 
5 Capitini’s political-democratic idea was nurtured by his idea of  ethical-religious reform. This 
paper cannot examine the religious aspects which greatly affected Capitini’s change of  perspec-
tive on the political world.
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totalitarian solution which no longer distinguished between public and pri-
vate, between political and economic. In Capitini’s view, however, capitalist 
organization of  society was scarcely different, reducing human beings to mer-
chandise, to instruments in the hands of  those in possession of  capital, to be 
exploited according to the needs of  industry. 
The distancing of  the philosopher from such totalitarian visions – that is 
from systems in which the unrestricted development of  human conscience 
and its free affirmation is forbidden – found its expression in a specific politi-
cal alternative which took the name of  liberalsocialism (Capitini 1990: 104-109). 
The characteristics of  liberalsocialism were defined by its very opposition to 
monocratic fascism or totalitarianism: «a decentralized socialism with a dem-
ocratic structure» which is «conscious of  the limits of  politics», which does 
not make «the majority coincide with the totality», which does not impose «the 
dominance of  a sole party, a sole idea, a sole interpretation of  it and a sole 
leader»; which opposes the «arms race» and the «theory that the end justifies 
the means» (Capitini 1950: 102; Polito 1994: 175). Capitini, working together 
with Guido Calogero, developed the bases for the liberalsocialist experiment6; 
in this paper it is not possible to examine in depth either the two thinkers’ 
political project nor their different theoretical positions, but it does attempt 
to highlight how Capitini’s idea for joining liberalism and socialism was the 
defining element in his political perspective, and with it the contrast between 
a monistic closure and a pluralistic openness of  reality.
For Capitini, liberalsocialism is essentially a method of  political renewal 
that should result in a truly democratic condition of  society. In this sense, 
Capitini’s liberalsocialist political engagement is a reinterpretation of  the doc-
trinaire traditions of  liberalism and socialism, to move beyond «liberalistic lib-
eralism» and «statalistic socialism» on the one hand, and «the revolution of  
rights» and the «collectivistic revolution» on the other (Polito 1994: 172-175; 
Capitini 1950: 11, 91-92). The Umbrian philosopher does not develop a uni-
fied ideological-doctrinaire perspective halfway between liberalism and social-
ism, but instead believes that a synthesis is possible between liberal principles 
(private sphere) and socialist principles (public sphere), aiming to go beyond 
both in order to found a society in which one class does not exploit the other 
and which guarantees, within the limits of  economic means, all political and 
private freedoms of  the individual. The concept is a harmonious (open) soci-
6 Between 1936 and 1937, Capitini created, with Calogero, the liberalsocialist movement; in 
1940 they issued Il Manifesto del liberalsocialismo, which enjoyed a wide underground circulation. 
Before long, however, the differences between the two founders of  liberalsocialism emerged: 
Calogero’s legalistic approach and Capitini’s ethical-religious/social-religious one. Concerning 
liberalsocialism in general and specifically as conceived by Capitini and Calogero, see: Cologero 
(1945); Capitini (1950: 73-90); Capitini (1966); Bagnoli (1997); Nacci (2010); Capitini-Calogero 
(2009); De Sanctis (2005).
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ety, opposed both to abstract individualism and abstract socialism, which can 
define the rights of  the individual in terms of  common good and those of  the 
community in terms of  individual well-being (Bobbio 1994: 51). The goal is 
to reconcile the greatest individual freedom with the greatest social solidarity. 
On the political plane that means reconsidering the relationship between free-
dom and authority, between freedom and social justice, in order to broaden 
individual and collective freedom. It is a matter of  achieving a «social free-
dom» which can resist self-interest, individualism, egoism and collectivism and 
instead promote social cohesion, solidarity, altruism, equality and reciprocal 
understanding (Capitini 1990: 122-123). Thus conceived, freedom becomes an 
ethical-existential choice which results in forms of  socialization and political 
participation inclined to change the democratic order of  society7.
2. After World War II, Capitini put his liberalsocialist principles into practice, 
with experiences of  shared involvement in democratic processes to grant peo-
ple a larger role as citizens. But for Capitini the liberalsocialist project, in order 
to maintain its peculiar connotations (i.e. not to lose its ‘openness’ and its 
role as critic of  the status quo), could not take the form of  party organization. 
The liberalsocialism he had in mind was an ethical-religious movement aimed 
at a profound renewal, both social and moral. The party, therefore, with its 
«exclusive program», with its extreme tactics, with its bare formulas could not 
be the natural locus for expression of  social transformation aiming to subvert 
«every rigidity and conservatism» (Capitini 1950: 94, 92, 19)8. It represented a 
concept of  power to be overcome: true participation of  citizens in discussion 
and decisions regarding common problems – that is in political life – did not 
necessarily have to take place through the mediation of  organized groups. 
Capitini, therefore, countered the party with his idea of  the «movement» and 
within the movement he favored the «center» (a space for discussion) which 
would «not align itself  with other parties but keep itself  open to all initiatives, 
not impose dogmas but discuss problems, not recognize membership privileg-
es nor the power of  politicos» (Bobbio 1969: 14). 
The first concrete application of  this political formula took place in July 
1944, in a Perugia recently liberated from fascism (20 June 1944): Capitini 
created the first CSO – Center for Social Orientation – as a place for open 
public discussion. For the first time since the 1920s it was possible to exercise 
7 Freedom is a fundamental principle in Capitini’s liberalsocialist political theory. Close behind is 
nonviolence, another element distinguishing Capitini’s position from Calogero’s.
8 In 1943, the liberalsocialist movement merged with the Action Party (Partito d’Azione), for 
its part formed by a merger among “Giustizia e Libertà”, republican groups and other similar 
democratic movements. Capitini opposed the transformation of  the movement into a party, 
and promptly expressed his dissent in the first national convention, held in Florence in Sep-
tember 1943.
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the right of  assembly and take part in democratic and grass-roots activities9. 
«The Centers are free assemblies where all can take part and speak […] about 
administrative matters both local and national, as well as social, political, ideo-
logical, cultural, technical and religious matters» (Capitini 1950: 238). Inspired 
by the participation of  political and administrative authorities as well as by 
intellectuals, the Centers for Social Orientation aimed to arouse interest in a 
constructive debate on local and national problems and international events. 
Although they had no power to deliberate, «they consider the issues, they pro-
pose solutions […] requirements and needs are dealt with as they arise» – with 
the result that there was no lack of  suggestions for specific measures to be 
adopted (Capitini 1950: 239). Moreover, examining administrative problems 
and observing the technical side of  local and national governing bodies, the 
Centers also filled a role of  democratic supervision to promote transparency 
in the practice of  power itself. Everyone, therefore, could take part in these 
meetings (in which women also participated in large numbers) which tried 
to give a political orientation and education to the Italian people (Capitini 
1950: 239-241). Here Capitini was – as defined by Calogero – a «political ed-
ucator» who ascribed importance to training the whole individual (Calogero 
1945: 112-122). Harking back to the spirit of  Giuseppe Mazzini, the CSOs 
educated Italians to be a «live, authentic, pure populace» on the one hand, and, 
on the other, to form a «democratic solidarity», a «collective spirit» (Capitini 
1950: 240). In the immediate post-war era following the Fascist dictatorship, 
Italians, in Capitini’s view, needed to be informed and educated to «discover 
community» (Capitini 1950: 245). The CSO was therefore «a school to oversee 
and develop democracy» and to carry out «open research» to promote ‘demo-
cratic literacy’ in citizens (Capitini 1950: 252, 241). The issues dealt with by the 
CSO were administrative, cultural, political and social; «not only was there a 
course in English […], a long course on political economy, and a course on the 
history of  social doctrines, but also […] conversations and discussions […] 
on the spiritual situation in America, on the kolkhoz, on historical materialism, 
on Albania and the Balkans, on freedom, on the cultural problems of  young 
people, on joy in work […], on decentralized socialism, on the Italian agrarian 
problem, on the way to vote, etc.». Such courses also examined «the programs 
of  the Italian political parties […]. The purpose was not only to expound on 
9 In the city of  Perugia, this first CSO was followed by eight more neighborhood Centers 
for Social Orientation. Moreover, early in the 1950s, the CSOs were flanked by a number of  
CROs – Centers for Religious Orientation. For Capitini the CROs represented a sort of  new 
church, open to all and never exclusionist, which attracted students, workers, office employees, 
and disciples not only from Perugia. The CROs carried on a program of  free discussions and 
reflections on religious themes, in the perspective of  personal and social renewal that could take 
place outside and beyond mainstream religious institutions. See: Foppa Pedretti (2005: 74-75) 
and Capitini (1992: 10).
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the single programs, but to examine the forces, the interests and the mentality 
behind those programs (Capitini 1950: 250-251). The Centers represented an 
early instrument of  renewal in preparation for open and direct democracy; 
this was to be carried out by engaging the masses, educating them through the 
practice of  a «collective way of thinking» – which did not, however, eliminate 
differences and contrasts. In Capitini’s view, it was precisely the plurality of  
opinions that was central, to be followed by a process of  comparing diffi-
cult choices: this pluralistic basis was essential to grow practically and achieve 
self-government and a new democracy (Capitini 1950: 260). 
In order to reform (and renew) politics, the CSO also represented a first 
attempt at self-government of  citizens: encouraging participation and political 
growth, it was the cornerstone for creating decentralized systems that would 
give value to local assemblies, associations, and civic organizations. In the 
campaign for administrative elections of  1946, the CSO in Perugia in fact 
proposed:
That the new city administration give a stable and organic force to these assemblies. In 
addition to the City Council, with powers of  deliberation, a number of  CSOs should 
be created corresponding to each neighborhood and each outlying hamlet, for periodic me-
etings, […] in which administrative problems of  each area can be examined, proposals 
and criticisms can be made, in the presence of  a city councilor charged with referring 
back to the City Council. The city administration for its part could entrust the regional 
and local CSOs with examining measures and giving their opinion, as well as carrying 
out duties such as local supervision, public order, price control, nomination of  personnel, 
creation of  circulating libraries with books and newspapers. […] The management of  
each CSO (with a secretary to transmit the minutes to the Municipal secretary) could 
be elected by the citizens every six months. […] This initiative would create the new 
extended Municipality. Whereas the municipality of  the 1920s did not grant a voice 
to many classes of  citizens or to women, this municipality as conceived in Perugia […], 
will be a municipality in which all inhabitants take part and are present, to overcome 
the excessive separation between those who administer and those who are administered, 
between civil servants and the public, between the city and the countryside (Capitini 
1950: 244-245).
The innovative element which Capitini wished to highlight was a decentral-
ized system through which the individual could be an active member of  his 
immediate surroundings. Intermediate groups would help temper the vertical 
structure of  power. The dual dimension of  State-individual was refuted, both 
in its collectivist version, in which the State is «all» and the individual «null», 
and in the liberal version, in which the individual is «maximum» and the State 
is «minimum». Through organs of  self-government (both political and eco-
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nomic) it would be possible to affect politics from within and below, resulting 
in its continual transformation. Capitini expressed himself  thus: 
The ideal is for everyone to participate in community life, each person bringing a full and 
continual contribution; it is therefore to be hoped, and to be studied, how agricultural 
concerns – for instance – and socialized industries may be based on the ‘advice’ of  all 
individual participants; this will happen of  necessity, according to the various compe-
tencies. Such self-government requires the participation of  everyone, in the culture and 
dignity of  their conscience (Capitini 1950: 78).
The ultimate goal was to have the interests of  the governed and the govern-
ing coincide, to have productive and regulative activities with a common aim, 
to result in a new collectivism that was democratic rather than authoritarian, 
capable of  eliminating the class of  inept politicos. (Capitini. 1950: 258-262.).
3. The result was that in this constant opening of  the political dimension, Ca-
pitini rejected any institutional ‘closure’, that is, all the rigid structures blocking 
a free dissemination of  power. This commitment to freshen and to break up 
fossilized institutions closed into themselves required constant revolutionary 
actions: «a total revolution, outspoken and open» to achieve «a society for all» 
(Capitini 1956: 5, 14). In the 1950s the content of  Capitini’s political inquiry 
turned toward forms of  political opposition which further enriched the body 
of  his thought. The open revolution was also a method of  «awakening» civ-
il society, improving social political structures from the bottom up through 
nonviolent struggle. For the philosopher the central point was that the «total 
transformation of  power and of  the economy» had to be based specifically 
on nonviolent methods, since political revolutions of  the past allowing «the 
destruction of  adversaries, the Reign of  Terror», had demonstrated the extent 
to which the new world they aspired to create was, in the end, similar to the 
old (Capitini 1956: 46, 14). Capitini’s revolution, aimed at changing social, eco-
nomic, political (and moral) structures, began with association (the «center» in 
his terminology), with debate and verbal confrontation, and proceeded with a 
series of  acts such as protest, noncollaboration, sacrifice10. It was a revolution 
in the sense that it was anti-authoritarian, anticapitalistic, and anti-bureaucrat-
ic, and it had as its objective a) a State «in the service of  all citizens» in which 
10 In this period, Capitini made numerous references to Danilo Dolci’s nonviolent struggle. In 
the 1950s, Dolci (1924-1997), like Capitini an educator and an activist in the cause of  nonvio-
lence, carried out a number of  actions aimed at highlighting social concerns and raising con-
sciousness, as well as concrete gestures to help the weakest and most needy. See the exchange 
of  correspondence between the two: Capitini-Dolci (2008) and Capitini (1958). For a bio-bi-
bliography on Dolci see: Spagnoletti (1975); Barone (2004).
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power would be «decentralized and monitored in the citizens’ meetings, under 
their control»; and b) an economy «at the service of  all citizens» leading to an 
economic order in which property was collective (Capitini 1956: 46-48)11. 
4. Nonetheless, the ‘revolutionary’ Capitini did not wish to bring down the 
existing democratic system, but rather try to reinforce it by spreading forms 
of  self-government while fine-tuning the mechanism of  participation. In the 
1960s this project was carried out with the idea of  «omnicracy», or power to 
all12. It was necessary to affirm a) a freedom that could be reconciled with 
socialization and b) an application of  freedom resulting in both individual 
well-being and common good. That involved a political and social unity able 
to withstand any thrust toward self-interest, and – as Capitini repeated:
a vast network of  grass-roots organizations, local advisory bodies, family-school com-
mittees, social centers […], internal commissions, school councils and university com-
mittees, training centers for nonviolent activism, local commissions to oversee all forms 
of  assistance and benefits, and development of  assemblies to train all citizens, especially 
young people so they do not feel isolated or manipulated from above (Capitini 1969: 
82).
The political order was to be built «from the bottom up»; on the one hand 
that meant a broadening of  popular participation in political and social issues 
and in the decision-making process; on the other hand it involved «power to 
all». The latter was effected in the assembly and in the strengthening of  public 
opinion, defending the rights of  free expression, information and control. 
Omnicratic power was therefore founded on assembly and on public opin-
ion as bases for a direct democracy not to be understood as «permanent ad-
ministration by the anonymous public mass which tramples […] on the rights 
of  minorities», but as the multiplication of  permanent assemblies and the 
spreading of  self-government at the local level (Capitini 1969: 83, 95, 99). 
In this way the parliamentary system could be integrated and to all effects 
improved; the assemblies dealt with certain problems, studying them and pro-
posing solutions; while the local government made possible administration 
and supervision of  the organs of  power on the part of  the citizens, thanks 
also to direct experience with the problems and the persons involved. 
From this point of  view, the epistolary exchange between Capitini and 
Norberto Bobbio is especially significant, since what emerges is a difference in 
viewpoint concerning the real possibility for direct democracy (or power of  all 
11 The idea of  open and nonviolent revolution calls to mind the great theme of  pacifism which 
occupies such a large part of  Capitini’s thought.
12 For a detail analysis of  Capitini’s concept of  «omnicracy» see: Polito (1998: 125-143).
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citizens) to correct the flaws of  the parliamentary representative system. For 
Bobbio, direct democracy must not be confused with the mere broadening of  
public participation in decision-making, because «if  this broadening occurs 
only through a multiplication of  the elective organs, the democracy remains 
representative – perhaps more representative, but not, simply for that reason, 
a direct democracy» (Capitini-Bobbio 2012: 119). Referring to Capitini’s ideas, 
Bobbio admitted that «[his] position is different, and far more consistent» (Ca-
pitini-Bobbio 2012: 119). According to Bobbio, the Perugian intellectual was 
in fact speaking of  «direct democracy in the sense of  power to all through 
discussions and decision-making by small groups», but this system, however 
laudable, would present major problems in practice, since it was applicable 
in small cities like Perugia but impossible to carry out «in industrial cities like 
Turin» (Capitini-Bobbio 2012: 119). Moreover, «without a certain amount of  
indoctrination or propaganda or, worse yet, manipulation, it is not possible to 
reach solutions […] reflecting at least the majority».
Bobbio emphasized the importance of  pedagogical instruments such as 
debate and discussion at grass-roots level, but «the purpose of  this discus-
sion and education should to be understand general problems», whereas he 
feared that it would «encourage the tendency of  each person to place his own 
particular interests at the forefront». For the philosopher of  law, «the danger 
of  direct democracy is particular interests, fragmentation to an extreme de-
gree»: with the exception of  choices which have no middle ground, such as the 
choice between war and peace, it was impossible to reach an effective political 
synthesis (Capitini-Bobbio: 2012: 119-120). 
How did Capitini answer? He understood his friend’s reservations; he well 
knew that an assembly could run aground on inconclusive shoals and be the 
instrument for an ideological violence lacking even basic rules to guarantee 
full democratic functioning. Nonetheless, in order to change a system that was 
closed, hierarchical and technocratic it was necessary to proceed by degrees, 
«creatively, making additions little by little», because «parliamentary democracy 
as the sole instrument is not acceptable» (Capitini-Bobbio 2012: 121). Of  course 
State administration was a complex matter requiring technical knowledge and 
decisions, but Capitini’s overall concept was «not only to overcome and exercise 
State power», but to have «instruments outside the State», grass-roots instru-
ments of  society to give a voice to citizens’ political weight. He wrote:
the point at which I was a follower of  Rousseau long before reading him was the distin-
ction between the sovereign, which for me is everyone, and the executors who are unable 
to make independent decisions and are at times simply temporary (Capitini-Bobbio 
2012: 122)13.
13 Rousseau appears to be one of  Capitini’s great ‘teachers’. The Perugian philosopher is at-
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The distinction between sovereign power and executive power did not satisfy 
Bobbio: 
I realize the good reasons of  those who speak, as you do, of  the need for power to all, 
but at the same time I realize that a power is all the more rational when it is based 
on clear knowledge of  the problems to resolve. A power is not rational simply because 
it is held by everyone. It is not rational even presuming that all those who hold it are 
reasonable. It is not enough to be reasonable; it is necessary also to know how things 
actually are, in order not to ask for impossible and contradictory solutions. Rousseau 
had not yet become aware of  industrial society. The first person to do so, Saint-Simon, 
anticipated technocracy. Today the political problem is far more in the terms in which 
Saint-Simon posed it than in the terms in which Rousseau resolved it. The fact that 
it is not enough to have a government of  scientists and industrialists, as the former 
[Saint-Simon] foresaw, does not means that we can go back to the latter [Rousseau] 
(Capitini-Bobbio 2012: 124-125).
These, therefore, were the differences (and the similarities) of  the two posi-
tions. In conclusion, one must ask to what extent the political project posited 
by Capitini was workable. The Perugian thinker’s intuitions were profound and 
his commitment was total. Bobbio captured the originality of  his friend who 
had a great vision that, however, was extremely difficult to convert into a func-
tioning political institutional model (Bobbio 2011: 23-55). Maybe it is more 
appropriate to speak of  a method (a pedagogic political method) to put into 
practice new forms of  citizenship with the aim of  arriving at a different way 
of  administrating power. As a matter of  fact, Capitini attempted a discussion, 
composed of  numerous thematic nuclei, on the need for a new power structure, 
on «the passage of  power from the hands of  the few who today hold it to the 
hands of  the many who today do not» (Capitini 1969: 154). The goal was an 
open society, whose political dimension would be grounded in socialism and 
be built up from the base, strengthening and broadening political participa-
tion. This took the form of  organizations of  direct democracy which were to 
claim larger and larger pieces of  decision-making power, through the free and 
nonviolent exchange of  opinions. This omnicratic reform aimed at creating 
a new man through a political and social pedagogy, criticizing old ideologies, 
dissolving old myths and provoking a new awareness for human possibilities. 
Looking beyond Fascist monism and contrary to the existing societies 
which were all more or less closed, Capitini had in mind a dynamic political or-
tracted by Rousseau’s ethical-philosophical idea of  political order as ‘good life’ and ‘common 
good’, corresponding to the nature of  man. Moreover, it is a concept which gives value to direct 
participation by the individual in political life and makes it a condition for moral excellence and 
rationality.
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der, in continual flux, perennially ready to be challenged, a system that would 
not repeat itself, its own past, its own traditions, its own habits. It was a dem-
ocratic method allowing politics a free rein, with purity of  intention, with dia-
logues, with maximum participation, with mutual respect for different points 
of  view. The peculiar character of  this ‘open’ method, aiming to go beyond 
the passive and marginal role of  citizens in the governance of  power, was its 
pluralism – identified as anti-institutional, anti-party, but also (and above all) 
as «center», open to the contribution and the involvement of  all, and capable 
of  creating a unifying dialogue to reconcile differences and convert them into 
fertile ground for debate. The Fascist dictatorship had fallen; yet, conscious of  
the risk of  underestimating the danger of  new authoritarian forms of  govern-
ment, and committed to emerging from a crisis that had affected economics, 
moral values and social solidarity, Capitini propounded «a work by the people», 
able to sustain continual examination and continually to challenge its own 
premises (Bozzi 1982: 121).
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Chapter Eleven
the functIonalIsM of davId MItrany: 
the monistic-technocratic perspectIve 
and the basIs for peace
Stefano Parodi
The functional theory stated by David Mitrany - Professor of  Economics at 
the London School of  Economics - is rather interesting for those scholars 
who, following Isaiah Berlin’s thesis, are willing to approach studies about 
monism and pluralism. In that theory (Mitrany 1943; Parodi 2013) the pluralistic 
and monistic concepts about the international organization are actually both 
present. In a recent paper I have dealt with this peculiar aspect, underlining the 
double level found in Mitrany’s theory:
To better understand this concept, it might be very useful to resort to the distinction 
made by Isaiah Berlin between “monism” and “pluralism”. In fact, seemingly, the 
international organization suggested by Mitrany is characterized by a “pluralism” 
which could be defined “total”, since the functional method does not envisage (at least 
basically) any hierarchical and coordinative structure. The international Authorities 
represent, according to Mitrany’s approach, some independent “islands”, which can 
freely be transformed depending on needs, activities to be carried out and problems 
to be solved.
However, analyzing Mitrany’s functionalist proposal we will have to face a “unidi-
mensional” approach, characterized by a sort of  “exclusive thought”: if  the political 
dimension is the “evil”, the main cause of  wars, the “technical” dimension is the 
kingdom of  the “good”, of  the lack of  conflicts and of  power struggles. And that 
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is founded on the belief  that following only the criteria of  competence and efficiency 
represents the only way to build a world without rivalry and conflicts (Parodi 2016: 
115).
In this paper I am going to deal with what might be called the «dark side» 
(Parodi 2016: 114) of  the international organization model proposed by Mi-
trany: it is represented by the ‘monistic-technocratic’ perspective rooted in 
Mitrany’s own theory. First of  all, to better define the concept of  monism, it 
is useful to remember what Marco Ferrari writes1:
Monocracy in its despotic, oligarchical majority or totalitarian forms, in which the gover-
nment of  the “one” gets organized each time, is the political expression of  monism, a 
religious, moral and philosophical ideal, whose critique is one of  the recurring themes in 
Berlin’s work. The most persuasive reasoning lies in the conclusion of  the Two Concepts, 
meaningfully titled “the one and the many”, a proposition S. Lukes considers the keystone 
of  his thought […]. “Metaphysical chimera” present in the whole western thought, “from 
Plato to the latest followers of  Hegel and Marx”, monism is described as the “belief  that 
somewhere in the past or in the future, in the divine revelation or in the mind of  a single 
thinker, in the solemn declarations of  history or of  science or in the simple heart of  a good 
and honest man, there is a final solution” where “all the positive values men have always 
believed in”, freedom, equality, justice, brotherhood, order “must in the end be compatible 
and maybe imply each other”. The conflict among values makes a complete human realiza-
tion impossible: accepting the choice, the compromise and the settlement implies the renun-
ciation of  “equally absolute needs” and it leads into believing that any means is legitimate 
in order to attain this “total harmony” (Ferrari 2001: 117; Parodi 2016: 115, 116).
Starting from this statement, in order to focus on the ‘dark side’ of  Mitrany’s 
theory, it is essential to ‘enter’ his mind and understand his way of  thinking. 
He is not a politician, but an economist, a technician who uses his own ex-
pertise to point out the road to follow, the solution to implement. In this per-
spective Lionel Robbins’s point of  view is quite enlightening. In fact, as we are 
reminded by Giuseppe Casale and Giulio Gianelli, Robbins
claims the impossibility of  pinpointing the scientific criteria of  choice among the diffe-
rent kinds of  governmental intervention. He states that the economy is “neutral towards 
the ends”, meaning it is not able to provide with scientific assessments about them, since 
they imply different kinds of  judgment (moral, political etc.).
This concept of  economics as a “positive science”, free from value judgment, implies that 
the economist’s task is not to indicate the aims the society proposes each time by adopting 
measures of  economical politics.
1 In this paper I personally translated all the Italian quotations.
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Their “professional” task is to show the best way, from the scientific point of  view, to 
reach certain aims proposed by others (for example the politicians) and not to choose 
among those aims (Casale, Gianelli 1993: 291; Parodi 2016: 114).
Those are the guidelines Mitrany follows when he strives to find a solution 
to the problem of  war and to secure a condition of  permanent peace for 
the whole world. As a result, Mitrany’s theoretical processing is organized in 
two phases: the analysis of  the given situation, that is to say, the analysis of  
the international system (and of  the international politics) and the proposal 
of  a solution which, in this case, is represented by a model of  international 
organization. 
It is important to notice that in this first phase, the one about analysis, Mi-
trany, though harshly criticizing the state-centric structure of  the international 
system and its politics2, deemed the main cause of  selfishness and therefore of  
conflicts, never takes on a position suggesting his belonging to any ideology. 
Not even when he is taking down or is trying to take the federalists’ thesis 
apart, does he lose the detachment of  the technician who analyzes and objec-
tively judges while he is thoroughly arguing his observations.
In order to understand his way of  thinking, we must, thus, envisage a tech-
nician with a goal to reach: permanent peace. In this perspective, the model of  
international organization proposed by Mitrany is only a suitable tool to reach 
that goal. At the core of  Mitrany’s theoretical thinking there is, in fact, the 
concept of  the ‘practical basis for peace’ (Mitrany 1943; 1975: 123-132): this 
concept corresponds to the need of  founding peace not only on solid basis, 
but also on realistically achievable ones. This is another important aspect of  
Mitrany’s functionalist theory, where he often harshly criticizes the ‘violence’ 
performed by ideologies against social and economical realities (Mitrany 1951).
Examining now in detail the structure of  his functionalist theory, it must 
be stated that the starting point is the charge against the state-centric struc-
ture of  the international system: this ‘charge’ turns into the proposal of  
overcoming the central role of  the States in managing economical and so-
cial issues at international level. At this very point, Mitrany, the ‘technician’, 
wipes out the distinction – so dear to the federalists (Malandrino 1998; Ter-
ranova 2003) – between national States and federations, while carrying out 
a rigorous analysis of  international relations and, above all, of  international 
politics. Mitrany, in fact, regards the world not divided into States and feder-
ations, but into separated political-territorial Unities, endowed with absolute 
sovereignty and almost ‘physiologically’ fitted to implement a policy of  pow-
er or supremacy. And that is why international politics turns into the place 
of  rivalries, of  selfishness and of  potential conflicts. Federations, as well 
2 Intended as dimension of  the politics.
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as national States, can also wage war3, they can carry on politics of  power: 
why, Mitrany wonders, should we consider the birth of  federations a guar-
antee for peace? Only a world federation, unattainable, according to Mitrany, 
could eliminate the risk of  resorting to war. In my opinion, that shows the 
ability of  the ‘technician’ to be, first of  all, an observer of  ‘what is’ and not 
of  ‘what should or could be’.
In those terms, a second element of  Mitrany’s theory is worthy of  notice: 
his mistrust in the politicians’ likelihood of  being really willing to work to-
gether and, therefore, of  a peaceful coexistence. It must be said that Mitrany’s 
‘mistrust’ is not only concerned with politicians, or with people who hold 
authoritative positions, in general, but also with ‘mankind’, thus evoking a 
sort of  ‘anthropological pessimism’. It is not by chance, in fact, that the mod-
el of  international organization – conceived by Mitrany and based on what 
could be defined the ‘common interest’- represents mainly a ‘net’ or somehow, 
even, a ‘cage’ in which the States have to accept a severe reduction of  their 
own sovereignty4. In other words, this new model is ‘suitable’ and thus it is 
successful with the States and, essentially, with the inhabitants of  the various 
countries. Going back to Adam Smith’s teaching, we can better understand the 
real meaning: the individuals act pushed mainly by the search for their own 
advantage, they are hardly pushed by high principles:
Smith claims that human acting is determined by six impulses: selfishness, desire for 
peace, sense of  ownership, habit of  working, tendency for taking one thing for another, 
“sympathy” (= social consensus). Pushed by them, men – who are the best judges of  
their own interests – act in a way to realize the maximum of  collective utility unawares. 
“It is not from the generosity of  the butcher, of  the baker or of  the brewer […] that 
we can hope to get our lunch, but from their evaluation of  their own interests. Each 
individual strives as much as possible to use his capital in support of  the national 
productive activity, and to direct then that activity in such a way that its product can get 
its maximum value, each individual necessarily works to make the annual income of  
the society as high as possible. Actually he does not usually mean to pursue the public 
interest nor is he aware of  the extent in which he is pursuing it… when he directs his 
activity in such a way that his product is as high as possible, he only aims to his own 
advantage and he is led by an invisible hand […], in this as in many other cases, to 
pursue an aim that does not form part of  his intentions…Pursuing his interest, he 
himself  pursues the interest of  the society in a way more efficient than he intended to 
pursue it” (Casale, Gianelli 1993: 135; Parodi 2016: 117, 118). 
3 We could also witness wars among federations.
4 In a theoretical way the States could suffer an almost total loss of  their sovereignty, with regard 
to social-economical questions and, obviously, within the international field.
The FuncTionalism oF DaviD miTrany 167
From this point of  view, Mitrany is certainly not far from Adam Smith’s po-
sitions.
As a consequence, the functionalist approach aims to take the new form of  
international organization away from the good will, the disinterested desire for 
peace and the improbable sense of  justice of  the individuals5. 
Even in this case we find ourselves in front of  conclusions (and theori-
zations) based on an analysis of  international relations and maybe of  human 
reality. Such analysis is pursued in a rigorous and interdisciplinary way, includ-
ing economics, political science, sociology, history and anthropology, perhaps 
even beyond Mitrany’s own intentions. 
What has been argued so far allows us to face the core of  the question: 
the indisputable presence of  a form of  ‘technocratic monism’ in Mitrany’s 
theory does not come out of  a technocratic vision, of  the adherence to a 
mainly anti-democratic theoretic model, but it is simply the result of  a crit-
ical thinking, of  a theoretical journey aiming at solving a problem. In other 
words, the technocratic perspective is the only way to build a world where 
the international relations are marked by a joint effort and not by rivalry: 
a world where permanent peace rules. Any element of  negativity is absent 
from Mitrany’s approach: a technocratic system is not seen as a danger for 
democracy anymore. Such an essential question is still open nowadays: on 
this point it is of  great interest the study of  Antonio La Spina and Giando-
menico Majone about the regulative Authorities which, within the States, are 
comparable to the international independent Authorities pictured by Mitra-
ny. The authors, challenging the anti-democratic thesis of  the Authorities 
write: 
Such institutions may appear non-democratic to some people because they are politically 
irresponsible and “not representative”. […] At least there could be two reasons in the 
perspective of  the democratic legitimation of  such authorities. 
In the first place, it is not always true that in democracy all the decisions must be 
espoused by those people provided with electoral mandate, “punishable” through non-re-
election (as it is assumed in a badly conceived “sovereignty of  the elector”). It is instead 
possible, and it happens everywhere more frequently than we think, that certain deci-
sions on certain subjects are delegated. If  the authorization is transparent and devised 
in an appropriate way, there will still be the possibility to check and punish the decision 
maker, in different ways from the non-reelection.
In the second place, it is fairly plausible that a rational citizen in a democratic state (the 
above mentioned “sovereign”) if  choosing under a “veil of  ignorance” about the future 
institutional set-up and the future majorities of  government, would like certain sectors 
5 In Mitrany, as it has already been said, a marked dosis of  ‘anthropological pessimism’ is no-
ticeable.
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(for example the monetary policy) to be appointed to people having some subjective 
requisites and working within a certain institutional design, free from political party 
post-mandate interferences (La Spina, Majone 2000: 8).
In these terms, Mitrany’s monistic-technocratic perspective is actually the only 
possibility when we want to diminish the weight of  the States, and their poli-
cies in the international economical and social questions.
The fact that each single part of  Mitrany’s functionalist theory must be 
considered the result of  a real scientific research is even more evident when 
we take into consideration one of  the ‘properties’ of  the functionalist model 
which Mitrany is very fond of: the endless adaptability, the elasticity. It is a 
central aspect in Mitrany’s thought and it is characterized by the ability to 
provide the constantly going on changes in the international system with swift 
and appropriate answers. The Authorities imagined by Mitrany arise in order 
to carry out a specific function and they are somehow generated by that very 
same function. At the root of  that need for ‘elasticity’ and ‘automatism’6 there 
is, in my opinion, a really definite awareness: it is not possible to foresee future 
events and so it is useless and, sometimes, harmful to plan or even worse, to 
pretend that the future (the reality) matches our theories. 
Mitrany stresses this point so much as to include it in his criticism of  the 
federalists’ positions, which ‘foresee’, thanks to the federalist way, a future of  
peace and stability. He is also aware of  living in the «age of  masses», that Tiz-
iana Carena and Francesco Ingravalle set as:
Whilst the collective (behaviorally homogeneous groups) prevails, the higher is the in-
cidence of  case, and case means the opposite of  thoughtful and rational behavior. The 
crowds love or hate; the higher the predictability of  their behavior, the higher the possi-
bility for a clever demagogue to use them (as the experiences of  mass dictatorships have 
shown); even Freud […] noticed the abyss which separated the logic of  individual acting 
from crowds, masses acting. The age of  masses is the age of  higher predictability of  col-
lective behavior. And, thanks to the media, it is also the age of  an easier making of  the 
collective behavior. On the other hand, each age has had its own media: each age has had 
its own rate of  “predictability” (Carena, Ingravalle 2012: 27; Parodi 2014: 37, 38). 
The two authors base their argument on the concept of  ‘event’, that is to say, 
the most obvious thing, the most common, the most ordinary: every event is characte-
rized […] by the “coming out” (in “technical” words: “phenomenizing oneself ”) of  
something that once was not there, or it was there, but it looked different from its present 
aspect. It is usually the retrospective reflection that draws the event: quite often while 
6 The States have a role only at the moment of  the founding act of  the functional institutions.
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facing unpleasant or painful facts we think back, sometimes with nostalgia, to the mo-
ment when they could still not have happened, maybe thanks to our intervention; but our 
corrective intervention should have implied the prediction of  that very unpleasant and/
or painful fact which later happened (Carena, Ingravalle 2012: 13; Parodi 2014: 48).
The problem of  the event and of  the possibility of  predicting the event moves 
then from a personal to a political level: 
In what limits is such prediction possible? If  this is the fundamental question in the 
history of  an individual, it is also the fundamental question in the history of  the 
community: what politician does not look back with regret on missed historical oppor-
tunities, on choices that turned out disastrous, on illusions that proved “fatal” for their 
country?” (Carena, Ingravalle 2012: 13; Parodi 2014: 49).
In my opinion, all of  this is present in Mitrany’s thought and it contributes to 
increase his mistrust towards politics, always seen as the field of  selfishness, 
of  low instincts and, as a consequence, of  conflict. Criticizing the solutions 
proposed by the federalists, Mitrany underlines, in an unequivocal way, the 
risks inherent in the ‘manoeuvrability’ of  the masses. We should not forget 
that he brings to an end his functionalist theory during the years of  the Second 
World War, that is to say, the years when the damages caused by the totalitarian 
regimes propaganda were tragically manifest. However, it would be a mistake 
to believe that Mitrany’s concerns deal only with non-democratic regimes: in 
democratic countries the ‘mass’ can also be manipulated. The question is, ul-
timately, about the stability, about the elimination of  the danger that a given 
‘political structure’ (for instance a federation) is radically misrepresented or 
even destroyed by traumatic political upheavals or simply by the results of  the 
electoral competitions. According to Mitrany, and this is one of  his main crit-
icisms to the federalists, the permanence of  a State inside a federation can be 
challenged anytime because of  the rising of  a new political leadership. If  we 
want to have at our disposal a reliable ‘tool’ for peace, it is thus necessary to re-
sort to a model that guarantees a continuity in time and it is not hostage of  the 
changes in the international political scenery and of  the changes in each single 
State and it is also not dependent on the masses mood. How can we, thus, 
reconcile the stability7 with the inevitable changes that are integral part of  
history? Obviously, a crystallization of  a particular political-institutional set-up 
(international in this case) is not even thinkable. At this point Mitrany comes 
up with what could be defined the ‘dynamic stability’ and that concept holds a 
central place in Mitrany’s functionalist model of  an international organization. 
The dynamic stability is the result of  the inner ability of  an organization based 
7 It is a question of  permanent stability.
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on the functional method of  constantly adjusting its own course, of  adapting 
day by day to the reality of  the moment. Virtually, there are some mechanisms 
inside each functional institution which click automatically, without long de-
cisional procedures. We are definitely beyond the mere ‘depoliticization of  
the decisions’: we are in the field of  almost automatic decisions founded on 
evaluations and, thus, on the ‘technicians’ competence. 
Once again it is not possible to separate Mitrany’s proposal from the prob-
lem to be solved. The problem, in this case, is embodied by the unpredictabili-
ty of  the events and, notably, by the unpredictability of  the individuals’ behav-
ior8. Though, being such unpredictability, as we have seen earlier, according 
to a logic inherent to crowds’ actions (and thoughts) absolutely predictable, 
for Mitrany it becomes a ‘datum’ to analyze and use in the elaboration of  his 
theoretical model. 
At this point, we can claim that Mitrany’s way of  thinking must be consid-
ered ‘functionalist’ and, as a consequence, his theory is the result of  a func-
tional kind of  journey. In other words, in his thought the functional procedure 
changes into a mental scheme, into an interpretative key suitable to understand 
the reality surrounding us. 
So we are back to the ‘dark side’ of  Mitrany’s theory and to the origins of  
the monistic-technocratic perspective easily recognizable in a model of  inter-
national organization which, while excluding the political dimension from the 
decision making process, poses a concrete problem for democracy, above all 
in our present time characterized by an increasing wave of  anti-politics. This 
theme is also deeply debated at scientific level. For example, the trust in the 
technicians and the mistrust in politicians comes out clearly in the analysis of  
Antonio La Spina and Giandomenico Majone, who consider the Authorities 
present in each State as 
the abandon of  a State model seen as a direct manager, a goods distributor, a social 
engineer in favor of  the idea of  a Regulator State. Its strategic tools are the regulative 
authorities: institutions that are independent from the political class and the electoral 
cycle and are provided with a specific mandate and with incisive powers, which are pro-
vided for by law, only about distinctly limited issues. These authorities are composed by 
people who were chosen because of  their high technical knowledge and their impartiality 
(La Spina, Majone 2000: 7; Parodi 2016: 109). 
The independence from the political power is seen as a positive condition, a 
basis for a fair and efficient management: as a consequence, a technocratic sys-
tem proves to be essentially acceptable. Therefore, there is a contrast between 
technocracy and politics. Hence it is useful to quote what Michela Nacci writes:
8 The term «individuals» stands for both the politicians and the masses.
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Technocracy deems politics irrational: the skills it requests are certainly different from 
the rational choice, from the same economical rationality. But the typical rationality of  
politics must take into account non-rational factors which are at the same time absolu-
tely crucial such as beliefs, emotions, general opinions.
Technocracy would like to do without ideologies, values, abstractness, recourse to general 
concepts such as the common good, mediation, negotiation, the class of  professional po-
liticians: these are probably requests which politics can comply only with effacing itself. 
[…] In the technocratic question the expertise, the knowledge takes place only on one 
side: the side of  technique, whatever it means, of  the technicians, whoever they are. […] 
Technocracy is an ideology in itself  and as such it must be dealt with and discussed 
(Nacci 2005: 273, 274; Parodi 2016: 116).
As matters stand, the concept of  ‘independence from political power’ - di-
rectly linked to the overcoming of  the political dimension, that is the ‘volun-
taristic’ dimension – represents one of  the core elements in the building of  
Mitrany’s international organizational model. If  we consider, for example, the 
process of  European integration, a concrete case of  (partial) implementation 
of  Mitrany’s functionalist theory, we realize the importance of  the contrast 
between the sphere of  automatism, typical of  the functional procedure, and 
the sphere of  the political decision-making process. Corrado Malandrino, in 
fact, reminds us that Walter Hallstein 
calculated the speed of  the unification process in the Sixties […] and he compared it 
to a “three-phase rocket”, which expressed three separate, complementary and ensuing 
forms of  integration: customs union, economical union, political union. A metaphor sti-
cking an irrepressible mechanic stroke to Hallstein’s idea of  the European integration. 
Even though, later on, the president of  the European Commission was aware of  the 
constant need for a voluntaristic element, for a discussion and for political decisions to 
make it actually move forward (Malandrino 2005: 11). 
As a matter of  fact, the two spheres can be considered complementary, ‘dif-
ferent phases of  the same rocket’: 
Anyway, since today the two first phases have mostly carried out their task, bringing 
Europe to an almost final degree of  social-economical integration and they have already 
left the main carrier, we should be in the middle of  the section of  space the third phase 
must complete, the political union. The most difficult, the most tormented, full of  pro-
blems no functionalist automatism could solve (Malandrino 2005: 11, 12).
This absolutely acceptable observation by Malandrino takes us back to the 
political dimension, to the role politics must have and to an unavoidable ques-
172 MonisMs and PluralisMs in the history of Political and social Models
tion: is the political journey the only open way? As we have previously seen, 
Mitrany’s answer is negative and that gives us the starting point for a short 
final consideration about the genesis of  the elaboration of  a theory that can 
also be defined ‘internationalistic-technocratic’. 
As I have tried to point out in this paper, Mitrany gets to a technocratic 
solution only after a deep and thorough analysis of  the international politics. 
Such a solution is based on a principle of  feasibility and on the possibility of  
overcoming any ideological element. As a consequence, the model of  interna-
tional organization proposed by Mitrany represents some sort of  landing in 
the harbor of  practicalness, of  reliability. In other words, it is not the result 
of  the search about what is right or preferable, but of  the search about what 
is possible and feasible in a certain historical, political, economical and social 
context. The sense of  ‘coldness’ we feel when we deal with Mitrany’s function-
alist theory9 comes probably out of  lack of  ideal surges commonly founded 
on high principles and irremissible values. However, a ‘technician’ works on 
facts and avoids what belongs to the dimension of  the illusion, or even the 
dream. That is why I have tried to ‘enter’ Mitrany’s mind, to picture a kind of  
functionalist way of  thinking. Unfortunately, along this path I have constantly 
run into the same question Mitrany must have asked himself  very frequently 
during the building process of  his international organizational model: is a po-
litical journey to peace (and integration) feasible? In front of  the severe crisis 
the European Union is going through, I personally can not refrain from asking 
myself  the same question, for which I have no answer. Or I might dread it.
9 It is probably the same sense of  ‘coldness’ felt by the European Union citizens when facing 
those community institutions they regard as some sort of  bureaucratic-technocratic monster.
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Chapter Twelve
deMocratIc pluralIsM and capItalIst MonIsM
Gianfranco Ragona
Translation from the original Italian by Angelina I. Zontine
12.1 pluralIsM and deMocracy
For both common sense and specialist studies, pluralism is considered con-
stituent of  democratic systems, as it allows us to recognize the “multiplicity” 
and “variety of  actors and opinions that contribute to public life” (Belligni 
2010:363)1 and legitimize the different structures of  interest, such as the set 
of  political parties, trade unions, associations, etc. that formulate civil society’s 
political demands, directing them to the decision-making sphere, the parlia-
ment in first instance. According to Noberto Bobbio’s eloquent definition, 
pluralism’s main aim is to construct “a society consisting of  various groups of  
power, potentially even in conflict with one another, whose function is to limit, 
control, contrast and, to some extent, eliminate the central role of  the domi-
nant power that is historically identified with the State” (Bobbio 1990:789). As 
the Turinese philosopher noted, to this end the theory of  pluralism becomes 
autonomous in relation to both classical liberal and democratic theories. The 
former seek to define the sphere of  interference power exercises in the lives 
of  citizens and, in particular by means of  a vertical division of  power, to limit 
the State’s tendency to colonize ever-increasing spaces of  civil society. On the 
1 Translations of  sources not published in English are by the author.
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other hand, democratic theories share the idea that power can be limited by 
the law and, above all, by citizens’ participation in decision-making processes.
The emergence of  the concept of  pluralism, however, precedes the es-
tablishment of  Western democracies: in fact, its origins can be found in the 
debates regarding “intermediate bodies”, representative of  the Modern Age, 
that put forward the idea that collective decisions could favourably count on 
the contribution of  subjects other than the sovereign. Hence, the tie between 
democracy and pluralism appears somewhat problematic, so much so that it 
has been challenged over time, especially by pure democracy theorists such 
as Rousseau. It was precisely this renowned thinker who rejected the idea 
that intermediate bodies could benefit the formation of  general will and pub-
lic good, fearing the fragmentation of  interests and opinions and, ultimately, 
judging pluralism not a resource but a pathology of  communal living.
Later, the promoters of  liberal democracy viewed pluralism with confi-
dence, placing it as a protective shield between the social body and possible re-
surgences of  despotism, abuse or tyranny, even of  the majority as Tocqueville 
would say. Finally, during the 20th century academic political science purpose-
fully raised pluralism to the status of  democracy’s core element, inaugurating 
the widely used term “polyarchy” to define pluralist democratic regimes.
The paradigm of  20th century democratic pluralism displays specific char-
acteristics. Firstly, «in all pluralist democracies (or polyarchies) the allocation 
of  political goods is the result of  interactions between [...] private actors and 
governmental agencies» (Belligni 2010: 366); secondly, a pluralist democracy 
goes beyond the State, and the State’s role is equal to that of  any other ac-
tor involved. It has also been noted that «rarely has the State-government, in 
this metamorphosis of  sovereignty, behaved as an organic body, tending ever 
more to fragmentation into apparatuses and powers that operate not as or-
ganic units of  a hierarchy but as autonomous subjects, at times competing or 
conflicting, other times in partnership, according to an internal pluralism that is 
not only structural and functional but also decisional» (ibid.). Lastly and most 
importantly, democratic power is pluralist both when concerning leadership – 
legitimized by elections, through which the deception of  the government’s gen-
eral will acts – and the agreement guaranteed by the system as a whole, that is, 
at the level of  so-called governance where manifold protagonists act through ne-
gotiations and compromises (see Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Arienzo 2013). 
In other words, electoral legitimacy is supplemented by the system’s legitima-
cy, which basically distinguishes the notion of  “democratic pluralism”; in any 
case, at present this notion seems to be undergoing a deep crisis:
Many empirical studies have documented how the construction of  the pluralist decision 
tends to generate new exclusions by privileging high demanders over disorganized citi-
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zens, giving advantage to specific groups of  interest over those of  public interest, and, 
within them, to shareholders as opposed to stakeholders, or to the top-tier oligarchy as 
opposed to rank and file members (Belligni 2010:369-370).
Given the contemporary democracy crises – an evident fact, as shown by the 
vast literature on the topic (Mastropaolo 2012) – and the different hypothe-
ses of  reform targeting democratic systems, pluralism in general remains an 
untouchable element, as if  it were surrounded by a sacred aura; attempts to 
redefine its concepts and practices notwithstanding, as the work of  French 
intellectual Pierre Rosanvallon demonstrates.
12.2 attendIng to deMocracy, or rather the crIsIs 
of deMocratIc legItIMacy
The achievement of  universal suffrage in European political culture simul-
taneously transformed political parties into representative brokerage organs 
between state institutions and society, posing challenges to the political system 
– of  which they are a part, however – organizing consensus and social life. 
The parties represented the organs of  pluralism, and today’s crisis in electoral 
participation seems to mirror their difficulties. The crisis can also be related 
to the fact that the object the parties represented has also become ambiguous: 
social classes, or the class sectors into which society was divided, not only citi-
zens sans phrase. Today, the voting population’s task is to select its governors; a 
minute after the elections, having removed the sovereign’s robes, the popula-
tion transforms itself  into the cluster of  the governed while the political focus 
dislocates to higher levels, giving rise to perverse effects in democratic life: 
disillusionment, disappointment, contempt, mistrust and silent protest. Some 
years ago, Colin Crouch observed that: 
Politicians in many countries are becoming alarmed at growing voter apathy and de-
clining membership in parties. This is the interesting paradox of the political class. It 
wants as much as possible to exclude the mass citizens from becoming actively involved 
in probing its secrets, organizing oppositional activities, disturbing the tight control exer-
cised by the politico-business ellipse. But it desperately wants us to offer passive support; 
it dreads the possibility that we might lose interest in activities, fail to vote for it, give no 
money to its parties, ignore it (Crouch 2004: 112).
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According to David Van Reybrouck, author of  the provocative text Against 
Elections, «the Democratic Fatigue Syndrome that is now emerging everywhere 
is a perfectly understandable consequence of  the beatification of  the elector-
al-representative system» (Van Reybrouck, 2016: 105), which in reality is not a 
democratic instrument at all but exactly the opposite; following in the tracks 
of  Bernard Manin’s study (Manin 1997), Van Reybrouck argues that it endors-
es the divide between those who govern and those who obey.
Rosanvallon suggests with a realistic – or resigned – perspective that we 
not seek to bridge this divide in extremis but rather acknowledge the distance: 
«Rather than attempt to carry over the bond of  identification from the elector-
al to the governmental sphere, it is better to recognize the functional necessity 
of  distance in the latter and to give this new relationship its own specifically 
democratic form» (Rosanvallon 2011: 220). In this perspective he introduces 
the concept of  «democracy of  appropriation» in an attempt to rethink pluralism in 
an original way.
The democracy of  appropriation is founded on certain pillars. Namely, on 
activism and society’s engagement, thus the critiquing of  power, its decisions 
and conduct and, lastly, on control, correction or pressure. This is what he has 
defined in a previous, highly-impactful text as «counter-democracy» (Rosan-
vallon 2006). Furthermore, the democracy of  appropriation is based on the 
development of  two other important elements of  democratic life: authorities 
and courts of  justice (constitutional, administrative, etc.). Generally, he speaks 
of  non-elective institutions, which in his eyes may represent «a new democrat-
ic horizon» (Rosanvallon 2011: 221).
In this article I focus on the former, as in the author’s perspective they 
seem to be able to grant protection to the polyphonic character of  contem-
porary democracies. In effect, independent authorities reduce «the scope of  
administrative-executive power» (Rosanvallon 2011: 75), meaning that they 
circumscribe the powers of  the governors by limiting and therefore recogniz-
ing it, leaving the field open to the rich and varied intervention of  civil society. 
The aim is to stem or contrast both power abuses and the privatization of  
general interests that many blame on the parties even though such privatiza-
tion is common practice within the institutions as well. These authorities give 
democracy a legitimacy of  impartiality, that is, a systemic legitimacy based on 
independence from governmental power, on the autonomy from the electoral 
period, namely from the partisan clashes, and on the technical rationality of  
prominent figures when facing the plural and vital struggle of  the people in 
its various expressions2. 
Rosanvallon’s argument is fuelled by from the consideration that there is no 
democracy without the shaping of  a society in which everyone can fully find 
2 Concerning the controversial concept of  “people”, see Pazè (2011); Badiou et al. (2013).
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their place, without a collective identity and the writing of  common history. 
The author asserts however that, within a pluralist society where «electoral le-
gitimacy rests on popular recognition» (Rosanvallon 2011: 97), the concept of  
“the people” should be replaced by that of  “generality”, a positive and active 
social dimension that includes all citizens. This terminological and conceptual 
adjustment is important given that the legitimacy of  impartiality is based on 
the concept of  “negative generality”, not in the sense that everybody has a role 
or that they all have rights, but that «nobody should benefit from a privilege or 
advantage» (Rosanvallon 2011: 97). In fact, although in today’s democratic sys-
tems it is not possible for every individual to be positively included, or rather, 
it is not possible to unite and constitute a “general interest” with increasingly 
vague outlines, it is nonetheless important that nobody be excluded. In other 
words, if  all particular interests do not constitute the general interest, at least a 
limit to the success of  the particular must be set. This is the purpose of  impar-
tial institutions, to prevent the overbearing victory of  particular interests – the 
cancer of  democracies – and thereby safeguard pluralism 
However, a problem arises in view of  the fact that we do not live in a 
laboratory and it is not possible to conduct experiments in neutral contexts. 
Democratic societies are also capitalist societies and, even if  capitalism may 
originate from different models (see Burroni 2016 and Crouch 2013), it is 
not pluralist in its essence. Quite the opposite: accumulation, its operating 
principle, is monist, an absolute principle on which society’s welfare or crisis 
depends, resonating in the life of  citizens and impacting their possibility to 
participate, control, decide and understand, reflecting the governors’ conduct, 
behaviour and integrity, and affecting the trustees of  independent authorities. 
12.3 capItalIsM and deMocracy, or rather: 
eIther deMocracy or capItalIsM
To try and make sense of  the current crises of  democratic systems, an original 
point of  view is offered by the political scientist Wolfgang Streeck who sets 
out from the almost naïve but nonetheless accurate assertion that the funda-
mental structure of  Western democracies is anchored to a capitalist economic 
order and that a thorough and articulated theory of  capitalism is necessary 
to analyse this kind of  society. This perspective ipso facto calls into question 
all the approaches that distinguish the political field from the economic one 
in a factitious manner, or that surreptitiously put forward ancient theories 
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regarding the autonomy of  one or the other. Streeck writes: «Following what 
happened from 2008 onwards, it is not possible to understand politics and 
political institutions without considering their relation with the market and 
economic interests, as well as with class structures and the conflicts that have 
developed within them» (Streeck 2013: 17)3.
In this perspective, the present crises of  neoliberal democracies mirror the 
crisis of  “democratic capitalism” that emerged during the post-war interval 
and started its decline during the Seventies, following the period known as 
the “Glorious Thirty”: thus it is not just a “simple” financial crisis, nor a crisis 
of  traditional democratic legitimacy, as Rosanvallon seems to believe, but a 
problem deriving directly from the fundamental tension between capitalism 
and democracy4. Then again, Streeck highlights, giving particular emphasis to 
historical processes, that «what is instructive for the social sciences is not the 
conditions themselves, but rather the processes, or the conditions in relation 
to the processes […]. All that is social happens and develops over time, be-
coming ever more similar to itself  in and with time. What stands in front of  
us can be understood only if  we know how it was yesterday and identify what 
path it has followed in the meanwhile» (Streeck 2013: 12-13).
The roots of  the crisis of  civilization that we are currently witnessing are 
anchored in the contradiction between «a kind of  economy governed by the 
capitalist imperatives of  exploitation and growth» (Streeck 2013: 12) and dem-
ocratic life. On one hand, then, the absolute of  accumulation is evidently mo-
nist, on the other, democratic relativism is the principle of  pluralism:
Retrospectively, the history of  the crises of  late capitalism, starting from the Seventies, 
appears to be the development of  the eternal and fundamental tension between capital-
ism and democracy, leading to the gradual dissolution of  the marriage that was imposed 
on them during the aftermath of  World War II (Streeck 2013: 25).
Streeck’s argument unfolds in keeping with a clear and convincing framework, 
recalling the objections on the compatibility between capitalism and democ-
racy raised by neo-Marxism between the Seventies and Eighties: think of  Paul 
Sweezy and Paul Baran’s text, Monopoly Capital (Baran and Sweezy 1966), in 
which crisis represents not an exception but the normal state of  the capitalist 
system or, for instance, Paul Mattick’s text, Marx and Keynes (Mattick 1969), 
which argues that mixed economy, characteristic of  the “Glorious Thirties”, 
was destined for crisis due to the tendency of  the rate of  profit to fall; and last-
ly, the more recent insights of  Alain Bihr (Bihr 1991), who cast a critical glance 
3 Translations of  Streeck 2013 are by the author.
4 For a wider discussion on the topic, refer to the monographic dossier of  the journal «Teoria 
Politica», 2014.
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on the end of  the Keynesian social pact between capital and labour within the 
context of  post-war liberal democracy. In effect, the growth of  the golden age 
could not have been without end, and only its growth, that is, the negotiated 
division of  productivity gains between socially and politically legitimate actors 
in a pluralistic context, acted as an instrument for guaranteeing civil peace.
Streeck believes that «the history of  capitalism during the Seventies, in-
cluding the continuous succession of  economic crises in that period, is the 
history of  the leak of  capital from the social regulation in which it was con-
strained after 1945» (Streeck 2013: 39). However, the fundamental tension 
between capitalism and democracy manifested itself  without directly precipi-
tating towards its extreme consequences, and that occurred because of  a strat-
egy based on a wise use of  money, that «was employed to defuse potentially 
destabilizing social conflicts, first thanks to inflation, and then through public 
debt and expansion of  private credit markets, and eventually - today - with the 
purchase of  State and bank debts on behalf  of  the central banks» (Streeck 
2013:15-16). 
During this phase, capitalism began to flood the economies with money, 
creating an illusion of  success and trust in future well-being, buying time, 
neutralizing conflicts and thereby giving way to the conditions of  a real “seces-
sion” from democracy. In Europe, the crisis of  state budgets translated into 
the erosion of  a peculiar and consolidated model of  social State, the guaran-
tee deriving from the “pact” that had operated for a period of  around three 
decades to enable imperfect forms of  democracy to coexist with a mode of  
production whose operating principle is obviously problematic:
The three methods, adopted one after the other to create, thanks to money, the illusion of  
growth and well-being - inflation, public and private debt - all functioned for a limited 
amount of  time. But once adopted, each method needed to be abandoned, as it interfered 
with the process of  accumulation rather than sustaining it (Streeck 2013: 65).
Naturally, a rational justification for this strategy is necessary; thus the debt 
crisis is traced from the dominant economic doctrine to democracy’s inef-
ficiencies and excesses (see Crosiet et al. 1975) following an argumentative 
strategy based on the concept of  “common resource” and “common good”, 
which are argued to be always and necessarily badly administered by the public 
and, by contrast, valorised by the market, i.e. the enterprise, recovering an old 
idea at the base of  the original accumulation of  capital that began with the 
appropriation of  medieval collective property.
This is an ideological operation that allows us to set aside the decisive his-
torical phenomenon represented by the eclipse of  the compromise between 
capitalism and democracy, with the establishment of  so-called neo-liberalism 
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and the simultaneous estrangement of  the masses that reveals itself  through 
increasing rates of  electoral abstention. The consequent paradox is that the 
apathy of  the democratic citizen always grants new strength to capitalism it-
self. In short:
Today democracy is at an advanced phase, in that democracy, as we know it, is about 
to become sterile and altered into a redistributive mass democracy, in other words it is 
about to be reduced to a combination of  state of  law and mere public entertainment. 
This process of  de-democratization of  capitalism through the de-economization of  de-
mocracy has further advanced [...] following the crisis in 2008 (Streeck 2013: 25).
Along these lines, Streeck reconstructs how the breach of  the social pact from 
the middle of  the Seventies led to the transition from the fiscal State – the 
one that drew its resources from a generally progressive imposition during the 
Glorious Thirties, with capital agreeing to contribute to the social State – to 
the debtor State, which instead needs to borrow money to guarantee the same 
benefits and subsequently support the privatization of  welfare and social se-
curity services:
And so the substitution of  the citizens’ social rights won during the post-war period 
with the privatization and commodification ran parallel to the emergence of  a new form 
of  democracy that Crouch defines as “post-democracy” in which political participation 
is redefined as entertainment and unfastened from political, especially politico-economic, 
decision making (Streeck 2013: 95).
Thus the action of  the State is financed by debt, following the interest of  
those who own the financial wealth. Additionally, with all due respect to dem-
ocratic, reformist and progressive utopia that attribute the State a neutral role 
in the conflict between those who own and those who do not, those who draw 
their income from capital:
have all the interest that the State not only leaves the money available to them as owners, 
but that it takes it back as credit, preserves it on their behalf, paying the interest for 
what has been burrowed instead of  confiscated, and lastly that gives them the possibility 
to hand it down to the next generation so as to keep it in the family, at which point estate 
taxes will have become insignificant. And so the State, as a debtor State, contributes 
persistently to the perpetuation of  the social stratification and inequality that derives 
from it. At the same time it subordinates itself  and its activity to the control of  its 
creditors, represented in the form of  “markets”. This control is exercised alongside the 
democratic control of  citizens, maybe overlapping or eliminating it as is happening at 
the moment (Streeck 2013: 99-100).
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The de-democratization of  capitalism, or the triumph of  capitalism over de-
mocracy, of  a monist economic system over a pluralist and open one such as 
yesterday’s mixed economy, translates into the freeing of  capitalist accumu-
lation from politics and the possible remedies that it might have introduced.
Here we get a glimpse of  the Berlinian figure of  the “hedgehog” (Berlin 
1953), a metaphorical subject that traces everything back to one, universal 
principle capable of  making sense and giving direction to life and history: for 
capital, this principle is the maximization of  the profitability of  investment. 
And if  this principle collides with the democratic one of  social justice – an 
object constantly debated and negotiated between different positions and in-
terests, and thus in itself  the fruit of  a pluralistic process of  definition and 
redefinition – then what needs to be reconfigured is democracy. This is true 
also in view of  the fact that the rational alternative, «a democracy without 
capitalism, or without capitalism as we know it» (Streeck 2013: 200), has yet 
to be defined.
184 MonisMs and PluralisMs in the history of Political and social Models
bIblIography
Arienzo, A., La governance, Ediesse, Roma, 2013.
Badiou et al., Qu’est-ce qu’un peuple?, La Fabrique éditions, Paris, 2013. 
Baran, P. and Sweezy, P., Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economy and Social 
Order, Monthly Review Press, London-New York, 1967.
Belligni, S.,“Pluralismo”, in d’Orsi, A. (ed.), Gli ismi della politica. 52 voci per ascoltare il 
presente, Viella, Roma, 2010: 363-371.
Berlin, I., The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of  History, Weidenfeld & 
Nicols, London, 1953.
Bihr, A., Du «Grand Soir» à «l’alternative». Le mouvement ouvrier européen en crise, Les Edi-
tions ouvrières, Paris, 1991.
Bobbio, N., Pluralismo, in Id. et al. (ed.), Dizionario di politica, Utet, Torino: 789-794, 
1990 (first edition 1983).
Bobbio, N., Teoria generale della politica, Einaudi, Torino, 1999.
Burroni, L., Capitalismi a confronto. Istituzioni e regolazione dell’economia nei paesi europei, il 
Mulino, Bologna, 2016.
“Capitalism and democracy”, «Teoria politica», IV, 2014:23-261.
Crouch, C., Post-democracy, Polity Press, 2004 (first Italian edition, 2003).
— Making Capitalism Fit for Society, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2013.
Croziet, M., Huntington, S. P. and Watanuki, J., The Crisis of  Democracy: Report on the 
Governability of  Democracies to the Trilateral Commission, New York University 
Press, New York, 1975.
Dahl, R.A., Dilemmas of  pluralist democracy, Yale University Press, New York-London, 1982.
Dahrendorf, R., Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Routledge, London, 1959 
(first German edition 1957).
Held, D., Democracy and the Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995.
Manin, B., The Principles of  Representative Government, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1997. 
Mastropaolo, A., Is democracy a lost cause? Paradoxes of  an imperfect invention, translated by 
Clare Tame, ECPR press Colchester, 2012 (first Italian edition 2011).
Matteucci, N., “Pluralismo”, in Enciclopedia delle scienze sociali, Istituto dell’Enciclopedia 
Italiana, Roma, 1996.
Mattick, P., Marx and Keynes: The Limits of  the Mixed Economics, Extending Horizons 
Books, Boston, 1969.
Pazé, V., In nome del popolo. Il problema democratico, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2011.
Pizzorno, A., I soggetti del pluralismo. Classi, partiti, sindacati, il Mulino, Bologna, 1980.
Rosanvallon, P., La contre-démocratie. La politique à l’âge de la défiance, Seuil, Paris, 2006.
Democratic pluralism anD capitalist monism 185
— Democratic Legitimacy: impartiality, reflexivity, proximity, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2011. 
— La legittimità democratica, Rosemberg & Sellier, Torino, 2015 (first French edition 2008).
Rosenau, J. N and Czempiel, E. O. (eds.), Governance Without Government: Order and 
Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Van Reybrouck, D., Against Elections: The Case for Democracy, The Bodley Head, London, 
2016 (first Flemish edition, 2013).

Chapter Thirteen
the probleM of true MonIsM 
and fake pluralIsM In noaM choMsky’s 
polItIcal thought
Sara Lagi
13.1 IntroducIng noaM choMsky: 
l Ibertar Ian socIalIst and anarchIst
Recognized as an internationally prominent linguist, father of  Transforma-
tional Generative Grammar, Professor emeritus of  Linguistics at M.I.T., 
Noam Chomsky was born in Philadelphia in 1928 into a Jewish Russian fam-
ily. He is considered a militant and anarchist intellectual, who has, over time, 
become a point of  reference for no-global and radical movements (Barsky 
1997; Kinna 2012: 133-134)1.
Although he has always rejected the idea of  an interconnection between 
his linguistic theory and his political ideals, it is Marcus Raskin who reminds 
us that Chomsky’s scientific interests in linguistics should be taken seriously 
into account when analyzing his political thought. Chomsky’s linguistic theory, 
1 In bio and bibliographical terms, a good and reliable research tool for investigating Chomsky’s 
work is the official web-site: www.chomsky.info 
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which was systematically elaborated for the first time in his Ph.d. Dissertation 
entitled Syntactic Structures (1955), is based on the idea that the intelligibility of  a 
language is not so much determined by peculiar rules which vary according to 
the language being considered, as by a deeper structure, a «universal grammar» 
(Chomsky: 1957; Smith a 2005: 21 f). Raskin thinks that Chomsky’s theory on 
generative transformational grammar and his political view share the common 
principle of  «universality»: 
one side of  the Chomsky strip is innateness which presents humanity with the gift of  
language and therefore of  communication. Follow that strip of  universality, you will 
note that there is imprinted on the strip a capacity that allows for rationality and moral 
action that can catalyze humanity’s benign social purpose (Raskin 2014: 9).
In other terms – according to Raskin – as a linguist, Chomsky theorizes a 
«universal grammar», as a political militant and thinker he writes and discusses 
about a universal entity, i.e. mankind who tries to find and carry out a better 
and just form of  society. Raskin’s interpretation is – in my opinion – acceptable 
not only because it catches the ultimate intellectual affinity between the two 
‘souls’ of  Chomsky’s work, but also because it allows us to better grasp another 
remarkable aspect: from Chomsky’s viewpoint, the creation and consolidation 
of  a just society requires a totally renewed way of  communication, an alterna-
tive way of  delivering information to the people, which should not be condi-
tioned and determined by those with economic and political power, i.e. «the 
élite domination» (Chomsky 1988). From Chomsky’s perspective, an active role 
in delivering truth instead of  manipulated information should be played by 
intellectuals who therefore should be independent from power. Intellectuals’ 
responsibility should be to «speak the truth and expose lies». It is exactly the 
idea – clearly inspired by the Enlightenment tradition – Chomsky elaborates in 
his first relevant work on political theory, published in 1967, entitled American 
Power and the New Mandarins2, in which the intellectual is called to speak the 
truth for those without power against the privileged (Chomsky 1967). 
In all of  his writings Chomsky uses different terms to describe and indicate 
the existence of  small groups detaining any form of  centralized, unaccount-
able, undemocratic power (economic, political, social): «prosperous few», «the 
minority of  the opulent», «the privileged élite», «the privileged minority», «aris-
tocrats», «masters of  mankind»3, «established power». Objectively, Chomsky 
does not provide a fully satisfactory and precise definition of  the terms above 
mentioned; in my opinion, he tends to use them as synonyms. Even if, scien-
2 This book made Chomsky popular as a representative of  the American libertarian Left, invol-
ved at that time in a harsh opposition to the Vietnam war.
3 Chomsky derives this term from Adam Smith’s The Wealth of  the Nations (1776).
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tifically speaking, Chomsky fails to delineate them in a more substantial way, 
we can see that all of  them are related to a core political issue to him: what he 
thinks is the gap between the minority holding the power and the majority cut 
off  from it. 
Chomsky refers to the concept and word of  pluralism (social, media and 
political) but never openly to those of  monism and political or social models. 
Yet, I will seek to show how, from Chomsky’s work, a discourse emerges not 
only on pluralism but also on what I call true monism and how this discourse 
fundamentally includes Chomsky’s opposition to the American political and 
economic model. Such a model, in his opinion, unjustly depicts and represents 
the U.S. as a Nation of  economic, civil, political freedom and plurality, a land 
of  pluralism (social, economic, political, media), while concealing, in his view, 
the «élite domination» over the people. The latter, which as we are going to 
see takes different shapes, is what I define true monism. I decided to use the 
adjectives “true” and “fake” in order to better stress Chomsky’s opposition 
to the «élite domination» and to a state of  things (social, economic, political) 
that – as I am going to argue – is, in his opinion, only seemingly free and plu-
ralist. With the purpose to comprehend in what sense Chomsky develops a 
discourse on fake pluralism and true monism, it is necessary for me to sketch 
out his ideological and political profile. 
Chomsky has been defined as libertarian, a supporter of  anarcho-syndacal-
ism or simply an anarchist, engaged in the frontal critique of  an élite monop-
olizing both wealth and means of  communication, and therefore capable, in 
his opinion, of  influencing the content of  information (Edgley 2015: 45 f; Call 
2002: 10; Ragona 2013: 118-120; Smith-Allot 2016: 186 f). Regardless of  these 
many ‘labels’, it is relevant – in my opinion – to make Chomsky himself  speak 
about his political and ideal identity, because I think that his self-perception 
turns out to be useful and important in developing our thesis. Chomsky states 
about himself:
I was attracted to anarchism as a young teenager, as soon as I began to think about the 
world beyond a pretty narrow range, and haven’t seen much reason to revise those early 
attitudes since. I think it only makes sense to seek out and identify structures of  au-
thority, hierarchy, and domination in every aspect of  life, and to challenge them; unless 
a justification for them can be given, they are illegitimate, and should be dismantled, 
to increase the scope of  human freedom. That includes political power, ownership and 
management, relations among men and women, parents and children, our control over 
the fate of  future generations (the basic moral imperative behind the environmental 
movement, in my view), and much else. Naturally this means a challenge to the huge 
institutions of  coercion and control: the state, the unaccountable private tyrannies that 
control most of  the domestic and international economy, and so on (Chomsky 1995).
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Generally speaking, if  we look at his vast intellectual production we can observe 
that he has always defined himself  as a libertarian socialist and anarchist (Otero 
1982: 245 f; Peck 1987: 22). One of  the major points of  reference for delin-
eating Chomsky’s political ideals and identity is his Notes on Anarchism4, an essay 
originally written as introduction to the English edition of  the French anarchic 
intellectual Daniel Guerin’s Anarchism: from Theory to Practice (1968) and after-
wards republished in 1970 in the «New York Review of  Books». Most of  the 
concepts, ideas, principles elaborated in the Notes would be entirely or partially 
re-proposed by Chomsky in all of  his further books from Manufacturing Consent. 
The political economy of  the mass media (1988) to the recent Power Systems (2013). 
In his Notes on Anarchism Chomsky seems to be driven by one chief  purpose: 
explaining what he means by libertarian socialism, anarchism and anarchic spir-
it. There is a core idea underpinning the whole essay: Chomsky uses the term 
anarchism and libertarian socialism as perfectly synonymous. To understand the 
reason behind this, it is necessary to take into account that he traces a sort of  fil-
rouge connecting part of  liberal tradition to socialism and anarchism. He does 
so by mentioning and discussing a series of  characters who played a relevant 
role in his intellectual formation. First of  all, he recalls Bakunin and in particular 
a self-portrait of  the Russian anarchist, who said he was a «fanatic lover of  liber-
ty, the unique condition under which intelligence, dignity and human happiness 
can develop and grow». These words represent to Chomsky the «leading idea 
within the anarchist tradition» (Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 121).
The truly interesting aspect to us is to observe how Chomsky relates just 
this «leading idea» to the Enlightenment, to the philosophical and political 
tradition embodied by Rousseau, Kant and above all to Wilhelm Von Hum-
boldt. The latter, who set on one of  the most important intellectual highlights 
of  liberalism (Gray: 19952), has always been a thinker particularly significant 
in Chomsky’s eyes and frequently quoted by him (Chomsky 2005 [1970]: 121-
122). It was Von Humboldt (1767-1835) who – as we read in Notes on Anar-
chism – was able to tie up the critique of  State’s interference with humanist 
principles and values, in a coherent. Von Humboldt is in fact the main char-
acter of  another of  Chomsky’s major works dating back to 1970: Knowledge 
and Freedom (Chomsky b: 2005 [1970]). Here Chomsky recognizes two great 
merits in Von Humboldt, who actually was also a pioneer of  general linguis-
4 Obviously this is not the only work where Chomsky defines himself  as libertarian socialist 
and anarchist. Important references are also included in Peck (1987: p. 22 f), where Chomsky 
also explains why he has been focusing primarily on European Anarchists rather than American 
ones: «the American anarchist tradition at least the more articulated part of  it, is composed 
of  writers in an individualist tradition who are thinking about […] What attracts me about 
anarchism personally are the tendencies in it that try to come to grasp with the problems of  
dealing with complex organized industrial societies within a framework of  free institutions and 
structures. And the American anarchists rarely dealt with these questions».
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tics. The first is the condemnation and refusal of  an unlimited State power 
– as this key-principle was elaborated in Von Humboldt’s The Limits of  State 
Action (1792) – and the second is the emphasis on the concept of  Bildung, the 
idea that the man should express and fully develop all his potentials and skills 
(Chomsky b 2005 [1970]: 108). 
In Von Humboldt Chomsky sees a defender and representative of  «lib-
ertarian values» who was able to harmonize political theory with a particular 
vision of  human nature. In doing so, it seems to me that Chomsky is not illu-
minating us only about his idea of  Von Humboldt’s intellectual legacy but also 
about his own most intimate beliefs. In Language and Freedom Von Humboldt 
is portrayed as that thinker who saw in unlimited power into the hands of  
the State, one of  the major obstacles to the development of  human intellect, 
diversity, dignity, freedom, plurality. By emphasizing, for example, Von Hum-
boldt’s belief  in man «as a fundamentally spontaneous and creative, self-per-
fective being», whose development and intellectual enrichment can be reached 
through an education capable of  stimulating «self-fullfillment», Chomsky is 
providing us an insight to his own idea of  education and the relationship ex-
isting, in his opinion, between the latter, freedom and social progress (Rai a 
1995: 1-18; Rai b 2005: 232-239). 
It is just in this sense that we can better comprehend the reason why 
Chomsky highlights a major affinity between Von Humboldt’s idea of  edu-
cation and that professed by another thinker truly relevant to his formation, 
John Dewey (1859-1952). Chomsky has always praised the American social 
philosopher’s model of  education aiming at a truly democratic society of  «an-
ti-dogmatic» minds and citizens (Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 119-120).. Yet, if  we 
limited ourselves to considering these aspects, we would have a partial view of  
Chomsky’s intellectual formation. In Notes on Anarchism Chomsky sees in Von 
Humboldt’s ideals – as well as those professed by Rousseau and by Kant – a 
humanist and libertarian message which after the degeneration of  classical 
liberal principles «perverted into an ideology to sustain the emerging social 
order» was inherited by libertarian socialism. The latter – Chomsky states – 
should be considered «as the libertarian wing of  socialism» because it «is prop-
erly to be regarded as the inheritor of  the liberal ideals of  the Enlightenment» 
(Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 122)5.
In his portrayal of  anarchism as the meeting point of  liberalism and so-
cialism Chomsky is far from being original. He openly recalls to the work of  
5 In his interpretation of  liberalism, «perverted» by the logic of  capitalism, market-system etc. 
Chomsky seems to forget (or simply not to know) that historically speaking, from the mid 19th 
century, the liberal tradition of  political thought encountered and embraced the democratic 
principles and progressively reformed itself  – chiefly from the late 19th century – in a more 
pro-social reforms direction: a good example for that might be T.H. Green’s work.
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another major intellectual point of  reference to him: the anarcho-syndacalist 
Rudolf  Rocker (1873-1958) and his Anarcho syndacalism published for the first 
time in 1938. If  it is true, according to Chomsky, that libertarian ideals are an 
integrative part of  anarchism, it is also true for him that in its socialist con-
notation anarchism opposes the «private ownership of  the means of  produc-
tion and the wage slavery»6 in favor of  a new form of  society where – here 
Chomsky is quoting from Marx – «labor […] will become the highest want 
in life» (Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 122-124). In Notes on Anarchism, Chomsky 
openly refers to Marx and particularly to the connection established by the 
latter between «the detailed worker of  today reduced to a mere fragment of  
a man» and the existing «capitalist relations of  production» (Chomsky a 2005 
[1970]: 123-124).
Generally speaking, Chomsky’s work is characterized by several references 
to Marx’ political and economic thought – interestingly the main references 
are to Marx as author of  La Commune de Paris – even if  – as Chomsky himself  
states – his own political work substantially reflects «a little engagement with 
classical marxist tradition» (Chomsky 1995). Instead, much more frequent 
and detailed are his references to Rosa Luxemburg, Anton Pannekok, Paul 
Mattick, Herman Gorter, Rudolf  Rocker. After criticizing the «capitalist rela-
tions of  production» and the «specialization of  labor», all «degrading human 
beings» Chomsky concludes that «a consistent anarchist, then, should be a 
socialist, but a socialist of  particular sort» (Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 125). He 
emphasizes how the anarchist opposes the system which reduces man to an 
instrument for fulfilling specific goals established by economic and political 
authority, in support of  a new kind of  society where «individuals’ purposes» – 
a term he openly derives from Von Humboldt – can be carried out. The refer-
ence to Von Humboldt proves and again testifies the relevance of  this thinker 
to Chomsky’s eyes but it should not make us forget that in Chomsky’s view the 
fulfillment of  «individuals’ purposes» must be pursued and enhanced accord-
ing to a perspective of  cooperation, solidarity and creation of  free workers’ 
associations. In my opinion it is precisely in these principles (solidarity, coop-
eration, free workers’ associations) that Chomsky identifies what makes the 
anarchist «a socialist of  particular sort». More specifically, in supporting the 
implementation of  «free associations of  free producers» Chomsky declares 
to draw inspiration again from Rudolf  Rocker (Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 124). 
Chomsky’s recall to anarcho-syndacalism has a huge implication in grasping 
the meaning of  his political and ideal identity better: if  it is true – as he states 
– that anarchists refuse any form of  «alienation», and «specialized labor», it 
is also true for him that they strongly support the «appropriation of  capital 
by the whole body of  workers». Chomsky heavily insists on the fact that the 
6 Chomsky is quoting from Marx’ Capital.
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appropriation must be «direct» rather than a process led and controlled by an 
élite of  politicians acting «in the name of  the proletariat» (Chomsky a 2005 
[1970]: 125). 
In this sense, it is worth quoting a passage from Chomsky’s Preface to the 
English edition of  Rocker’s Anarcho syndacalism, vividly highlighting how this 
book and his author influenced Chomsky’s political identity and thought:
In Rocker’s [...] conception, people must take their lives and their work into their own 
hands. Only through their own struggle for liberation will ordinary people come to com-
prehend their true nature, suppressed and distorted within institutional structures de-
signed to assure obedience and subordination. Only in this way will people develop more 
humane ethical standards, “a new sense of  right”, “the consciousness of  their strength 
and their importance as a social factor in the life of  their time” and of  their capacity to 
realize the strivings of  their “inmost nature”. Such direct engagement in the work of  
social reconstruction is a prerequisite for coming to perceive this “inmost nature” and 
is the indispensable foundation upon which it can flourish (Chomsky 1989 a: VII).
It is evident how Chomsky is profoundly critical – as libertarian socialist and 
anarchist – towards any form of  «State-socialism», and «bureaucratic central-
ism», denounced, for example, by Bakunin. In that light, we can also better 
understand and situate Chomsky’s frequent references to Rosa Luxemburg’s 
critique of  the Bolshevik tendency towards the primacy of  bureaucracy, i.e. 
the absolute power and control concentrated in the hands of  the Bolshevik 
Central Committee (Chomsky c 2005 [1969]: 41). Chomsky identifies the same 
critical and anti-centralist perspective in the British Communist William Paul 
– author of  State, Its Origins and Functions (1917) – who, in his opinion, stresses 
how so-called State-socialism has hindered true democracy. Its implementa-
tion will always be negatively influenced and «limited» as long as – Chomsky 
states – «the industrial system is controlled by any form of  autocratic elite» 
(Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 128). 
His insistence on those thinkers criticizing «red bureaucracy», State-social-
ism, bureaucratic control – all considered as forms of  despotism – is clearly 
finalized to stress what he thinks is the fundamentally libertarian and humanist 
content of  anarchism. This aspect of  Chomsky’s political reflection represents 
an important premise to his critique of  «élite domination» and any form of  
power concentration in the contemporary U.S. political, economic and social 
system.
To Chomsky – libertarian socialist and anarchist – the creation of  a true 
democracy implies a totally new form of  social organization, which would 
allow the full development of  human potentials by overcoming traditional 
power systems. By reading Chomsky’ works, we can observe how he has sub-
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stantially remained loyal to his political ideals emerging, for example, from his 
Notes on Anarchism. A majority of  the beliefs, ideas and ideals discussed so far 
are included in the writings I am going to analyze. Here he denounces what he 
thinks are the obstacles on the road to a true democracy and to a just society 
of  fully developed individuals. Two of  these obstacles are, in my opinion, what 
I called at the beginning of  my paper true monism and fake pluralism.
13.2 choMsky as polItIcal thInker: true MonIsM and fake pluralIsM
The thesis I am going to propose and develop, basically consists of  two el-
ements: firstly that in Chomsky’s work a political and economic American 
model can be identified. In his Storia del pensiero politico europeo, Salvo Mastellone 
recognized three different meanings and types of  political model: 1) those 
elaborated and designed on the basis of  a specific, existing and functioning 
political system («modelli politici funzionanti») with the general purpose to use 
that model as an example to follow and imitate; those based on a past political 
system («modelli politici storici») and those created on the basis of  a utopian 
project («modelli politici utopici») (Mastellone 1993: 9).
Part of  the first definition fits into Chomsky’s work: in my opinion, 
Chomsky’s political reflection – although not explicitly – identifies an Amer-
ican political and economic model which, in his opinion, emphasizes a se-
ries of  merits and positive aspects supposed as belonging to the U.S., i.e. free 
market, pluralism (social, economic, political, media), solid democratic institu-
tions, which actually – in his opinion – do not correspond to reality. I think, as 
I am going to show in the following pages, that the problem of  true monism 
and fake pluralism in Chomsky’s political work can be situated ideally within 
the discrepancy he establishes between what he thinks is the true American 
political and economic system and the American political and economic mod-
el spread in and out of  the national borders. Both severely criticized by him. 
Having said that, the point for me is to seek to answer the following questions: 
How and to what extent can we talk about the problem of  true monism and fake pluralism 
in Chomsky’s political thought?, And why is it relevant to discuss about it? 
I think that the problem of  true monism as well as of  fake pluralism, inter-
connected with Chomsky’s critical attitude towards the American political and 
economic model, develops and articulates on three specific macro-levels of  
reflection: 1. the critique of  the American free market system; 2. the in depth 
critique of  American mass communication system; 3. the reflection on what 
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Chomsky defines as the gradual impairment of  American democratic institu-
tions and life. In his The Prosperous Few and the Restless Many (1993), Chomsky 
poses the problem of  free market principles in the U.S. In his view, there is 
an evident but unmentioned gap characterizing the American economic sys-
tem: that between the rhetoric of  a true free market, free competition among 
different subjects all sharing equal opportunities, economic pluralism – all ele-
ments praised by the official American political and economic model – and the 
reality of  a growing predominance (economic and even political) of  multina-
tionals that – in his view – has been fostered by the U.S. government itself  by 
means of  special protectionist measures (Chomsky 1993). I think that exactly 
this contrast emerging from Chomsky’s work of  1993, can be read as between 
fake pluralism and true monism. Not only in his book of  1993 but in all of  
his writings we can observe that Chomsky is as much in favor of  a clearer and 
more effective governmental role in promoting good public education and 
social insurance7 as he is against government support to the interests of  the 
«prosperous few»: i.e. the multinationals and their managers, by subsidizing 
specific industrial fields often, according to Chomsky, closely linked with the 
Pentagon:
Internationally, the Pentagon was an intervention force, but domestically it was a method 
by which the government could coordinate the private economy, provide welfare to major 
corporations, subsidize them, arrange the flow of  taxpayer money to research and deve-
lopment, provide a state guaranteed market for excess production, target advanced indu-
stries for development, etc. Just about every successful and flourishing aspect of  the US 
economy has relied on this kind of  government involvement (Chomsky 1993: 346).. 
Chomsky emphasizes how this kind of  government involvement has turned 
into a great opportunity for the «prosperous few» to increase their wealth: 
So you could say that one alternative to the free market system is the one we already 
have, because we often don’t rely on the market where powerful interests would be da-
maged. Our actual economic policy is a mixture of  protectionist, interventionist, free 
market and liberal measures. And it’s directed primarily to the needs of  those who 
implement social policy, who are mostly the wealthy and the powerful (Chomsky 1993: 
346).
In this sense, the U.S. government involvement would show how the true 
American economic system is – according to Chomsky – far from being based 
on a coherent free market mechanism: 
7 See for example: Chomsky (1969).
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For example, the US has always had an active state industrial policy, just like every 
other industrial country. It’s been understood that a system of  private enterprise can 
survive only if  there is extensive government intervention. It’s needed to regulate di-
sorderly markets and protect private capital from the destructive effects of  the market 
system, and to organize a public subsidy for targeting advanced sectors of  industry, etc 
(Chomsky 1993: 346).
In Chomsky’s critical analysis the American economic system emerges as be-
ing characterized by what I would define as a truly monist logic covered up 
by the supposedly pluralist free market principles. His reflection on the power 
of  multinationals should be correctly situated within the context of  a general 
critique of  neo-liberal policies, which represent the backbone of  current glo-
balization (Ritzer-Dean: 2015). The latter, in Chomsky’s opinion, contributed 
to extend «the Third World model to industrial countries» which means the 
growing gap between «prosperous few and the restless many». It is just the 
prosperous élite who – in his view – has found a major point of  reference 
and support in the main International Governance institutions such as MIF, 
Nafta, G-7, and even the EU Bank which, according to Chomsky, «answer 
basically to the transnational corporations, international banks, etc. All these 
structures raise decision making to the executive level, leaving what’s called 
a “democratic deficit” – parliaments and populations with less influence» 
(Chomsky 1993: 347). 
The international institutions above mentioned should correspond to a 
logic of  pluralism (pluralism of  voices, interests, international actors), where-
as they conversely embody and exercise what we could define a monist kind 
of  economic and political power. Monist because, in Chomsky’s view, these 
institutions concentrate in their hands a huge amount of  power in contrast 
with the interests of  the many (Chomsky 1993: 344). In the U.S as well as on 
a global scale Chomsky denounces thus the existence of  that «autocratic elite» 
he opposed in his Notes on Anarchism. 
His critique of  multinationals’ power and that of  international governance 
bodies can be related to the second macro-level of  Chomsky’s reflection. His 
repeated critical statements on how profoundly distorted the American free 
market system is and on the role played by government intervention seem to 
imply, according to Chomsky that, the American political and economic mod-
el, as it as been designed and promoted inside and outside the U.S, is based on 
a fake form of  pluralism hiding a true state of  monism. This might be, in my 
opinion, one of  the keys to interpreting Chomsky’s attack on the U.S media 
system which he defines a refined and sophisticated mechanism whose pur-
pose is to indoctrinate people and change citizens into consumers, convincing 
them that a government of  the people or for the people cannot and must not 
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exist (Chomsky: 2013 a [2011]). To this end, in my opinion, Chomsky’s focus 
on the U.S. mass media communication system directly connects the second 
level of  our reflection to the third one concerning the impairment and weak-
ening of  American democratic life.
In Chomsky’s view, the process of  indoctrination has taken place through 
what he defines as a «propaganda model» based on a systematic manipulation 
of  language and people’s critical ability and skills. He elaborates the connec-
tion between media-indoctrination and power in one of  his most important 
works, where he also employs his knowledge and understanding of  linguistics, 
Manufacturing consent (1988) (Chomsky-Hermann: 1988)8. 
Starting from the idea that «mass media serve as a system of  communica-
tion […] in order to integrate (the populace) into the institutional structure 
of  the larger society and to fullfil this role requires a systematic propaganda» 
(Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 61), Chomsky states that such propaganda serves 
to strengthen the «élite domination», while weakening democracy. More pre-
cisely, he thinks that the «propaganda model» set up in the U.S. has distorted 
and altered democratic principles because, while pretending to support and 
nurture a state of  freedom and pluralism, it would be actually based on a 
precise strategy (economic and political). I would define this monist because 
its main purpose would be, in Chomsky’s view, to preserve the power in the 
hands of  a very small group of  people. Hence, according to Chomsky’s inter-
pretation, the U.S. media system can be considered an integrative part of  the 
true American political model. In other terms, a contrast seems to take shape 
in Chomsky’s pages: on the one hand, a mass communication and media sys-
tem supposedly pluralist, open, free, articulated, far from any form of  censor-
ship, as depicted by the official American political model, on the other a mass 
communication and media system monopolized and controlled by a small élite 
of  power. A contrast, in my opinion, between fake pluralism and true mo-
nism. In Manufacturing Consent, it becomes of  great relevance for Chomsky 
to understand and explain how concretely the «propaganda model» works. 
In doing so he identifies five special «filters», by means of  which the «elite 
domination» reinforces and imposes itself  on the people, neutralizing dissent 
(Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 62-63). 
It is Chomsky to stress how ancient and deep the roots of  the propaganda 
model are. With regard to this aspect, he relates the failure of  many British late 
19th century working class newspapers to «various taxes designed to drive out 
radical media by raising the costs» (Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 63)9. A strategy 
8 Chomsky wrote the book in collaboration with Edward S. Hermann (1925-): Professor Eme-
ritus of  Finance at the University of  Pennsylvania and media analyst.
9 Chomsky and Hermann refer to Power without Responsibility (1981) by J. Curran and J. Seaton 
as one of  their major sources for the history of  the British news media from the Eighteenth 
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created and implemented by the «autocratic élite» whose major purpose was 
to strengthen its social, political and economic control over the people («élite 
domination»). 
Yet, the use of  State intervention to eliminate specific targets, such as radi-
cal media, proved to be unsuccessful. That was the reason why it was replaced 
by a market-oriented kind of  media resulting in the «industrialization of  the 
press» which – as Chomsky states – means that over time the media has need-
ed a growing amount of  financial investments and only those receiving them 
have been able to survive. This situation shows, according to Chomsky, the 
ever-closer connection between two realms that should be independent from 
each other: the media, on the one hand, and the «corporate power», on the 
other. As for this aspect, Chomsky identifies a third subject playing, in his 
opinion, a major role in the media industry, i.e. the government. All media 
companies require «government licenses and franchises» and they can obtain 
them as long as they are able to foster and promote their ties with the gov-
ernment, through a lobbying strategy. These ties in Chomsky’s view, are also 
functional to media corporations, which would use their relations with gov-
ernment actors to influence a series of  key-aspects for their business: «interest 
rates, labor policies, business taxes, enforcement or non-enforcement of  an-
ti-trust laws». But just this complex and multi-level interdependence, depicted 
as an integrative component of  the U.S. media system and that of  the major 
Western countries, has contributed, in Chomsky’s opinion, to erode any form 
of  true media pluralism. In doing so it has hindered ever-more, any form of  
dissent and critical skills, dealing a serious blow to American democratic life 
(Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 73-74). 
To Chomsky, another aspect – corresponding to the second «filter» of  his 
«propaganda model» – should be carefully taken into account: the massive 
role played by «the advertising license». Parallel to the aftermath of  big media 
corporations, the number of  media companies whose publishing success is 
largely determined by their ability to attract ads has increased, resulting in 
an increasingly inevitable «marginalization» of  those newspapers, Tv, radio 
etc. whose survival is actually based on the «revenue from sales». According 
to Chomsky’s analysis, the strong (economic) influence exercised by adver-
tising is another means by which the «élite domination», imposes, preserves 
and strengthens its interests and in doing so it impacts people’s mentality and 
attitude by fostering a kind of  business-oriented media system rather than 
«cultural-critical programming» (Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 74-78).
Besides the prominent role played by media corporations and ads in shap-
ing the media world, Chomsky identifies a third element (the «third filter») 
which, in his opinion, works on an even more subtle and complex level, i.e. 
century to the present (Chomsky-Hermann 1988).
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the problem of  «sourcing the media». So far, Chomsky has explained what he 
thinks are two major (negative) forces drastically limiting and distorting true 
media and information pluralism by means of  an essentially economic and fi-
nancial strategy, which punishes marginal and often dissident newspapers, TV, 
radio. However, in Chomsky’s opinion, the first two identified «filters» would 
be nothing without the ability of  finding the ‘right’ and ‘proper’ sources of  
information:
the media need a steady, reliable flow of  raw material of  news. […] they cannot 
– Chomsky writes – afford to have reporters and cameras at all places where im-
portant stories may break. Economics dictates that they concentrate their resources 
where important rumors and leaks abound and where regular press conferences are held 
(Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 79).
The ‘where’ to which Chomsky is referring is a group of  places and loca-
tions that we might define representative and highly symbolic of  the «élite 
domination», i.e. «The White House, the Pentagon, the State Department» 
along with «business corporations», whose chief  point of  strength – Chomsky 
states – is their ability to grant a regular flow of  news (Chomsky-Hermann 
1988: 78-79). If  the first three «filters» deal with a market-oriented strategy, the 
remaining two («flak and the enforces»; «anticommunism as a control mech-
anism») are more openly driven by ideological factors. With «flak» Chomsky 
refers to «negative responses to a media statement or program. It may take 
the form of  letters, telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and 
bills before Congress and other modes of  complaint, threat, punitive action» 
(Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 86). According to Chomsky, the fourth «filter» 
corresponds thus to a deliberate, direct, intentional, open attempt to dras-
tically discourage and even eliminate that media programming perceived as 
dangerous by the «established power». The last of  the five filters has been 
recently updated by Chomsky. When Manufacturing consent was published for 
the first time, the Cold War did still exist and therefore he identified in «the 
ideology of  anti-communism» a vital and strategically relevant target for the 
U.S. (Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 86-89). In the new edition of  the book (2001) 
following to the end of  bi-polarism, «anti-communism» was replaced by «an-
ti-terrorism» and the War on Terror as one of  the major current social control 
mechanisms (Chomsky-Hermann: 2001)10.  
In the light of  this reflection, Chomsky states that, through a series of  
special and well-working «filters», the «autocratic élite» has not just been able 
(in the U.S. and outside) to become the main source of  information but also 
– or even mainly – the subject manufacturing what people must and must not 
10 As for the updating of  the propaganda model theory, see also: Chomsky-Hermann (2008).
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know, while using this huge power to protect its own interests (Chomsky-Her-
mann 1988: 79 f)11. 
It seems to me that in Manufacturing consent the élite monopolizing eco-
nomic and political power creates an actual state of  true monism (in terms of  
media system and not only) covered and hidden by fake pluralism. As I have 
tried to show, Chomsky insists greatly on how the people are manipulated and 
indoctrinated by the «media-industry». It is the indoctrination created through 
the «propaganda model» and more precisely through the above-mentioned 
«filters» that, in his opinion, has increasingly weakened democratic sovereignty 
and the principle that the people rule. To this end, «the manufacture of  con-
sent is the antithesis of  democracy» because, in Chomsky’s view, it generates 
from the «attempts at the control and manipulation of  democratic politics» 
(Wilkin 1997: 4; Catanzaro 2013: 194 f).
When the dominating few use their material power to condition, lead and 
determine information, the space of  democratic freedom is severely harmed: 
according to Chomsky, the weaker the principle of  democratic sovereignty is, 
the stronger the «domination élite» is. In his perspective, this kind of  mech-
anism has reached such a refined, subtle and complex form that the people 
themselves, who are the main target, paradoxically change into an integral 
part of  it: he stresses how the people internalize it, without being conscious 
of  it. The conclusions he draws are pessimistic the most perverse outcome 
of  the situation he delineates in Manufacturing Consent is Consent without Consent. 
This is the title of  another popular work of  Chomsky’s, relevant for me in 
order to elaborate my thesis. Consent without Consent was originally published 
in 1996, during the primary season for the American presidential elections. 
Chomsky identifies what he thinks is one of  the most striking aspects of  that 
season: «money and publicity were present in abundance, but not voters or 
much difference in outcome» (Chomsky 1996: 417). Yet, his primary interest 
is not so much to focus on 1996 primary season as to reflect on the state of  
American democracy. Recalling one of  his intellectual points of  reference, Da-
vid Hume, according to whom «the governors have nothing to support them 
but opinion», Chomsky introduces the concept of  «consent without consent». 
11 The topic of  manufacturing consent is a long-term problem in Chomsky’s intellectual pro-
duction; a problem he has largely discussed either in many of  his public speeches. In 2013, he 
held a speech at the East Stroudsborough University in Pennsylvania, where he addressed the 
issue of  «global warming and common good», while referring to how, in his opinion, almost any 
kind of  information, including that about global warming would be heavily conditioned and di-
storted. In particular, he criticized the recently enforced Environmental Literacy Improvement 
Act, whose major objective would be to promote environmental education in American scho-
ols, and supported by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which is financed, 
as Chomsky states, by «lobbying organizations of  the fossil fuels». See: Chomsky (2013 b). As 
for the manufacture of  consent see also: Chomsky (1989 a).
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Not only, in my opinion, is this one of  the chief  components underpinning 
both true monism and fake pluralism, but it also allows us to deepen and 
better grasp his idea of  democracy, and more precisely, what Chomsky thinks 
democracy is. Like in most of  his writings, Chomsky uses many specific and 
detailed examples to elaborate his critique. Firstly, he refers to the Sixth Circuit 
Court of  Appeals which «denied an appeal by workers who lost their job when 
Ohio plants were moved to states with cheaper labor» by noting «States and 
counties in the U.S. compete with each other for companies contemplating re-
location» (Chomsky 1996: 429). According to the Court, the labor laws could 
neither «discourage such relocations, nor bar closing unionized plants in favor 
of  an nonunion plant in another part of  the country or in a foreign country 
as contemplated by the NAFTA» (Chomsky 1996: 429-430). Chomsky relates 
the judgment of  the Sixth Circuit Court of  Appeals to that on Allen vs Die-
bold Inc.,12 dating back to 1994 and noting that:
Congress and the Courts have made the judgment that […] our capitalistic system, 
Darwinian though it may be, will not discourage companies from locating on the basis 
of  their own calculations of  factors relating to efficiency and competitiveness. The rules 
of  marketplace govern. By so reflecting commercial interests, the institutions of  govern-
ment serve – according to current legal and economic theory – the long-term best interests 
as a whole. That is the basic social policy the country has opted to follow (Chomsky 
1996: 429).
Chomsky provides further examples with a more specifically political nature. 
On the basis of  United States and World Court U.S Department State Bureau of  
Public Affairs of  1985, he mentions, for example, the U.S government decision 
in 1980 to withdraw «its compulsory jurisdiction of  the World Court» as a 
response to the fact that a growing number of  U.N. Member states were no 
longer aligned with the American leadership and began to openly oppose U.S. 
international conduct (Chomsky 1996: 428). More precisely – as Chomsky 
stresses – one of  the most important international questions regarded the 
American interventions in Nicaragua, condemned by the World Court as «il-
legal». Chomsky interprets these events as a means to the preservation and 
empowerment of  what he calls «traditional structure of  power» (Chomsky 
1996: 428). This «structure» can take a variety of  different shapes: it might be 
embodied by the U.S government which, thanks to its military, economic and 
political power, can withdraw from World Court jurisdiction, or by the U.S. 
Courts whose judgments, according to Chomsky, are actually against workers 
although they seem to be justified on the basis of  a (fake, to him) respect for 
12 The case concerned the employer’s decision to replace «two unionized Ohio manufacturing 
plants with the two new non-unions plants in Virginia and South Carolina». www.justa.com 
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pluralism of  interests and demands (companies, workers, commercial inter-
ests). The point is that, in his opinion, in both cases we are dealing with deci-
sions justified and supported in the name of  national interest or, specifically 
like in the case of  the Ohio workers, in the name of  a market-oriented econ-
omy, which actually – as Chomsky states – seems to be applied only to lower 
classes or, like in the case of  Allen vs Diebner, in the name of  a social policy 
considered good and just for the whole society. To Chomsky all this becomes 
excellent proof  of  how relevant, even vital economic and political decisions 
actually reflect the «élite domination» based on alleged understanding of  what 
is objectively right and wrong for the people, for those who have no power, i.e. 
through a practice that Chomsky defines the undemocratic «consent without 
consent». (Chomsky 1996: 428-429).
To Chomsky, the issue of  «consent without consent» is a long-term Ameri-
can problem that he traces back to a substantial and persistent fear of  the peo-
ple, perceived as threat to the élite. An historically relevant example for that 
comes, in his opinion, from the thought, work and political engagement of  
one of  the American Funding Fathers, James Madison. Despite his frequent 
references to the Constitutional values and the principle of  freedom, Madi-
son’s primary objective – in Chomsky’s opinion – was to serve the «opulent 
minority» with property rights and whose interests were identified with «the 
common good». Showing his sensitivity for linguistic matters, Chomsky criti-
cizes Madison’s defense of  «rights of  property» by observing that technically 
«[this] formulation is misleading. There are no rights of  property, only rights 
to property, which are rights of  persons standing alongside other rights (to 
freedom, to speech etc.)». In the use of  «rights of  property» instead of  «rights 
to property» Chomsky identifies what he thinks was Madison’s true, final 
purpose, i.e.: «provide special and additional guarantees for the rights of  one 
class of  persons, property owners, thus protecting the minority of  the opulent 
against the majority» (Chomsky 1996: 432). It is in this sense that, according 
to Chomsky, we should interpret Madison’s emphasis on the importance of  
providing political rights on the basis of  property rights and economic wealth. 
In his Consent without Consent Chomsky is decisive: he sees the backbone of  the 
entire true American economic and political system in Madison’s defense of  
private property rights. Yet, according to Chomsky, a relevant gap does exist 
between Madison and the current American ruling class. He reminds how to 
Madison, the country had to be ruled by men who had to be not only wealthy 
and economically independent but also wise, well educated, capable of  de-
fending public interests and ready to sacrifice their own for the good of  the 
nation (Chomsky 1996: 432-433). In contrast to this view, the contemporary 
American political and economic system is depicted by Chomsky as ruled by 
«huge, uncountable private tyrannies». Chomsky’s comment is harsh:
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they largely dominate, have gained substantial control over the domestic and interna-
tional economy as well as the informational and doctrinal systems, bringing to mind 
another Madison’s concern: “that a popular Government, without popular information 
or the means of  acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy, or perhaps both 
(Chomsky 1996: 433).
In Chomsky’s view, the post-Madisonian America has gradually turned into 
the cradle of  what I would define a true monism, whose development and 
aftermath seem to be connected, in his analysis, with the centralization of  
economic power as well as of  media and information systems into the hands 
of  the few. It is not by chance that in Consent without Consent Chomsky refers 
to Jefferson and Tocqueville sharing, in his view, the same concern for the es-
tablishing of  a new form of  tyranny in the U.S., led by an «opulent minority»:
Thomas Jefferson, who warned of  the rise of  a “single and splendid government of  an 
aristocracy, founded on banking institutions and moneyed corporations” which would 
enable the few to “riding and ruling over the plundered ploughman and beggared ye-
omanry”, destroying democracy and restoring a form of  absolutism if  given free rein 
[…] Or Alexis de Tocqueville, who like Jefferson and Adam Smith, regarded equality 
of  condition as an important feature of  a free and just society. He saw the dangers of  a 
“permanent inequality of  conditions” and an end to democracy if  “the manufacturing 
aristocracy which is growing up under our eyes”, “one of  the harshest that has ever 
existed in the world”, should escape its confines. (Chomsky 1996: 420).
Most of  Chomsky’s critical reflections on his country, which we have tried 
to read and interpret in terms of  true monism and fake pluralism, have been 
stimulated and inspired not only by his own political and ideal beliefs but 
more concretely by concrete historical events and changes: the Vietnam war, 
the Free Speech Movement, the birth of  the U.S as global power, the outbreak 
of  international tensions due to Islamic terrorism and 9/11, global warming 
and last but not least the massive financial crisis of  2008-2009. The latter, in 
particular, was seen by Chomsky as an opportunity to revitalize and re boost 
American civil society, making positive forces emerge. Chomsky’s focus on 
the recent American economic breakdown shows how we can identify another 
major issue in his thought, that is, true pluralism as opposed to the fake one 
and true monism.
It seems to me that in Chomsky’s thought true pluralism is linked to the 
principle of  popular sovereignty, solidarity, cooperation, i.e. ideals that, as we 
read in Notes on Anarchism, Chomsky traces back to libertarian socialism and 
anarchic tradition. Looking at American society, he identifies a series of  forces 
and groups whose major merit – in his opinion – is to make these principles 
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circulate again. To his eyes, the best example for that is the birth of  the Occu-
py Wall Street movement, established as reaction to 2008-2009 financial crisis. 
Chomsky has devoted great attention to it in recent years as witnessed in the 
book Occupy in 2012 and in many lectures and interviews he has held on this 
topic across the U.S (Smith-Allott 2016: 307 f)13. Chomsky’s interpretation of  
the Occupy movement becomes comprehensible if  we take into account all 
we have discussed about his political thought so far. Behind his analysis of  the 
Occupy activism there is again a critique substantially similar to that of  the 
Prosperous few and the Restless Many. In the movement, he sees a force capable of  
regaining public attention to the problem of  rising economic inequality: 
one of  the really remarkable and almost spectacular successes of  the Occupy movement 
- Chomsky states – is that it has simply changed the entire framework of  discussions 
of  many years. There were things that were sort of  known, but in the margins, hidden, 
which are now right up in front of  – such as the imagery of  the 99% and the 1%; and 
the dramatic facts of  sharply rising inequality over the past 30 years, with wealth being 
concentrated in actually small fraction of  1% of  the population (Chomsky: 2012).
Although Chomsky thinks that the movement has to tackle with many differ-
ent challenges on many different fronts, he is also convinced – as libertarian 
socialist and anarchist – that it should capitalize what he considers as its major 
point of  strength, i.e. its ability to:
create communities – real functioning communities of  mutual support, democratic in-
terchange, care for one another, and so on. This is highly significant, especially in a 
society like ours in which people tend to be very isolated and neighborhoods are broken 
down, community structures have broken down, people are some kind alone (Chomsky: 
2012).
Chomsky’s suggestions about concretely what the movement should do and 
what methods it should employ to spread are objectively too general and not 
fully satisfactory in strategic terms but what is really relevant to me is how 
his comments can be read in the light of  the contrast between fake and true 
pluralism. In fact, the «real achievement» of  the movement is, according to 
Chomsky, the creation of  «bonds» and «associations» being formed by people 
13 Occupy collects a series of  Chomsky’s writings, public speeches and intersections with the 
Occupy Movement: 1. the lecture he gave at Occupy Boston in 2011; 2. an interview about the 
meaning of  Occupy; 3. a conference call with militants of  the Occupy Movement; 4. the spe-
ech on Occupying Foreign Policy at the University of  Maryland; 6. a tribute to his friend and 
co-agitator Howard Zinn (1922-2010), historian, author of  A People’s History of  the United States 
(1980), political activist for the civil rights movement and militant against the war in Vietnam.
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and which «should be brought into the wider community» (Chomsky: 2012). 
In his public speech at the Boston Occupy Movement (October 2011) he 
particularly emphasizes the relevance and the revolutionary potential of  the 
movement in terms of  creating associating structures, «cooperative communi-
ties» (Chomsky: 2011). In doing so he directly relates to the ideals expressed, 
for example, in his Notes on Anarchism when he opposed the truly anarchic and 
libertarian spirit to any form of  centralism. 
To the fake pluralist American political and economic model, Chomsky 
seems to oppose the truly pluralist component of  the Occupy movement (as 
a new political and social model), just because the latter has been able – in his 
opinion – to create a network of  groups and associations working horizontal-
ly rather than vertically, i.e. democratically, giving voice to a variety of  ideas, 
proposals, adopting principles of  solidarity and direct participation to public 
life. Regardless of  the progressive marginalization of  the Occupy Movement, 
it is relevant to me to stress Chomsky’s interpretation of  it: he sees in it an at-
tempt to carry out true democracy. This is particularly clear if  we take into ac-
count his lecture at Columbia University (December 2013). On that occasion 
Chomsky defined the idea of  Common Good (Chomsky: 1998), as the search for 
finding «social arrangements that are conducive to people’s rights and welfare, 
and to fulfilling their just aspirations» (Chomsky: 2014).
In his opinion, these «social arrangements» can be set up within a truly 
democratic system which he defines using the words of  Rudolf  Rocker: «an 
alliance of  free groups of  men and women based on cooperative labor and a 
planned administration of  things in the interest of  the community». It seems 
to me that, in part, it is through Rocker’s words Chomsky sees the Occupy 
Movement and relates to it. Chomsky’s political thought is based on the trust 
that a true libertarian, just, democratic society can be established only from the 
bottom-up. In this sense, we can identify a direct link to the ideals and beliefs 
professed in his Notes on Anarchism. From his critical analysis of  the media 
system as well as from his open support to the Occupy movement, his idea of  
pluralism (true and fake) and monism (true) takes shape. In my opinion, in his 
work, true pluralism is where people come together with their ideas, poten-
tials, variety of  aspirations and search for a just society, a true democracy and 
regaining the public sphere in the name of  a shared political and social project, 
whereas monism (true) and pluralism (fake) are where a small group of  the 
privileged concentrate all the power in their hands, to the detriment of  the 
people and therefore democratic principles, imposing their view and interests 
from top to bottom. 
Yet, regardless of  the righteousness (or lack thereof) of  Chomsky’s crit-
ical reflection (Collier-Horowitz: 2004), Chomsky seems in fact to outline 
an American political and economic model in which fake pluralism becomes 
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functional to the preservation of  a power he considers profoundly monist, i.e. 
vertically based and controlled by a «prosperous few» with the purpose to cut 
off  and neutralize the majority: 1% vs 99% (Chomsky: 2012); in other terms, 
a profoundly undemocratic system to his eyes. 
Fake pluralism becomes – and is depicted by him – as the ‘mask’ of  true 
monism and true pluralism turns into one of  the chief  ‘antidotes’ against the 
first two. An antidote in favor of  what he thinks should be a well-functioning 
democracy, i.e. a social and political reality based on freedom and solidarity, on 
people’s ability to associate, give voice to their ideas and demands.
Chomsky’s political vision – regardless of  its objective legitimacy or lack 
of  it – contributes, in my opinion, to showing how problematic and complex 
finding a univocal, one-sided meaning of  pluralism and monism can be. This 
especially if  we address both – as all the authors of  the essays here collected 
have done – in relation to the political thought of  single and specific authors 
who inevitably bring their own intellectual formation, specific historical-polit-
ical influences and sensitivity into their work. In this context a question arises 
again: what monism and what pluralism in the history of  political and social models?
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